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This doctoral thesis is a work of poetics, which speculatively casts into the future of possible 
writing, to ask how contemporary innovative poetry can enact or contribute towards political 
resistance. More specifically, it asks how poetry that finds its conditions materially and 
ideologically oppressive might imagine alternative realities through the language of those 
conditions, and contribute to their realisation. 
The stakes and difficulties of resistance are established through an Althusserian account of 
ideology as universal and subject-forming. The question of poetic resistance is not how poetry 
can directly alter material conditions, but how poetry contribute to falteringly shifting those 
conditions by critiquing and re-forming the ideological premises for action and relation. 
This takes the form first of a theoretical account of this problem and prospective solutions, 
integrating preceding radical poetics with a range of theoretical positions. This lays the 
groundwork for close engagements with works by four contemporary poets: Sean Bonney 
(1969-2019), Lisa Robertson (b. 1961), Bhanu Kapil (b. 1968) and Anna Mendelssohn (1948-
2009). 
This thesis contends that previous innovative poetics, while heavily invested in resistance, 
have focussed on poetry’s ability to destabilise conceptual and linguistic frameworks, leaving 
under-discussed the possibility of gesturing towards new possible frameworks, relations and 
subjectivities. 
It instead builds a tentatively propositional poetics, which takes the subject as a primary site 
of struggle. Resistive potential and instability in the cycle of ideological reproduction is found 
in divergent, not-yet-intelligible affective experiences, pains and desires. A poetry whose 
forms disrupt conventional, ideologically-formed limits of coherence might, I suggest, best 
gesture to, evoke or constitute these affective resistive potentials. This poetry posits and 
attempts forms of communication and affective recognition that are not based on realist 
expression, but nonetheless build solidarities across experiences rendered outside 
comprehension, between subjects who do not wish to be comprehended.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
practice arises from conditions 
yet these are the conditions we must change 
(Lisa Robertson, ‘On Physically Real Being and What Happens Next’, 3 
Summers, 2016, p. 47) 
 ~ 
This thesis begins from a wish, or a drive, for things to be different. This simple wish 
underlies much of the more or less strung together traditions of experimental, innovative, 
alternative Anglophone poetry from at least the latter half of the twentieth century. How can 
poetry resist? How can the work of that (real and imagined) community of writer- and reader-
ship contribute somehow towards acts of making-different. This might be reformulated as the 
question: how can poetry that finds its conditions materially and ideologically oppressive 
attempt to imagine alternative (better) realities through the language of those conditions – and 
contribute to their realisation? 
The particular concerns, political perspectives, and longed-for horizons of the poets and 
critics brought together here will be various, and won’t always coincide precisely with those 
which I bring to the thesis. As a starting point for articulating a loose shared understanding on 
the nature of the situation which they, and I, recognise as needing to be resisted, I might begin 
by suggesting a general, shared opposition to structures of kyriarchy – a term that expands the 
idea of patriarchy to think about structures of domination and subordination more generally, 
and the complicated and intersecting oppressions which emerge based on, for example, class, 
gender, race, and sexuality, within such structures.1 Alternatively, I might use bell hooks’ 
phrase ‘imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy’, to describe the interlocking 
systems of oppression that structure much of the world in which we live.2 Across differences 
of specific politics and concerns, it is an opposition to this general framework of oppression, 
and a loose Marxist critique of material domination under capitalism, which I will be taking 
as the basic shared ground for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
1 Coined by Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza in But She Said. Feminist Practices of Biblical Interpretation, though 
the term has by now entered common vernacular within some contemporary activist and social justice circles, 
and online communities. Summarised as “a complex pyramidal system of interlocking multiplicative social and 
religious structures of super-ordination and sub-ordination, of ruling and oppression” (Fiorenza, 2013, p. 49 
[footnote 4]) 




This study is situated in the context of the somewhat amorphous, ill-defined, contemporary 
trans-Atlantic poetry communities and practices which call themselves or are called 
innovative, experimental, alternative, or other such contested and inadequate terms. The 
lineage or tradition in which this constellation of poetries sits might be characterised by 
reference to some of the more prominent of its predecessors: Linguistically Innovative and 
Cambridge Poetry in the UK, and the British Poetry Revival before them, and Language 
Poetry in the US. These themselves are ill-defined and sometimes contested terms for 
overlapping and interacting communities of poets and readers. 
The British poetry Revival and the Linguistically Innovative and Cambridge scenes form an 
overlapping and semi-continuous strand of poetic activity in the UK. This is an ‘alternative’ 
tradition that has defined itself in opposition to a mainstream or orthodox tradition, of 
“officially-sanctioned British poetry” (Eric Mottram’s phrase; Hampson & Barry, 1993, p. 
26), which it sees as both politically and aesthetically conservative. Work within this 
alternative poetic tradition has mostly been distributed through small presses and little 
magazines, rather than higher profile platforms, which have often shown a lack of interest, 
and sometimes active animosity towards it. 
The British Poetry Revival refers to a period of heightened creative activity roughly from 
1960 to 1975. This reached a height of public profile and influence when a number of poets 
associated with the Revival took up positions on the council of the Poetry Society in 1971, 
and Eric Mottram became editor of Poetry Review (this period was forcibly put to an end by 
the financial strong-arming of the Arts Council in 1977). These poets took influence from 
neglected older British poets such as Hugh MacDiarmid, David Jones and Basil Bunting (who 
was President of the Poetry Society during this period), as well as American poets such as 
Ezra Pound, William Carlos Williams, Allen Ginsberg, George Oppen, Louis Zukofsky, the 
New York School and those associated with the Black Mountain College. Key figures include 
Tom Raworth, Roy Fisher, Bob Cobbing, Elaine Feinstein, Barry MacSweeney, Tom Pickard, 
and Lee Harwood. 
The name Linguistically Innovative Poetry originates in a letter from Gilbert Adair to Robert 
Sheppard’s Pages magazine in 1988. Adair names a body of work “for which we haven’t yet 
a satisfactory name” (Adair, 1988, p. 68), which was being written in the UK since 1977, as a 
direct descendent of the British Poetry Revival following its fragmentation. Sheppard 
describes how “during the 1990s the clumsy term […] began to be used of much of the 
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alternative British work of the era […] it is a term to constellate overlapping practices in the 
British alternative poetries from the 1980s onwards which operated under less propitious 
conditions than its predecessors” (2005, p. 142). As well as Sheppard and Adair, important 
figures include Maggie O’Sullivan, Robert Hampson, Geraldine Monk, Adrian Clarke, 
Wendy Mulford, Bill Griffiths, and poets like Allen Fisher, who was a key figure also in the 
earlier Revival. The New British Poetry anthology (1988), edited by Gillian Allnutt, Fred 
D’Aguir, Eric Mottram and Ken Edwards, collected much of these – alongside other relatively 
neglected poetries by women and black poets – connecting both of these generations of poets. 
Cambridge Poetry is a narrower and more contested term, for a sub-set of poets across both 
generations, and on to the present day. These are poets who have been associated with 
Cambridge, and often specifically with the teaching of JH Prynne, who taught at Gonville and 
Cauis college from 1962 until 2005 – though I know from my own proximity that he 
continued to meet with and mentor younger poets until at least 2013. By 1980, there was a 
distinct enough sense of a particular Cambridge clique around Prynne for Blake Morrison to 
mention it, albeit somewhat derisively, alongside the group associated with Mottram, as an 
emerging strand of oppositional poetry in the 1970s (Morrison, 1980, pp. 145-6). In 1988, 
Robert Sheppard writes that “even 20 years ago an impressive collection of emerging 
‘Cambridge’ poets could have been assembled,” and refers to A Various Art, the 1987 
anthology edited by Andrew Crozier and Tim Longville, as an anthology of Cambridge poetry 
(Sheppard, 1988, p. 49). Sheppard acknowledges that Crozier would reject such a definition, 
and Crozier’s introduction explicitly rejects any strict categorisation by style or location, 
gesturing to the wider context of Innovative poetry. Poets associated with the Cambridge 
banner include Veronica Forrest-Thomson, Denise Riley, Douglas Oliver, Peter Riley, and 
later Drew Milne, Anna Mendelssohn, Andrea Brady, and Keston Sutherland.3 
Language Poetry refers to a loose association of poets which emerged in the early 1970s in 
the United Stated “as both a reaction to and an outgrowth of” the same American poets who 
were influencing their UK counterparts (e.g. Black Mountain, New York School) (Preminger 
& Brogan, 1993, p. 675), and based predominantly in cities such as New York and San 
 
3 For further discussion of the history, influence, and constitution of the groupings described in the above three 
paragraphs – from which much of my own account is drawn – see e.g. Robert Sheppard’s The Poetry of Saying 
(2005), Robert Hampson and Peter Barry’s New British Poetries (1993), or the introduction to Richard Caddel 
and Peter Quartermain’s anthology, Other: British and Irish Poetry since 1970 (1999). For a discussion of the 
relative lack of women in these groupings, see David Kennedy and Christine Kennedy’s Women’s Experimental 
Poetry in Britain 1970-2010 (2013). 
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Francisco. The Language poets also reciprocally read and interacted with their UK 
contemporaries, and shared a sense of forming an avant-garde against “the narrowness and 
provincialism of mainstream literary norms” (Silliman et al, 1988, p. 262). Centring around a 
number of journals such as L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, edited by Bruce Andrews and Charles 
Bernstein, Language Poets included Ron Silliman, Carla Harryman, Lyn Hejinian, Steve 
Perelman, Barrett Watten, Rae Armantrout, Rosmarie Waldrop, and British-Canadian poets 
Steve McCaffery and Karen Mac Cormack (Preminger & Brogan, 1993, pp. 675-6) (it’s worth 
noting that this grouping was notably more hospitable to women than its UK counterparts at 
that time). 
Whilst this project, and the contemporary poets I will be discussing, have some hereditary 
relationship to these poetries in an ongoing tradition, the nature of their contemporaneity – 
with no yet formed canon – means that it is difficult for me to situate the works I’m reading, 
as a group, with any more specificity than as heirs of these lineages, within the umbrella of 
contemporary innovative poetry. Transient populations, and an extremely high level of 
interaction and connectivity, which characterise our current moment, make geographical- or 
scene- focussed characterisations even less helpful than ever. Yet, through interactions within 
critical conversations, conferences, overlapping publishing histories, public readings, reviews, 
shared readerships, there are webs of connections between many of the poets I will be 
discussing, which I hope will become more apparent as I go on. On the ground in the UK, the 
innovative poetry scenes are in a period of flourishing and activity, which has seen a shift 
away from the heavy male domination of previous periods, and with some significant – albeit 
recent, slow, and as yet wholly insufficient – movements being made to counter on-going 
historical exclusions around race and the whiteness of experimental poetry.4 
Chapter 3 will begin by discussing the way that some resistance to the general state of things 
has long been taken as foundational to the self-conception of these experimental poetic 
traditions that are the context for this study. Central to this discussion will be three works of 
critical poetics – Veronica Forrest-Thomson’s Poetic Artifice, Robert Sheppard’s The Poetry 
of Saying, and Charles Bernstein’s ‘Artifice of Absorption’ – which, whilst mutually 
informing, emerge from the Cambridge, Linguistically Innovative, and Language scenes 
respectively, and which I take as key examples. Veronica Forrest-Thomson, for example, 
 
4 One exemplary set of interventions comes from Race and Poetry and Poetics in the UK. Events include two 
conferences, one at University of London in February 2016, and one at the University of Cambridge in October 
2018. See: http://www.rapapuk.com/ 
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argues for a poetry that uses artifice to “challenge our ordinary linguistic orderings of the 
world, make us question the way in which we make sense of things” (2016, p. 36). Robert 
Sheppard gives an account of British Innovative poetics which describes how formal 
innovations were always conceived of as ways to disrupt pre-existing meanings, to cut 
through “the known” (2005, p. 3), as a way of critiquing the status quo and looking towards 
alternative possibilities. The drive towards formal innovation and poetic invention in these 
poetries has consistently been combined with some element of politically radical intention, in 
a wish to excavate and undermine current meanings which underpin current (e.g. capitalist, 
etc.) relations, and open up new possibilities in and through this disruption in language. This 
chapter will also include discussion of the poetic thinking of poet-critics such as Allen Fisher, 
Denise Riley, Andrea Brady and Keston Sutherland. 
This radical poetics was influenced by key theoretical arguments such as those made, for 
example, by Theodor Adorno in his essay ‘Commitment’ (addressed later in this thesis), or by 
Julia Kristeva in Revolution in Poetic Language. Both argue that works of art which are 
highly disruptive of pre-given structures of signification are able to make resistive critiques 
and disruptions of the conceptual frameworks that underpin and perpetuate our oppressive 
material conditions.5 These works are influenced by experimental poetic and literary works, 
and make arguments which have in turn been highly influential in shaping the political poetics 
that underpins many subsequent developments in experimental poetry. 
This self-conception, this sense of radical politics as a shared ground from which, and 
sometimes, tentatively and with much scepticism, for which writing is done, continues as a 
central feature of contemporary trans-Atlantic experimental poetry communities. I will 
discuss this with reference to two conferences which occurred in 2013 – Militant Poetry and 
Poetics (Birkbeck, University of London) and Poetry and/or Revolution (UC Santa Cruz, UC 
Davis, UC Berkeley) – as well as the 2015 anthology of poetics, Towards. Some. Air., edited 
by Amy De’Ath and Fred Wah. 
 
5 I have chosen to use “resistive” here, and throughout this thesis, as the adjective characterising that which 
enacts or aims towards political resistance, rather than the more common “resistant”. The latter term seems to me 
to be laden with senses that aim for stillness, that drag their feet, that don’t go anywhere – as one who is resistant 
to persuasion keeps their mind unchanged, or the body of one who is resistant to disease remains (nearly) as it 
was before. Of course, the resistant, uncooperative subject might also kick and scream, and resistance is 
ultimately about refusal. I have turned to the less common, but closely synonymous term, because I want to 
emphasise in the idea of resistance – of the refusal of the current state of things – also the more future-oriented, 
revolutionary impulse of resistance, not just to drag against the forces which structure our lives, but to push 




to put it simply, the purpose of song is not only to raise the living standards of the 
working class, but to prevent the ruling class from living in the way that they have 
been 
(Sean Bonney, ‘Second Letter on Harmony’, Letter Against the Firmament, 
2015, p. 35) 
 ~ 
The central focus of this thesis will be reading-encounters with contemporary poetry from the 
UK and North America which sits within this lineage, by poets who many within these scenes 
would consider pre-eminent members, elders, or recent predecessors6: Chapter 4 will focus on 
Letters Against The Firmament (2015) by British poet Sean Bonney (1969-2019); Chapter 5 
will focus on 3 Summers (2016) by Canadian poet Lisa Robertson (b. 1961); Chapter 6 on 
Ban en Banlieue (2015), by British-Indian and now US-based poet Bhanu Kapil (b. 1968); 
Chapter 7 on works by British poet Anna Mendelssohn (also known as Grace Lake, 1948-
2009), spanning her pamphlets viola tricolor (1993), Bernache Nonnette (1996), Tondo 
Aquatique (1997), and her collection Implacable Art (2000). 
In these readings I wish to advance from the position of tracing some exemplary and distinct 
ways in which resistance is being crafted out in the contemporary moment, how both its need 
and its possibility are conceptualised, and what these works show us through their example 
about the possibilities of future writing, and future being. In Chapter 2 I will explain in more 
detail how these readings will operate, in the context of this thesis as a work of poetics, in 
relation to the establishing of an overall argument which uses existing work to suggest 
speculative possibilities for resistive poetry yet to be written. 
* 
Whilst this project sits within a long lineage in which the question of how poetry, and 
specifically how experimental poetries, can engage in political resistance – to understand what 
I mean specifically by resistance, what problem these poems are facing, we need to 
understand in more detail how this thesis conceptualises the nature of the situation which 
must be resisted. I don’t here mean just the harmful structures and conditions of the world, 
 
6 For most of the duration of the writing of this thesis, three out of the four poets in question were alive and 
actively writing, publishing and performing their work. Sean Bonney’s most recent work, Our Death (Commune 
Editions, 2019), was published mere months before his unexpected death. His is a great loss to all of us engaged 
in the attempt at radical poetic writing. 
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described loosely above; also, importantly, any resistance must reckon with the processes 
through which those conditions reproduce themselves. 
The groundwork for the understanding of resistance which this thesis brings to contemporary 
poetry begins from the understanding of ideology described by Louis Althusser in ‘Ideology 
and ideological state apparatuses’, summarised in the maxims “ideology is eternal” and 
“ideology has no outside” (1971, pp. 167/175). 
It is important to distinguish here, as Althusser does, between “ideology in general” and 
“particular ideologies” (Althusser, 1971, p. 159); when I refer to ideology in this thesis, I am 
drawing primarily on the theoretical account given in the latter half of Althusser’s essay, of 
“ideology in general”. To clarify this distinction further, Althusser claims that “ideologies 
have a history of their own” whereas “ideology in general has no history […] in an absolutely 
positive sense”, that is it “omni-historical” (1971, pp. 60-61, emphasis in original). Ideologies 
in the plural sense refer to particular mystifications which arise from particular historical 
conditions, such as those of capitalism, and are determined by class struggle, whereas the 
general form of ideology is an inescapable process. Althusser distinguishes his usage from 
what he calls the “positivist and historicist thesis of The German Ideology” (1971, p. 60), 
explicitly repudiating Marx’s notion that the distortions and mystifications of ideology arise 
from “the material alienation which reigns in the conditions of existence of men themselves” 
(1971, pp. 163-4). This notion would elide the central distinction made above, and suppose 
the possibility that outside the specific alienating conditions of capital lies a non-ideological 
conception of the world. By contrast, Althusser claims that: “the representation given to 
individuals of their (individual) relation to the social relations which govern their collective 
and individual life [is] necessarily an imaginary relation” (1971, p. 165). Thus Althusser 
claims not just that the unjust and oppressive material conditions in which we live are also 
ideological, but that ideology is not a contingent inconvenience brought about by conditions 
as they are currently, but is a universal and subject-forming process of necessary 
mystification, an inescapable part of the experience of being a subject within a collectivity. 
In this conception, individuals are always socialised as certain kinds of subjects, within pre-
existing frameworks of understanding. The conceptual parameters of our thought, and our 
conception of possible actions, are limited by the historical and cultural forces through which 
we come to understand the world, and which are the conditions of our understanding anything 
at all. In very simple terms, we are always socialised, always educated in one way or another, 
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not just with facts, but with the basic concepts from which we might begin. This always 
mystifies and naturalises the conditions in which we live. To say that “ideology is eternal” is 
therefore to say that there is no possibility of a clear, objective understanding, or a ‘free’ 
action, which exists outside of these socially formed bounds of possibility. To say that 
“ideology has no outside” is to point out not just that there is no thought or action which 
doesn’t occur within ideologically formed limits, but that we cannot perceive these limits at 
all, since they appear only as the true, obvious, or unquestionable conditions of the world, 
beyond which we cannot conceive. 
 ~ 
It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes (without appearing to do so, since 
these are ‘obviousnesses’) obviousnesses as obviousnesses, which we cannot fail to 
recognize and before which we have the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out 
[…]: ‘That’s obvious!’ 
(Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and ideological state apparatuses’, Lenin and 
Philosophy, 1971, p. 172) 
~ 
To reiterate: Althusser is not saying that the domination of any particular ideological system 
is eternal, or that any particular ideology has exclusive and uncontested force within ideology 
as a general process. Ideology – in general – always operates this way; no social situation is 
more or less ideological than any other. Nonetheless, this process functions to primarily 
reproduce the conceptual frameworks, and concurrent power relations, of any given social and 
historical moment, as limits of the conceivable for subjects who emerge through it – 
Althusser’s is an account of “reproduction of the conditions of production” (1971, p. 127). 
Ideology reproduces the social relations from which it emerges, to the inevitable benefit of 
those who are materially dominant within those relations, by shaping the bounds of what is 
possible. 
This essay, and Althusser’s account of ideology, has generated a great deal of discussion. It’s 
not the place of this thesis to catalogue or respond to these discussions, but it’s useful for me 
to point to one strand of response here. One recurring complaint is along the lines that 
Althusser’s position is “depressing,” (Eagleton, 2007, pp. 2), “bleak” (Eagleton, 2007, p. 
145), or “pessimistic” (Ricoeur, 1994, p. 65; Elliot, 1987, p. 231). I pointedly say “complaint” 
here, rather than “criticism”, since its being pessimistic says nothing about whether or not it is 
a useful or incisive account, and only that the complainant would wish things to be different. 
Gregory Elliot expresses a fuller version of this kind of response: 
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in the class struggle in ideology the cards are always already stacked in favour of the 
ruling class because its particular interests coincide with the universal functional 
requirements of social reproduction [...] little efficacy can be assigned the oppositional 
ideologies Althusser nonetheless posits. (Elliot, 1987, p. 232) 
The more substantive criticism is one of inconsistency then, that Althusser’s position almost 
entirely rules out the possibility of resistance which he nonetheless argued for and believed in. 
Related criticisms, of the totalising nature of Althusser’s ideology and the picture it paints of 
society, have been made by a range of highly sympathetic readers. For example, Stuart Hall, 
in his essay ‘Signification, Representation, Ideology’, takes issue with what he calls the 
“functionalism” of the version of ideology presented in ‘Ideology and Ideological State 
apparatuses’: “Ideology seems to perform the function required of it (i.e., to reproduce that the 
dominance of the dominant ideology), to perform it effectively, and to go on performing it, 
without encountering any counter-tendencies” (Hall, 1985, p. 99). Hall claims that Althusser’s 
ideology oversimplifies the social whole, and shows only the reproduction of dominant 
structures, and not the ongoing struggles and contradictions, that it leaves out “the ideologies 
of resistance, of exclusion, of deviation, etc.” (Hall, 1985, p. 99). 
A response that gets at a further aspect of this same area of criticism, this time focussing on 
the relative lack of space for deviations and agency at the level of the individual rather than 
the social whole which is Hall’s focus, is made in Mladen Dolar’s ‘Beyond Interpellation’. I 
read this essay through its treatment in Judith Butler’s ‘Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us 
All’. Butler quote’s Dolar: "there is a part of the individual that cannot successfully pass into 
the subject, an element of 'pre-ideological' and 'presubjective' materia prima that comes to 
haunt subjectivity once it is constituted as such" (Dolar, 1993, p. 75; Butler, 1995, p. 18); 
“There is a remainder involved in the mechanism of interpellation” (Dolar, 1993, p. 85; 
Butler, 1995, p. 24). That is, there is an element of individual experience which will always 
elude the process of ideological subjectification. Butler explains the basis of this element: 
“Dolar thus criticizes Althusser for eliding that dimension of subjectivity that remains 
radically immaterial, barred from an appearance within materiality” (Butler, 1995, p. 18). 
Concepts not dissimilar to Dolar’s “remainder” will become very useful for me in this thesis; 
but Butler rightly criticises his claim that love is an example of that remainder, responding 
that our forms of love can be subject to the law – to ideology’s structuring limits – and that 
we can indeed love the law, seek it out in “passionate pursuit” (1995, p. 24). This re-instates 
the all-encompassing element of ideological subjectification: 
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that passionate attachment to the law is that without which the linguistic guarantee of 
existence for the subject proves impossible. This complicity at once conditions and 
limits the viability of a critical interrogation of the law. One cannot criticize too far the 
very terms by which one's existence is secured. (Butler, 1995, p. 25) 
I take Butler’s rejoinder here to be a useful one for all the above criticisms. In Hall’s criticism, 
there is some moderate slippage between ideologies and ideology. As I take Althusser’s terms, 
the conflictual ideologies and positions within the social whole are included in the function of 
ideology in general. The latter is a process, not a position or worldview – it is the pre-
condition of any worldview being formed. It therefore does not preclude conflicts of position, 
but is a much broader and more intangible set of conceptual limits, which nonetheless helps to 
explain what Hall himself describes as the question of  
how a society allows the relative freedom of civil institutions to operate in the 
ideological field, day after day, without direction or compulsion by the State; and why 
the consequence of that "free play" of civil society, through a very complex 
reproductive process, nevertheless consistently reconstitutes ideology as a "structure in 
dominance." (Hall, 1985, p. 101) 
That is, despite the open conflicts between positions of groupings and individuals, society’s 
dominant structures, and the conditions through which we relate to one another, remain 
remarkably intractable. 
It is my position – and a key working principle of this thesis – that Althusser’s account of 
ideology, or my reading of it as given here, usefully describes the experience of being a 
subject in the social world, that its pessimism urgently presses the real extreme difficulty 
faced by any attempts at resistance. In this sense, I re-read Elliot’s criticism above as a useful 
description. Since no one can escape pre-existing systems of thought and action, and all 
possible actions and speech are made within the terms of their ideological situation, any 
attempted acts of resistance will predominantly function to reproduce the dominant material 
and ideological relations out of which they emerge, even as they may improve conditions or 
have liberatory effects in specific and quantifiable ways. Any intervention that wishes to 
radically change the situation in which it occurs will likely change it only superficially, within 
the pre-given parameters of that situation; the primary result of any attempted resistance is 
failure, in the form of reproduction of the same. 
And yet, fatalistic and difficult as this situation is, it is also true that things manifestly do 
change; difference can be produced in the place of sameness. Althusser’s account does not 
deny this, but only shows how very heavily the odds are stacked; resistance is not impossible 
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here, only almost impossible.7 This thesis begins with a commitment to take that radical 
challenge to the possibilities of resistance fully seriously, to a degree which, I contend, is 
relatively rare. 
Within this framework, the question of the possibility of resistance to the particular systems 
of material and ideological oppression within which everyone lives – to the particular 
relations and structures of imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy, etc – must be 
reframed as also a question of the possibility of resistance to the ideological processes which 
reproduce those relations. Yet this is a question I will be asking primarily through the 
framework of poetry and poetics, rather than through a focus on Marxist theoretical debates, 
of which I have given a brief flavour above. I wish to ask foremost how poetry can participate 
in or contribute towards activity that disrupts the reproductive function of ideology towards 
alternative ends, towards the purposive, ethically and politically driven production of 
difference rather than sameness. The apparent impossibility posed by this account of 
ideology, and the need to articulate the faltering and uncertain ways in which resistance is yet 
possible, is a central problem which underpins this investigation, and it is primarily for the 
spirit of this controversial insight that I invoke ideology in this form. 
When the very possibilities of our thought and action are locked in a system of mutual 
formation with the conditions in which we live – produced by and in turn reproducing them – 
how can we even conceive, let alone concretely bring about, the possibility of something 
radically different, and better? This is an old question, but one that I think needs continually 







7 For example, Althusser posits that struggle, resistance and contradiction are already present within the spaces 
and structures which inscribe and enforce ideology: “the Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the 
stake, but also the site of class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle. The class (or class alliance) in 
power cannot lay down the law in the ISAs as easily as it can in the (repressive) State apparatus, not only 
because the former ruling classes are able to retain strong positions there for a long time, but also because the 
resistance of the exploited classes is able to find means and occasions to express itself there, either by utilization 
of their contradictions, or by conquering combat positions in struggle” (Althusser 1971, p. 147). These 
comments do not suggest that such resistance is easy, or that the ideological contradictions it mentions are 





speaking begins, plays its tenuous continuities near and in spite of the accreted 
institutions that compel anyone to obey, violate and buy, to be situated by identity’s 
grid. But speech is never simply single […] The conversations are conditioned by 
profoundly ancient and constantly reinventing protocols – protocols we enliven, figure 
and transform with our bodies and their word, by beginning. 
(Lisa Robertson, ‘Untitled Essay’, Nilling, 2012, p. 73) 
 ~ 
How does this thinking about ideology, reproduction and resistance specifically manifest 
itself in relation to poetry? 
As our primary medium of communication, language is both necessarily shaped by, and plays 
a key role in, the formation of our conceptual and ideological limits. The limits of that which 
is expressible in language are ideological limits.8 That is, the concepts and experiences of 
which any given language can coherently speak will have embedded within them assumptions 
about the world that arise from and reproduce the conditions of its historical and social 
formation – some of which may be so basic as to be beyond explication or recognition. A 
language will exclude from clear thought what it cannot name, and will wrench what can be 
named into particular shapes contingent on that formation. 
Another common strand of objection to Althusser’s account of ideology – a demand for 
objectivity, as if it were either possible or necessary for efficacious resistance – helps to 
demonstrate its productive challenge on this point. For example, Paul Ricoeur asks, in direct 
response to this account, “What would be the point in a critique of miscognition if it were not 
for the sake of a more faithful recognition?” (Ricoeur, 1994, p. 65). He goes on: “I do not see 
from where we could borrow the forces to resist the apparatus if not from the depths of a 
subject having claims that are not infected by this supposed submissive constitution,” which is 
to say, objectively recognisable outside of the mystification of ideology, and instead suggests 
that “we need a utopia of total recognition” (Ricoeur, 1994, pp. 65-66). In my view, Ricoeur 
correctly sees the difficulty Althusser poses, but turns to the conceptually easier but ultimately 
unhelpful answer. 
 
8 There are resonances between the above Robertson quotation and its relevance here, and Adorno’s expression 
of these problems in ‘Lyric Poetry and Society’: “For language itself is something double. Through its 
configurations it assimilates itself completely into subjective impulses; one would think it had produced them. 
But at the same time language remains the medium of concepts, remains that which establishes an inescapable 
relationship to the universal and society.”  (Adorno, 1991, p. 43) 
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The fact that Althusser’s account rules out “total recorgnition” is one of its strengths for this 
thesis. The Althusserian position that ideology is generally mystifying, and there is no access 
to a clear pre- or non-ideological understanding, necessarily entails a critique of objectivity or 
clarity in language, since all possible expressions are mystified by the ideological boundaries 
that form their possibility; this requires that we see the “forces” with which we might resist as 
relying not on such a false horizon of objectivity, but emerging in and through the fact of that 
objectivity’s lack. The demand for objectivity is not only fundamentally inconsistent with the 
understanding of ideology and the subject under which this thesis operates, but also counter-
productive to any hopes for resistance, since it mis-diagnoses the nature and scale of the 
problem at hand. Any use of language that makes claims to communicate on these terms 
simply masks – even if by the necessary concession to the needs of everyday shared reality – 
the fact of its function to reproduce the conditions in which it exists. This might militate for 
uses of language that move away from holding up a value for ‘clear’ or ‘objective’ 
communication. I will expand on the relation of this critique of objectivity to my own writing 
practice in Chapter 2. 
 ~ 
We agreed for the moment not to speak of the nature of the individual tether, the 
institutions and lordships and instituted shortages, and certainly this agreement 
marked our complicity with the administration of shortage. But we did not know any 
other way to go on. 
 (Lisa Robertson, ‘First Walk’, Occasional Work and Seven walks from the 
Office for Soft Architecture, 2011, pp. 192-3) 
 ~ 
A specific consequence of these problems of ideology for the question of poetry’s political 
resistance is that even the most apparently radical statement is made within the boundaries of 
intelligibility which are the conceptual limits of its ideological situation. Even these 
statements thereby function, as all else, primarily to reproduce those same limits, and the 
conditions which they entail. 
 ~ 
The notion of a ‘message’ in art, even when politically radical, already contains an 
accommodation to the world. 
(Theodor Adorno, ‘Commitment’, 1974, p. 88). 
 ~  
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This is how I get to my specific understanding of the question of how poetry can involve itself 
in resistance, as the questions: how can poetry written in the language of its conditions 
meaningfully oppose those conditions; how can it contribute through its use of that language 
towards oppositional shifts in those conditions? Again, the effort to investigate answers to 
these questions must begin both from an acknowledgement of their intractability, and a 
conviction that resistance is yet possible. The tentative and uncertain attempt to reconcile 
these positions is a central matter of this thesis. 
Althusser claims that artworks “make us ‘perceive’ (but not know) in some sense from the 
inside, by an internal distance, the very ideology in which they are held” (1971, p. 204). 
Althusser proposes the possibility of a resistance which cannot clearly recognise and destroy 
oppressive structures, but might instead critique and alter material relations, conceptual 
frameworks, language and limits on action, from within those conditions. He attributes special 
critical capacity to art to enact such critique. 
Some of the work that most consistently and acutely recognises language as a socially 
mediated, opaque material, pre-loaded with the contents of the messy and oppressive social 
systems of which it speaks, is experimental poetry. Such work often accordingly takes an 
uncertain view of any expectations of simple communication. It is a premise of this thesis that 
poetry, and particularly experimental poetry, might on this basis have some specific and 
distinct utility for facing up to these problems of ideology and resistance, and for critiquing 
and re-forming ideological conditions from the inside. 
 ~ 
The law is a mouth. 
Glossolalia. 
(Sean Bonney, ‘Lamentations’, Letters Against the Firmament, 2015, p. 16) 
 ~ 
The ways these ideas have been absorbed into the foundation of experimental poetics will be 
the subject of the beginning of Chapter 3, using Forrest-Thomson, Sheppard, Bernstein and 
Adorno. Through these accounts I will show how poetry’s capacity to trouble expectations of 
clarity or ready intelligibility, or the terms by which such modes of communication might be 
constituted, has been central to radically-intentioned poetics. This context builds the 
groundwork from which an account of the contemporary possibility of resistance may step 
off, to develop these ideas further in the face of the enormity of the problem posed. 
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Whilst this project does not take for granted the possibility that disruptions in poetry have any 
meaningful resistive effect – and is in fact extremely sceptical of such a possibility – it 
follows from this conception of the reproductive function of ideology that any shifts in the 
material conditions of our society necessitate and entail reciprocal ideological changes. Each 
kind of change is necessary for the other to have any meaningful reality. Since poetry 
manifestly does not make any drastic material interventions, it is at the level of ideological 
change which I take to be its likely possible contribution to the ongoing work of resistance. It 
is by participating in the work of shifting each collective-individual subject’s conception of 
themselves, the world and the relations within it, and the premises for the possibilities of day-
to-day action, through complicated and diffuse mechanisms, that poetry might gradually push 
toward transformations in the conditions of living.9 It is in this sense – exploring the 
possibilities of interventions in the process of ideological subjectification – that this thesis is a 
poetics of subjective resistance. So whilst resistance here is not explicitly resistance in the 
streets, poetry’s role in exploring and re-forming conceptual premises and limits is also a 
direct contribution to the resistive efficacy and imaginative possibilities of such material 
resistance and action. This will be discussed more in chapters 3 and 4; such discussions will 
aim to break down any strict dichotomy between poetry as conceptual work about resistance 
and material work conceived as actual resistance, without positing poetry as sufficient 
resistive activity in itself. 
* 
The second half of chapter 3 will use readings of Judith Butler, Denise Riley, Brian Massumi, 
Lisa Robertson and Andrea Brady to develop the notion that there are kinds of experience 
which are rendered inarticulable within any given conceptual or ideological framework, or 
elements of experience which exceed and overspill the limits constructed by ideology’s 
interpellations, which exist beyond, or below, the threshold of clear articulation – something 
like the “remainder” named by Dolar above, though I won’t be using his terms. It is by 
definition not possible for me to name directly what these experiences are, but as the thesis 
develops they will come to include the hazy and inarticulate edges of grief, melancholy, 
hunger, gendered and racial abuse – the pains and deprivations of life under imperialist white-
supremacist capitalist patriarchy – as well as desire, for something different. I claim that these 
 
9 When I say that poetry does not make material interventions, I’m referring to poetry qua poetry, as text, and not 
thinking of the wider range, of the conditions of production and distribution of poetry. In these areas, the work of 
poetry could be involved in more materially resistive work, or at least work on explicitly anti-capitalist models, 
but these areas, important as they are, are outside of the scope of this thesis, and of poetics as such. 
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experiences offer a basis for resistance, conceived as the possibility for thinking, acting, and 
being differently than that which is produced and reproduced by our prior conditions. 
This thesis asks how the affective fractures of such experiences can be articulated in a 
language they by definition lie outside of. Its exploration of the possibilities of resistance in 
poetry will develop through the idea that forms which disrupt or lie outside of realist modes of 
representation, or readily articulable meaning, might have some particular capacity for 
accessing and thinking about those experiences. It is here that I find the potentially vital 
capacity for ideological resistance of experimental poetics. 
An additional contention, which will be developed more clearly in chapter 3, is that accounts 
of resistive experimental poetry have largely focussed on poetry’s ability to destabilise 
conceptual and linguistic frameworks in which it operates, through techniques that create the 
effect which Robert Sheppard calls “defamiliarisation” (2005, p. 92), following the work of 
Victor Shklovsky. Such techniques include ironic distance, fractured language which 
disorients the reader and separates them from the certainty of their normal expectations, and a 
move away from deterministic or closed language towards openness and ambiguity, 
“plurivocity” in Allen Fisher’s terms (2016, p. 76). A characteristic example of this tendency 
is Denise Riley’s description of irony: “Once it has heard and has become alert to the harm in 
excessive reiteration, then it cannot any longer wear the old formulae” (2000a, p. 155); irony 
“illuminat[es] the historicity as well as the arbitrariness of the categorical words that 
consolidate me” (2000a, p. 3). 
The “old formulae” may become unfamiliar, and this shaking off of the apparent necessity of 
historically hardened concepts might well be of vital importance in any critical resistance, but 
this leaves under-discussed the possibility of gesturing towards new possible frameworks, 
relations and subjectivities, or even of making positive diagnostic articulations of the harms of 
a given situation. A concept of resistance which focusses too strongly on destabilisation as an 
end goal is insufficient to my thinking because it supposes that the language of current 
conditions can in some sense be demystified, and in doing so implicitly suggests the 
possibility of a language shaken free of its problematic ideological baggage, and with it the 
possibility of a demystified or less ideological general state of being. 
It is more difficult, and more necessary, to think about how we might use and heighten the 
instabilities that we find in language and ideology, in order to transform them into something 
new and better, whilst always inside the conditions which render that newness unrecognisable 
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before it is realised. This thesis aims to begin that discussion of more positive, if necessarily 
ephemeral or hard to describe resistive contributions, gesturing from within to some unknown 
elsewhere which is the possibility of alternative conditions, towards a realisation, an attempt 
to bring those conditions into being. It does so knowing that the attempt is necessarily slow, 
and easily turned back to safe comprehension under the logic of those conditions. 
Chapters 4 to 7, those which make up the core poetic encounters of the thesis, will not make 
their answers to these questions in the form of a strictly sequential argument, and instead will 
develop a resistive poetics in multiple directions, taking its lead from the particular 
experiences of the works in question. There are certain elements which each reading will have 
loosely in common. 
Each of the poetic works under discussion is strongly rooted in an experiential subject, taken 
not as a stable expressive authority but as a point of exploration. From this starting point, each 
recognises the individual subject as a primary site of struggle, recognising that the subject is 
always brought into being, subjectified, by the processes of ideology, but yet always pushing 
against those bounds with the multiplicity of their actual experience. Each work in some way 
explores the resistive potential of affective experiences which are divergent from or overspill 
the normative bounds of their ideological situation. This includes conventionally recognisable 
kinds of divergent experience, such as the experience of people whose identity is 
marginalised, but also stretches towards the notion of experiences that are beyond articulate 
recognition. The poetics of each of these works are then grounded in these kind of 
experiences, and in their different ways see them as sites of fracture, incoherence and 
instability in subjects’ ongoing ideological inscription, as points of potential resistance, as 
ways to begin to imagine and enact new subjectivities. 
As these readings go on they also accumulate an understanding of aesthetic elements of both 
poetic text and wider experience or perception, which aren’t only reducible to clear, 
articulable concepts, but which operate beneath or around linguistic or semantic meaning. 
Through a variety of different formulations, they offer up the idea of the musical, the 
prosodic, the incoherent elements of poetry, or the moments where it can gesture outside of 
the pre-given limits of coherence, as having distinct resistive and communicative capability. 
These aesthetic registers – encompassing both perception and the object, or poem, perceived – 
are seen as operating affectively, and as having the capacity to open up or in some sense 
express potentially resistive moments of affective experience. These aren’t distinct elements, 
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but intertwined ways of attempting to describe possible modes of resistance which might be 
called aesthetic-affective. Such a resistance starts from these unstable or unclear elements of 
ideologically-formed subjective perception, in the hope of re-forming from within the 
possibilities of being in the world. 
The poetic encounters in these chapters will also build upon one another, if not strictly 
sequentially then cumulatively. 
Sean Bonney’s Letters Against the Firmament, as encountered in Chapter 4, faces the 
problems of resistance absolutely head on, and articulates them in ways which are most 
closely related to the initial conceptual framework of the thesis. Bonney’s poetry is a ruthless 
dual critique of the difficulties that face any attempt for poetry or for political protest to do 
anything except reproduce more of the same under contemporary capitalism. Yet with 
hopeless defiance it still attempts to find a way to break open this reality. This chapter begins 
to think through the difficulty of communication under these conditions, and to re-figure it as 
something which doesn’t centre clarity, but cares instead about partisan commonalities, 
solidarity, and a sharing of those experiences of pain and abjection that are caused by, and 
open up ruptures within, the conditions of living under contemporary capitalism. This chapter 
also tentatively begins to think about the relationship between these affective, experiential 
ruptures and the aesthetic, through Bonney’s figure of “harmony” – which comes to 
encompass both the balance of social relations, and the musical signals which might evoke or 
create disruptions in that balance. 
Chapter 5 finds in Lisa Robertson’s 3 Summers an iteration of the problems of ideological 
reproduction specifically through a dialectical experience of interpellation as a woman, and 
the ideological formation of possibility and desire. This interpellation is at once a constriction, 
painfully shaped within and by patriarchy, and yet a source of resistance, precisely because of 
the feminine-coded thinking-feeling which is constructed as outside of the norms of 
patriarchy and capital. The poems begin from the question of survival and flourishing as a 
woman under these circumstances, and follows this to a thinking about a more general 
resistance and flourishing. This chapter also outlines most directly a relationship between 
affective experience and aesthetics, by following the claims of Robertson’s work that they are 
essentially the same kind of thinking-feeling. In Robertson’s poetics, the poem might then 
become a kind of feminine-coded political decoration, which looks to those experiences and 
desires that are as-yet-unknowable to imagine new possibilities of collective flourishing. 
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In Chapter 6 I will explore the hybrid form of Bhanu Kapil’s Ban en Banlieue, which disrupts 
and interrupts itself, always gesturing to an ‘outside’ of the text, to its failures, to what it 
might be, or to the performance-gestures that are supplementary to it. Performance actions are 
ways of addressing the lived reality of racist and gendered violence, where language alone is 
seen as unable to make a sufficient intervention against the reproduction of these conditions. 
In a meeting point between insights from Bonney’s work about forms of aesthetic 
communication, and Robertson’s development of the intimate relationship between the 
affective and the aesthetic, I will explore how Kapil’s work figures the performing, sometimes 
nude body and the notion of colour. These come together in capacities for sending signals, for 
sharing, identification and touch, between subjects who refuse to be comprehensible on the 
oppressive terms which are given to them. 
Chapter 7 uses Mendelssohn’s work – older and more linguistically disruptive than the other 
works encountered – as a kind of test case for the thesis’s claims about the resistive 
possibilities of disruptive and incomprehensible language. Rebarbative as they are to their 
readers, I find Mendelssohn’s poems to nonetheless be strongly invested in finding ways to 
articulate experiences of pain and trauma particularly, and to have some positive notion of 
nurturing subjects who could live together in a different kind of world. They contain an 
uncompromising, damning critique of reading and writing practices which expect easy 
understanding, which stem from the same patterns of thought that are present in all the 
apparatus of the repressive state. The poems replace the wish to understand and be 
understood, with the wish to be believed – creating the conditions for recognition through 
readers’ experience of struggling through the poems, rather than through a clear 
understanding of their articulated content. This distinction between being understood and 
being believed is central to the possibilities this thesis proposes for language which could 
begin to gesture towards positive possibilities, whilst resisting the reproductive force of 
ideology and its construction of the premises of linguistic coherence. 
In my conclusion I will draw out and synthesise some of the common threads that emerge 
through these chapters. I will further articulate what I see as the possibilities of relations 
between subjects which are embedded in the poetics articulated in this thesis, but which 
remain implicit throughout. 
This begins from related dialectical conceptions of communication and of the subject. The 
subject is seen as both collective – emerging from its ideological conditions – and individual, 
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solipsistic and wildly various in its actual experiences. This tension is where the grounds for 
subjective resistance arises. Similarly, clear, comprehensible communication reproduces the 
ideological conditions of its intelligibility, and yet this basis of resistance in subjective 
experience also makes some form of communication or mutual understanding necessary. In 
discussing Bonney’s work, I suggest the notion of ‘non-reified recognition’ – a term that 
becomes important throughout the thesis that follows – to describe the kinds of mutual 
understanding to which these poems are committed. This term describes the idea of finding 
ways to recognise shared experiences which are marginal to the dominant ideological 
framework, and not yet stabilised into intelligible and ideologically reproductive form. 
Mendelssohn’s work most clearly articulates a desire for subjective relations which match the 
model of this resistive poetics, but these relations are an implicit proposition in the poetics of 
each of the poets in the thesis. The relationship between a critique of intelligibility in writing 
and the centrality of subjective experience suggests the importance of subjective relations 
which recognise and care for the amorphous and unintelligible in subjective experience, 




Chapter 2: Methodology 
This thesis is a work of poetics, which is a form historically written by poets in verse and 
prose, containing critical and creative kinds of speculative proposition and formal work. 
~ 
Poetics are the products of the process of reflection upon writings, and upon the act of 
writing, gathering from the past and from others, speculatively casting into the future.  
(Robert Sheppard, the necessity of poetics, 2003, p. 2) 
~ 
Though the tradition is much older, an understanding of poetics as a distinct genre in the 
contemporary moment, in the context of contemporary experimental poetry, and for the 
purposes of this thesis, might begin from the sequence of (non-definitive, contestable and 
generative) definitions offered by Robert Sheppard in the necessity of poetics. He calls poetics 
“writer-centred self-organising activity” (Sheppard, 2003, p. 2). 
Poetics, in this account, is written by artistic practitioners, and whilst it may manifest itself 
through a multiplicity of forms far beyond the limits of a critical reflection on writing, it is 
focussed on an exploration of art in-the-making, with an eye towards the future possibilities 
of art yet to be made. Whilst I am not producing a piece of work which turns towards my own 
poetic writing, and thereby diverge a little from Sheppard’s account, I nonetheless situate this 
work within the genre of poetics, since it is a constitutive element of the questions I ask and 
the manner of my asking and answering that I write this not just as a literary critic or scholar, 
but as a poet. I write about poetry here as a fellow practitioner, involved in the ongoing 
process of developing my own writing practice, in sympathy with the concerns of the poets 
encountered, and as part of a constellation of shared concerns within a writing community to 
which I belong. As a reader-poet, there is always an underlying motivation, to ask about the 
way these works open up possibilities for me, and for my own writing practice. It is through 
the lens of this personal investment that I wish not to only give a detailed account of some of 
the workings of poetry that already is, but to find the possibilities that work and my reading of 
it can suggest for poetry “speculatively casting into the future.” 
~ 
Poetics is a prospectus of work to be done, that might involve a summary of work 




Poetics is a genre of writing which is distinct from either literary criticism or literary theory. 
Sheppard’s account treats this as a somewhat hard distinction,10 whereas I aim for a writing 
that may at times also be these things, but which differs from them by way of the positions it 
takes or its overarching intentions, and which writes and reads across the boundaries of 
poetry, criticism, and theory. 
In more practical terms, this means that I will be largely engaging with the work of poet-
critics whose own writing blurs these boundaries and thinks across the demarcations of these 
genres. I won’t be using theoretical and literary-critical ‘secondary reading’ to establish 
frameworks to read poetry as primary material. Instead, the relationship between critical and 
poetic work will be more fluid and multi-directional; both can be treated as containing serious 
theoretical thinking – including but not limited to the explanatory force of its propositional 
content – and both can also be read closely in ways which are subjective, emotive, disavowing 
too strong a concern for strict semantic coherence, and doing interpretive work with the 
generative possibilities of their utterances. 
~ 
Poetics offers generative schema. (Sheppard, 2003, p. 4) 
~ 
Criticism, theory and poetry will mutually shape the development of a schema, of a set of 
concepts, language, ideas, speculations and projections, about the possibilities of poetry to 
engage with and in resistive activity. The argument of the thesis and its theoretical and 
linguistic framework are reciprocally related and mutually develop throughout, neither being 
strictly prior to the other. Structurally, the greatest attention to theoretical texts will be in 
Chapter 3, in order that the poetic encounters can be closely focussed on those works 
themselves, on their own potentials for thinking, resonating against the generative theoretical 
work with which I have set the scene. The developing vocabulary of this thesis will not aim 
for static definitions, nor the argument for definitive conclusion. Rather, this thesis will enact 
a process of tentative formulation and re-formulation of fluid concepts – returned to, modified 
and augmented from chapter to chapter – whose value might be judged on their potential 
functionality in a continuation of that on-going process for a reader of the thesis, or as a 
generative intervention within a community of radically intentioned writers and readers. 
 
10 “A test to see if you’ve produced explicit poetics is to ask of your discourse about writing: is this literary 
theory or literary criticism? If the answer is no then it might be poetics. (If the answer is yes, it might still 




Poetics is a way of reading or misreading texts (in the widest sense) not normally 
thought of as poetics: to refunction their discourses as part of its own. (Sheppard, 
2003, p. 6) 
~ 
The critical and exploratory reading practice through which this framework will be built will 
also be a practice of mis-reading. It will see all its critical, theoretical, poetic material as just 
that, material to be used and manipulated, without much heed to whether or not my use of a 
particular text, passage, or formulation bears any strong consistency with the intentions of its 
original use, the views of its author, the general body of their work, or even necessarily the 
rest of its containing text. 
 ~ 
Poetics steals from anywhere. (Sheppard, 2003, p. 6) 
~ 
This will be an appropriative reading, open to the possibility of engaging with a kind of bad 
faith, to re-purpose, to steal. Particularly where I’m dealing with theoretical and critical work, 
there will be points where I find that a particular textual moment offers generative 
possibilities for my discussion, within a body of work which is otherwise at some odds with 
the premises of this project. Where such moments can be functionally repurposed in the 
service of a speculative poetics, the inherent flexibility of the genre allow that this disjunct is 
not in itself a meaningful contradiction internal to my own writing. 
* 
~ 
Poetics is not theory in the ordinary rationalistic sense. (Sheppard, 2003, p. 2) 
~ 
The disruption of a static, rationalist theory – towards the speculative, generative, functional – 
through the invocation of the conventions of poetics is also part of a drive to disrupt any sense 
that a useful critical writing or knowledge-production must be dispassionate or objective. 
Such disruption is essential if the form of my writing is to attempt some consistency with its 
own theoretical premises, and with the claims it makes for poetry and resistance. The 
necessity for such a writing practice will become ever clearer as I delineate my initial 
theoretical framework and context in more detail in the following chapter; these ideas, and a 
strong critique of the “rationalistic”, will be significantly fleshed out and explored in the 
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chapters that follow. But for now I can begin to explain the premises that lead me to feel that I 
must write in this way. 
In ‘An Undeleter For Criticism’, Simon Jarvis describes the way in which conventional 
expectations of critical writing, and specifically aesthetic theorising, demand “not that we 
merely report our own subjective experiences, but that we produce knowledge,” where critics 
are “a kind of scientists of art” (2002, p. 3). This understanding of what constitutes knowledge 
– as rational, scientific, generally agreeable, never subjective – is seen as ossifying both the 
text and its reader, treating the former as a measurable object, and the latter as a standardised 
measure: “I must profess what I think it may be in my power to compel others to believe: that, 
for example, a certain pattern of phonemes or graphemes ‘has’ a certain effect upon ‘the’ 
reader” (Jarvis, 2002, p. 5). The function of this convention, as Jarvis describes it, is that 
critics must erase their subjectivity from the experience of a text or event, replacing it with a 
“dummy subject, the subject from which all singularity has been predeleted” (Jarvis, 2002, p. 
12).11 
The conventional expectations which Jarvis describes here are implicit in the practice of close 
reading as it still retains traces of its formulation in the practical criticism of I.A. Richards and 
in New Criticism; a detailed examination of the minutiae of formal and semantic features in a 
text is made dependant on a notion that that text is a static object independent of its context, 
which can produce relatively consistent, even verifiably correct, results to a competent reader, 
and that such results can be explicated by a suitably dispassionate examination.12 In 
 
11 I have some hesitance and discomfort about the use of Jarvis’s work in this thesis. In 2017, Jarvis received a 
suspended sentence on conviction for possession and distribution of indecent images of children. As an academic 
he has directly supervised friends of mine, and he was (perhaps still is) a friend and collaborator with some of 
the poets and critics discussed in this thesis. As such this situation is a cause of pain for many in precisely the 
poetic communities in which I situate my own work. I want to acknowledge this explicitly since, whilst the work 
of his which I discuss in this thesis has been greatly productive for me, I wish only to steal from it what can be of 
use, and hope that my use of it would not contribute towards laundering an academic reputation at the expense of 
acknowledging those harmed, or in such a way as to facilitate e.g. a return to direct undergraduate supervision. 
 By the same token, then, I should also acknowledge that Louis Althusser, for all his good and useful 
works of Marxist theory, strangled his wife Hélène Rytmann, herself a social scientist at the Research Institute 
for Economic and Social Development in Paris, and a communist militant, who fought with the French 
Resistance during the Nazi occupation of France (see Seymour, 2017). I hope that my use of his work does not 
serve to erase her life or minimise that act of violence. 
12 For example, Wimsatt & Beardsley’s ‘The Affective Fallacy’, a canonical New Critical text, dismisses 
emotional response – “affective relativism” and “the personal” (1949, p. 39) – as a basis for criticism; they 
distinguish between “those who have coolly investigated what poetry does to others and those who have testified 
what it does to themselves”, with a preference for the former, ‘cool’ investigation of abstracted or measurable 
“others” (1949, p. 41). A key criticism of affective accounts is that they are “neither anything which can be 
refuted nor anything which it is possible for the objective critic to take into account” (1949, p. 45). They value 
“translatable emotive formulas”, corresponding to “classical objectivity”, in a critical practice whereby an 
attention to that object “the poem itself” is intended to produce “an account of what the poem is likely to induce 
in other—sufficiently informed—readers” (1949, p. 47). 
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‘Necessary Business’, an early work of poetics within Linguistically Innovative poetry, 
originally published in 1985, Allen Fisher makes the related observation: “It is […] a 
common presumption that there can be a pseudo- scientific approach that could lay an 
analytical device upon the work that would create the work’s readability” (2016, p. 39). This 
pseudo-scientific stance of critical distance is a commonly assumed premise of the notion of 
rigour. 
This version of critical knowledge, according to Jarvis, “depend[s] upon the deletion of 
everything idiosyncratic about my experience and, with it, upon the deletion of everything 
that makes that experience an experience” (2002, p. 6). 
Lisa Robertson’s essay ‘Perspectors/Melancholia’ – which will later make a vital contribution 
to my account of the nature of unstable affective experience as a site of critique and resistance 
– speaks from a scepticism about the general grounds of knowledge which is similar to 
Jarvis’. Robertson breaks down any distinction between the subject and the world it 
experiences, instead seeing our relationship with the world as an unstable act of perception 
that extends continuously between the falsely distinguished ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ experiences: 
“the subject is the perceiving aperture through which the visual threads pour, in either 
direction” (2012, p. 49). This leads into a high level of scepticism, as expressed by Kant, 
which treats sensory experience as fundamentally unreliable, and can only know the world as 
it is refracted through the “sensual intuition” of the “occupied space”, the space of thought, 
affect and perception, which is the only space the existence of which admits no scepticism 
(Robertson, 2012, p. 52).13 
This is not in contradiction with the Althusserian description of ideology as a process of 
subjectification whereby the individual subject is formed through and within the conditions of 
their social situation. It is also a correlative of my reading of Althusser on ideology that any 
resistive investigation and reframing of our ideological conditions is strongly rooted in the 
subject, since it is at the level of the subject that ideology acts. The subject is caught in a 
 
Similarly, the catalogue of ‘errors’ which ends the introduction to Richards’ Practical Criticism 
supposes a set of correct responses to a poem (“a large portion of average-to-good […] readers of poetry 
frequently and repeatedly fail to understand it”; 1929, p. 13), where the insertion of arbitrary factors of readerly 
experience (“mnemonic irrelevances”; 1929; p. 15), or of excessive or inappropriate emotional response 
(“sentimentality” or “inhibition”; 1929, p. 16), are signs of a wrong reading. 
13 Robertson approvingly quotes Kant’s the Critique of Pure Reason: “Kant describes the subjective space thus: 
‘if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to experience – colour – 
hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability – the body will vanish; but the space which it occupied still 




dialectic between the sociality through which it is created and situated, and the solipsism of its 
actual, verifiable experience; the subjective and particular basis for criticism and resistive 
thinking is also in a sense the most certain and reliable starting point, from which one might 
hope to reach out to others. 
Jarvis goes on to claim that to require objectivity and see subjective experience as irrelevant 
to knowledge is a fundamental misunderstanding: 
Until affective impressionality is recognized as the substance that most certainly 
exists, it will continue to be ruled out of court as merely idiotic, as singular, as 
personal, as subjective, and […] the first move in any account of aesthetic experience 
will be to cross out, to fail accurately to listen to, the experience the inquirer has 
actually had, in favor of an experience she thinks she ought to have had. (2002, p. 12) 
My claim, following these insights from Jarvis, Robertson and Althusser, is that the 
experience which underpins any criticism is always subjective, particular, varying depending 
on the perspectives and experiences of the individual reader, as well as the ways in which that 
reader is situated by the identity categories and class position they occupy within the 
ideological processes of the social whole. By the same token that I take the specific, 
individual subject, the reader of any given text, to be the primary point of action of that text, I 
also take the individual subject – conceived not as isolated, as individually free, but as formed 
and forming of the social whole, in interrelation with every other individual subject – to be a 
primary site of ideological struggle. The question is whether this messy reality, and the 
difficulties it poses for the possibility of a generalisable criticism, is dealt with head on, or 
whether it is erased through a critical stance of dispassionate objectivity. I choose not to erase 
it. This is important from the point of view of being epistemologically honest, but also from 
an ethics which wishes to acknowledge without universalising the partiality of my own 
perspective and subject-position. 
Fisher’s ‘Necessary Business’ integrates arguments about the necessary singularity of any 
individual’s reading, and therefore of criticism, with ideas which are more central to 
Linguistically Innovative poetics, about readerly participation in the creation or completion of 
the meaning of an open and ambiguous text. He states that “it is impossible to eliminate the 
self from the act of interpretation” and that “reading takes place from the present, however 
contextualized or prepared the reader is” (Fisher, 2016, p. 39). His own critical reading, 
therefore, “necessarily brings another text. I would be naive to believe it was the same text as 
another’s, or that a generalization of text […] was possible” (2016, p. 39). Fisher shows that 
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the radical, subjective singularity of any given reading experience is a correlative of the idea 
that it is a participatory, collaborative reading practice that creates a text from a poetry which 
itself deliberately eschews fixed and clear meaning. This idea is and has been important to the 
self-conception of much experimental poetry. 
The disruption of any standard of objective criticism further follows from the initial premise, 
the Althusserian understanding of ideology as universal, which suggests that clear, objective 
knowledge is neither possible, nor really even a coherent aim. Theoretical or critical texts are 
made out of the same socially formed and always ideologically loaded language as literary 
texts, and speak only in and of the conditions, presuppositions and material inequalities of 
their ideological milieu. They can neither be read nor written only for their dispassionate, 
supposedly clear and objective content, within a framework that sees their ideas as abstract 
and defers to their authority. If all understanding is mystified by the processes that make it 
possible in the first place, then a language which pretends to an unmediated clarity – which 
believes itself able to make claims of anything more than a highly conditional and provisional 
use- or truth- content – is not only naïve in its denial of its own ideological nature, but in 
being so blithely obfuscates the ways it reproduces the ideological conditions of its legibility. 
The ways in which this claim is also central within the tradition of experimental poetics in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries will be delineated in more detail in the following chapter. 
~ 
Poetics’ ‘answers’ are provisional, its trajectory nomadic, its positions temporary and 
strategic. (Sheppard, 2003, p. 4) 
~ 
This thesis will develop the idea that thinking which is resistive or divergent from processes 
of reproduction, which has the capacity to reach towards newness, might best be done though 
forms, like those of experimental poetry, whose coherence is, at most, tentative, provisional, 
uncertain, which eschew transparency and gesture towards kinds of cognitive content not 
containable within the clear language of a given ideological moment. I must take this into 
account in my own writing, if I am to be consistent, and to avoid an abstracted theorising that 
simply reproduces the forms and conditions it claims to resists. 
The subjective-singular basis of any critical encounter, the conventions of innovative poetry, 
and my theoretical premises about the function of ideology and the subject therefore all 
dictate that my own critical reading and writing practice will attempt to move away from both 
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expectations of dispassionate, objective critical discourse, and from a stance of clarity and 
authority. 
I include myself, not as a transparent, non-ideological, untainted and universal non-subject, 
but as a thinking, feeling, encountering, particular subject-critic, whose experience is the 
admitted basis for criticism, with all the messiness, partiality and uncertainty attendant on 
that. It follows that the four readings of texts by my four key poets might be referred to not as 
close readings but rather as encounters. These readings will begin as non-universalised, 
subjective encounters, which admit from the start that they are refracted not just through the 
concerns and questions of this thesis, but also through all the arbitrary and unrelated 
circumstances of my reading them – specifically me, the loosely continuous, fluctuating, 
tentative constellation of sensations, concerns and desires interpellated by the name Joey 
Frances, a man working on his PhD thesis in a rented house in Manchester, UK, a poet 
scribbling in the margins of some of his best-loved works of poetry, an inconsistent 
participant in the class war the British left are currently losing, etc. 
Whilst I hope that these semi-discrete encounters, taken in isolation, might usefully describe 
and examine much of what is happening in the texts themselves, in what might be thought of 
as a more conventional literary-critical function, they will do so using my own experience of 
the poetry as a tentative test-case. I ask what effects the texts have or demands they make on 
me as a reader, and what the possibilities of thinking and being they attempt to open up in the 
reading-encounter itself can show me about resistance more generally.  
Beyond this, I aim for a writing whose coherence is, at most, tentative, provisional, uncertain 
and self-doubting, which allows fracture into itself, attempting to make speculative, strategic 
and temporary kinds of propositions of possibility – thinking from and with the poetry and 
theory – rather than dispassionate claims. As the poetry, and my readings of it, rejects 
objectivity and over-hasty naturalisation, and embraces ambiguous, multiplicitous, uncertain, 
fractious kinds of reading, a reading adequate to these demands and able to account for the 
experience of reading this work must attempt to reach for all its absences, insufficiencies, 
indeterminacy, the evocation of that which feels out of reach, and must work hard not to ride 
over these things or render them more comprehensible than they really are. The risk of being 
reductive which accompanies any critical reading of poetry, and especially that which 
strongly resists naturalisation, becomes urgently felt, for example, in the readings of Anna 
Mendelssohn’s work. This work explicitly rejects inquisitorial kinds of conventional 
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academic reading, which it derisively describes as “gradgrind rectification” (Mendelssohn, 
2000, p. 31). 
It follows from the need for a kind of writing which disrupts some of these conventional 
expectations of academic prose, in the context of the genre of poetics, that this thesis will also 
include what might be thought of as some minor more ‘creative’ elements, of formal and tonal 
shifts towards the ambiguous, the impressionistic, away from a claim to the stable authority of 
the rational, dispassionate and clearly explicable dissection of texts or ideas. One such 
manoeuvre that I have already employed is the use of interruptive, unremarked quotations, 
scattered throughout the previous chapter, and to a lesser extent in this one. These quotations 
aim to have an illustrative relationship to the arguments and ideas that surround them, or to 
expand on those ideas through a kind of poetic meaning, in an oblique relationship that relies 
on and necessitates a degree of readerly interpretation, rather than requiring the stabilising 
action of my own explication, which I have deliberately omitted. This is something I will do 
occasionally throughout the thesis. 
* 
One further reason for this subjective, provisional, destabilising drive in my own writing, 
briefly alluded to above, is that the uncertainty which underpins attempts to create a general 
certain knowledge also negates the real experiences of marginalised subjects. Whilst universal 
ideology undermines any notion of objective, rationalist knowledge, there is a more specific 
criticism that can be made here: discourses which purport to this kind of generality, in 
deleting the actual, partial subjective experience of the individual, project an alternative 
experience onto it – “an experience she thinks she ought to have had”, in Jarvis’s terms. The 
standards of generality to which this projected experience will tend to conform are dictated by 
the experience of those subjects who occupy more privileged or dominant identity categories, 
and so will further reinforce already dominant understandings and relations. Where an 
individual critic occupies hegemonic subject positions, but treats their subjective experience 
of a text as authoritative and universal without any interrogation – were I, as a straight, white, 
cis man born in the UK, and in the midst of a highly privileged education, to attempt to write 
with unchecked authority – it would be to continue a long intellectual legacy of claiming 
perspectives like mine to be the standard by which knowledge is established and (oftentimes 
violently) enforced. Such discourses entrench the most hegemonic understandings of 
collective subjectivity by treating them as neutral, and erase possibilities for deviation. 
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My writing from a self-acknowledged position of partial subjectivity doesn’t solve these 
problems, but is the very least I can do, as part of an attempt to write in a way which is 
tentative, open, available for interrogation, challenge, change, and which is focussed around 
listening to, reading and learning from the work of those who know and understand what I 
simply cannot by virtue of different experiences and subject positions. Acknowledging that I 
come to these works through my own constellation of concerns, each encounter will pull 
together, from all the potentialities and dis-jointed elements of each text, the possibility of an 
intelligibility within a thought-world that they help me to form, as they push generatively 
towards the conception of an argument, as a resistive poetics. This is offered forth not as solid 
knowledge, but as a series of tentative gestures, which hope to be found useful in our general 
struggle. 
This opens up the problem, however, that my own subject position comes with its own 
epistemological and conceptual biases and barriers to understanding. This is less obviously 
relevant to my encounter with Sean Bonney’s work, but the chapters that follow raise some 
clear issues in this regard. Robertson’s work very explicitly builds up an argument for a 
feminine mode of thought which emerges from the experience of being interpellated into the 
social norms of womanhood; Kapil’s work aims for an identification across experiences of 
racial, gendered and sexual violence; Mendelssohn’s work deals with traumatic and 
oppressive experiences as a woman and a mother, as well as thinking about experiences of 
antisemitism, and widely condemns the modes of thinking which link these and other forms 
of domination and violence. As a white man, ongoingly interpellated into masculine thinking, 
with little to no direct, or indirect, experience of racial or gendered violence, I am not the 
person with whom these texts most wish to connect – though I may be the object of some of 
their harshest challenges – and my experiences and knowledge poorly equip me to understand 
some of their central matters. 
I don’t admit these positions and their potential biases and barriers as a manoeuvre to shake 
them off, but to point out their specifics, where all readings and experience unavoidably have 
their own particular subjective positionings. As these are often obscured by claims to a more 
dispassionate reading, I admit them freely in order to open my work up to (self) critique, and 
to accept the rebuttals of these texts. These readings will be failing and non-definitive, they 
will miss things that might be rightly central or obvious to another reader – but yet I hope that 
the process of working through these texts can teach me something, that a faltering but 
sympathetic engagement might open myself and my readers up to that which we don’t yet 
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know, and that the witness to that working-through can be of use to others in drawing out 
some of what is most vitally resistive in the poems. 
* 
 ~ 
The aim of literary criticism, to parody Marx, is to describe writing; the purpose of 
poetics is to change it. (Sheppard, 2003, p. 3) 
~ 
Whilst my poetic encounters are partially discrete, at the same time they are intended to work 
cumulatively, to build a long-form argument which is not strictly about these texts but is of 
and through them. These encounters might contain open questions, or moments of 
inconsistency from one to the other, since the argument is not strict and sequential, but is 
made through the totality of the four readings taken together. The final goal of that argument 
is not to illuminate what those poems are as such, but to give an account of what they suggest 
and show about the possibilities of what a poetry could be, in answer to the problems of 
ideology and resistance (in (poetic) language). The accounts of contemporary poetry will then 
be exploratory, looking at both what the poems do and the potential arguments for possibility 
which they advance in their doing. 
Since the questions I am asking of poetry – how can poetry which finds its material conditions 
oppressive contribute towards resistance through the language of those conditions? – are 
concomitant with wider questions of being and resisting in the world – how we can act to 
consciously imagine and bring about less oppressive conditions from inside the ideologically 
and materially forming limits of those conditions? – these acts of speculatively casting into 
the future of writing might hope also to, tentatively and uncertainly, speculatively cast into the 
future possibilities of being, together, of new relations, of possible action. I take this too to be 
a central dual wish of the poetry which I’m reading in this thesis. 
In The Poethical Wager, Joan Retallack explains her coinage of the term “poethics”, which 
signifies how the premises of any poetics are also always implicitly a set of ideas about the 
world that can be seen to have an ethical dimension. She states: “Every poetics is a 
consequential form of life. Any making of forms out of language (poesis) is a practice with a 
discernible character (ethos)” (Retallack, 2003, p. 11), and later, “Every form, old or new, has 
its poethical matrices and consequences. We can ask—after or while locating our questions 
within a value context—What are they? Are they useful to us?” (2003, p. 43). These claims 
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bring to my mind similar formulations of Frederic Jameson’s, from The Political 
Unconscious: “every form of practice, including the literary-critical kind, implies and 
presupposes a form of theory”; “the working theoretical framework or presuppositions of a 
given method are in general the ideology which that method seeks to perpetuate” (2002, p. 
58).  
Within a highly politicised poetic tradition, the questions of poetry’s possibility has always 
been tied up with working through questions of political struggle, and the demands made 
upon my poetics, or which lead me to it, are also already ethical demands. This is a vital 
function of the form of poetics as I am deploying it here. As I delineate a poetics which deals 
in the possibility of resistance, I will be also always alert to the ideological and political 
consequences of this framework, to the forms of life embedded or longed for in the forms of 





Chapter 3: Some generative schemas 
 Against known reality 
A critique of “transparency” (Bernstein, 1992, p. 26; Silliman et al, 1988, p. 268), “realism” 
(Bernstein, 1992, pp. 9/26; Sutherland, 2011, p. 57; Bonney, 2015, pp. 27/142; Lake, 1995, 
[p. 12]) “empirical lyricism” (Sheppard, 2005, p. 2; Crozier, 1983), forms of language that 
convey thoughts, feelings, messages – even politically radical ones – in forms which can be 
readily recognised and understood without challenging the basis of that recognition or 
understanding, is a central basis of the traditions of radically intentioned innovative poetry in 
which this thesis situates itself. This critique, in its various forms, often employs ideas that are 
closely related to my Althusserian understanding of the problem of universal ideology, 
reproduction and resistance, to suggest that more mainstream forms of poetry which employ 
these modes are inherently conservative at a formal level, if not at the level of authorial 
intention or articulate subject matter. The idea of disrupting this conservative function, and 
writing a poetry which is capable of having a more critical relation to its ideological 
conditions as they exist in language – even a poetry that might push towards something new – 
is a consistently attributed motivation for the use of formally disruptive techniques and the 
move away from conventional comprehensibility in this poetry. 
A key theoretical influence on this kind of thinking within the poetic traditions in which my 
project is working is Theodor Adorno. His essay ‘Commitment’, first published in English in 
1974, discusses the almost intractable problems of ideological complicity for any literature 
which wishes to be politically resistive, from the point of view of Marxist criticism, using 
terms that are familiar to discussions of innovative poetry. The piece responds to Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s emphasis on political commitment in literature (specifically in his What is 
Literature?) by dismantling a distinction between ‘autonomous’ and ‘committed’ works of art 
(in very simple terms, a distinction between ‘art for art’s sake’, which values aesthetic 
freedom and repudiates social or political instrumentality, and art which aims to have a 
recognisable social message or action). Adorno argues that both modes can be reactionary, 
complicit in the reproduction of their social (pre)conditions, can constitute a refusal to face up 
to the extent to which we are all inside the reality of the conditions that impoverish us. 
This is underpinned by an understanding that “the surface of social life, the sphere of 
consumption, which includes the psychologically motivated actions of individuals, occludes 
the essence of society—which, as the law of exchange, is itself abstract” (Adorno, 1974, p. 
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80); the conditions of our living and the social processes by which they reproduce themselves 
are rendered invisible and natural, from our inescapable position within them. This chimes 
with my understanding of ideology; I take it as similar, for example, to Althusser’s claim that 
“the tenacious obviousness […] of the point of view of production alone […] are so integrated 
into everyday ‘consciousness’ that it is extremely hard, not to say almost impossible, to raise 
oneself to the point of view of reproduction” (1971, p. 132). Art too, is always caught within 
these same processes:  
Works of art that react against empirical reality obey the forces of that reality [...] 
There is no material content, no formal category of an artistic creation, however 
mysteriously changed and unknown to itself, which did not originate in the empirical 
reality from which it breaks free. (Adorno, 1974, p. 86)  
Adorno argues that ‘committed’ works which push a particular intelligible agenda within the 
confines of acceptable realism acquiesce in a notion of reality which doesn’t recognise the 
ways individuals are shaped and limited by the situations in which they live – doesn’t 
recognise that the bounds of intelligibility are themselves part of ideological formation – but 
which believes in a liberal idea that we can simply change our situation through self-will. 
Supposedly autonomous works, whilst less bound by the limits of intelligible message, can be 
apolitical, can refuse to engage with the social world at all, in a kind of complacent aesthetic 
play which is inherently conservative. They fail to acknowledge that they are still rooted in 
the particular conditions of their emergent situation, and so can also imply a false liberal 
freedom. 
The dichotomy between autonomous and committed works is folded into a dialectical 
criticism whereby “each of the two alternatives negates itself with the other” (Adorno, 1974, 
p. 76). They cease to be opposites since each is made necessary by the criticism of the other, 
within the same web of complicity in their conditions. Adorno’s essay tells us that all works 
depend, for any function at all, on a partial submission to the intelligibility of current 
constraints, no matter how much it rejects them: 
Works of art which by their existence take the side of the victims of a rationality that 
subjugates nature, are even in their protest constitutively implicated in the process of 
rationalization itself. Were they to try to disown it, they would become both 
aesthetically and socially powerless: mere clay. (1974, p. 87) 
Adorno argues for a politicised autonomy which is non-realist, non-programmatic, difficult, 
using language in unconventional and formally involved ways. This, he says, makes an active 
refusal of the notion that empirical reality is a true presence and that there could be no other 
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than the parameters of what appears to us in the given moment. Against realist committed 
texts, Adorno suggests “a text whose language jolts signification and by its very distance from 
‘meaning’ revolts in advance against positivist subordination of meaning,” advocating the 
importance of “what the shock of the unintelligible can communicate” (1974, p. 77). Both this 
logic and the characteristics of its proposed texts might readily speak of characteristic 
principles of innovative poetry. 
However, this final turn towards autonomy belies the most interesting and vital parts of the 
essay, its most dialectical moments of criticism of the dichotomy between autonomy and 
commitment, and suggests despite itself that unintelligibility and revolt from meaning can in 
themselves have some resistive efficacy. I want to maintain the critical position whereby all 
forms are seen as tending primarily towards complicity in the terms of their given reality, and 
not to pick autonomy as one option in this dialectic, but to move through it to a re-assessment 
of what political commitment might usefully look like. (This wish, to find the as-yet-invisible 
through-way between the intractable complicity of presented options, to dissolve restrictive 
binaries, will be a recurrent method of thought in this thesis). This is not a radical divergence 
from Adorno so much as a re-emphasis, more towards something like a non-realist 
commitment, which uses the kind of shocks Adorno advocates to disrupt from the inside the 
realism of its oppressive conditions, whilst still having some hope for specific, if not readily 
recognisable, political aims. 
 ~ 
 Poems teach one that much: 
 To expect no answer. 
  (Veronica Forrest-Thomson, ‘S/Z’, Collected Poems, 2008, p. 161) 
 ~ 
One early and highly influential work which expounds these kinds of ideas as integral to an 
innovative poetics is poet and critic Veronica Forrest-Thomson’s Poetic Artifice. The book, 
first published in 1978, uses contemporary post-structuralist thinking in a defence of artifice 
in poetry – all poetry’s formal, prosodic, organisational or aesthetic qualities – which casts 
itself in opposition to perceived orthodoxies of poetry and criticism. Forrest-Thomson 
criticises over-hasty “naturalisation”, which she defines as “an attempt to reduce the 
strangeness of poetic language and poetic organisation by making it intelligible”, reducing it 
to “an external thematic statement about the already-known world” (2016, p. 36). “Already-
known” is a key term here; it reflects Forrest-Thomson’s claim that poetry which makes 
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claims about the world in recognisable, intelligible language colludes in the terms of that 
intelligibility, and re-presents the world as it is currently recognisable, which is to say, 
perpetuates an idea of the world as it already exists. Poetry seen as a “‘comment on life’” 
makes 
art subservient to life as we know it rather than a subversion and reinvention of that 
life through artifice; it makes us ignore mediation and take the ‘reality’ given us by 
ordinary language as the final court of appeal. (Forrest-Thomson, 2016, p. 71). 
“Mediation” here can be taken as analogous to ideology, the overall collective conceptual 
framework which forms the conditions of possibility of understanding, and through which all 
possible perception of ‘reality’ is seen: “We have been taught by Marx, Freud [etc] […] that 
the human consciousness cannot get at reality itself without mediation” (Forrest-Thomson, 
2016, p. 71). 
Alluding to the possibility for a critical relation to this mediation, for something like the 
“internal distance” posited by Althusser, Forrest-Thomson quotes Paul de Man: “literature, 
unlike everyday language, begins on the far side of knowledge; it is the only form of language 
free from the fallacy of unmediated expression” (Forrest-Thomson, 2016, p. 72). It is taken as 
a given here that literary uses of language dispense with the sometimes necessary pretence to 
such clarity, and can recognise that the language of which they are made is opaque, pre-
loaded with all sorts of socially formed contents.14 
By contrast to practices of reading and writing poetry which ignore mediation and turn 
towards easy naturalisation and formal transparency, squandering poetry’s critical and artistic 
potential and “puchas[ing] intelligibility at the cost of blindness”, Forrest-Thomson claims 
it is only through artifice that poetry can challenge our ordinary linguistic orderings of 
the world, make us question the way in which we make sense of things, and induce us 
to consider its alternative linguistic orders as a new way of viewing the world. (2016, 
p. 36) 
This is articulated primarily as an ambition, or a wish, rather than a fleshed-out poetics of 
subversion and reinvention. Nonetheless, Forrest-Thomson’s more developed critique of the 
conservative function of easy naturalisation directly leads to the influential notion that a 
politically resistive poetics might deliberately utilise foregrounded artifice which cannot be 
 
14 Distinguishing between the workings of poetry and more common utilitarian functions of language, Forrest-
Thomson points to Wittgenstein's aphorism that “a poem, even though it is composed in that language of giving 
information is not used in the language-game of giving information” (2016, p. 34; quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Zettel, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), p. 160) 
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easily naturalised to disrupt the processes of reproduction and attempt to reach for alternative 
conceptions of the world. 
 ~ 
   As soon as I write “the world”, 
 It doesn’t invert. 
  (Robert Sheppard, ‘Internal Exile 1’, The Flashlight Sonata, 1993, p. 32) 
 ~ 
More recently, poet and critic Robert Sheppard has delineated much of the history, 
development, thinking and common features of British Innovative poetics, first in Far 
Language (1999), and later in his three books The Poetry of Saying (2005), When Bad Times 
Made for Good Poetry (2011) and The Meaning of Form in Contemporary Innovative Poetry 
(2016). These accounts are informed by Sheppard’s own central involvement in the activities 
and conversations that formed themselves under the banner of Linguistically Innovative 
Poetry. I will be focussing on The Poetry of Saying here, in which, through the lens of his 
own interpretive readings, Sheppard describes a poetics in which these questions about 
ideology, resistance, reproduction, and their relation to poetic form play a central role.  
Sheppard criticises what he calls the “Movement Orthodoxy”,15 a mainstream poetry with a 
normative convention of “empirical lyricism” (2005, p. 2).16 The Movement Orthodoxy 
“privileges a poetry of closure, narrative coherence and grammatical and syntactic cohesion, 
which colludes with the process of naturalisation” (Sheppard, 2005, p. 2) (note the use of 
terminology which is key to Forrest-Thomson’s Poetic Artifice here, demonstrating its 
acknowledged influence on Sheppard’s work17). 
By contrast, Sheppard posits something of an alternative foundational position in Jean-
Francois Lyotard’s notion of a post-modern art “producing not the known but the unknown” 
(Sheppard, 2005, p. 3). He states his own position: “Writing’s only possible state is one of 
change and development, a process of working towards new meanings hitherto unuttered, not 
the formulation of a product from prior assumptions of meaning” (Sheppard, 1999, p. 24). 
 
15 So named after the persistence in mainstream British poetry of some version of the poetic values of the 
‘Movement poets’, a grouping from the 1950s, exemplified in Sheppard’s account by Philip Larkin. 
16 This term was originally coined by Andrew Crozier in his 1983 essay ‘Thrills and Frills: poetry as figures of 
empirical lyricism’. 
17 Sheppard reviewed Poetic Artifice in 1979 (Sheppard, 1999, pp. 9-11). It comes up many times in The Poetry 
of Saying, e.g.: (Sheppard, 2005, pp. 6, 68, 153) 
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Sheppard suggests mainstream, empirical, closed forms acquiesce in the status quo even when 
they oppose it; a poetry of empiricism tends particularly strongly towards reproduction of “the 
known”, is wrought at a basic level out of “prior assumptions of meaning”. Once again, clear 
propositions are seen as partly complicit in their ideological situation at the level of form, by 
dint of their conformity to ideologically enforced and enforcing standards of legibility. He 
sees the formal techniques of Innovative poetry, oppositional to the Movement Orthodoxy, as 
using open forms which disrupt or resist conventional, empirical kinds of coherence, to create 
previously unrecognisable possible meanings, as a critique of the status quo. 
Poet and critic Charles Bernstein’s verse essay ‘Artifice of Absorption’ is another key account 
which demonstrates some related thinking about poetics and resistance to structures of 
ideological formation, constraint and reproduction, from within the parallel and overlapping 
Language Poetry tradition in the US. 
 ~ 
the power of poetry to reconnect us 
with modes of meaning given in language 
but precluded by the hegemony of restricted 
epistemological economies 
(Charles Bernstein, ‘Artifice of Absorption’, A Poetics, 1992, p. 18) 
 ~ 
The essay focusses initially on a distinction between the concepts of “absorption” and 
“impermeability”. The two concepts are deliberately left hazy, but loosely speaking 
“absorption” is that which engrosses a reader, which lets them in, whereas “impermeability” 
is associated with difficulty, struggle, uncertainty. Initially, a vulgar absorption is aligned with 
realisms that acquiesce in, are absorbed by, absorb the reader in, accepted versions of reality 
and their concomitant modes of expression; “transparency is a central technique | of 
absorptive realisms” (Bernstein, 1992, p. 26). Anti-absorptive techniques, which emphasise 
rather than hide their artifice, create impermeability, beginning to resist the acquiescence of 
realist absorption and critique the modes of expression through which our perceptions are 
established. Bernstein explains by reference to Poetic Artifice: “‘artifice’ is the contradiction 
of ‘realism’, with | its insistence on presenting an unmediated | (immediate) experience of 
fact” (1992, p. 9); “absorptive & antiabsorptive elements both require | artifice, but the former 
may hide | this while the latter may flaunt | it” (1992, p. 30). Bernstein claims that 
encountering and working through difficult poetic texts which focus on the materiality of 
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language involves an examination of the linguistic structures through which our 
understanding of the world is constantly produced and reproduced. 
These few examples are by no means a comprehensive sweep of the history or theoretical 
basis of ideas about linguistic disruption and ideological resistance in Anglophone radical 
poetics; nor do I make a claim that they are in some way definitive or representative of an 
uncontested or monadic shared poetics across these connected but wide traditions. However, 
these are important and influential texts, whose ideas communicate closely with one another, 
as most obviously shown by the direct use of Forrest-Thomson by both Sheppard and 
Bernstein. They demonstrate an interrelated web of thinking that runs through much of the 
innovative poetic tradition whereby linguistically disruptive formal techniques – “artifice”, 
“the shock of the unintelligible” – are seen as capable of challenging the “already-known”, 
“prior assumptions of meaning”; whereas language which is easily naturalisable, claims 
transparency, which operates through “absorptive realisms”, is seen as acquiescing in those 
assumptions, in the “positivist subordination of meaning”, to reproduce the known world, to 
naturalise existing relations. This provides a conceptual starting point and the beginnings of a 
vocabulary for launching my own investigation into the possibilities of poetic resistance to the 
processes of ideological reproduction in – and out of – language.18 
 
Defamiliarisation and newness 
These texts also demonstrate what I see as some major divergences between some dominant 
elements of radical poetic thinking as it has been hitherto articulated and the poetics I wish to 
work through here, showing the space in which this thesis hopes to develop. 
 
18 I will often use the term ‘realism’, with occasional and various qualifications, throughout this thesis. This 
follows the use of “realism” and “reality” in Adorno, Forrest-Thomson and Bernstein here, to operate as a 
shorthand for the particular kind of realism which suggests that a certain set of conditions and relations are ‘real’, 
in a way that naturalises and reifies those conditions and sets all that isn’t cast as ‘real’, that is outside this 
realism’s descriptive capacity, as also outside of conceivable possibility. This also implicitly extends to a 
language which, through transparency, empirical lyricism, a commitment to an already-intelligible description of 
an already-known world, commits itself to the unchallengeable reality of its prior conditions. A belief that one 
can neutrally depict what is real reifies that version of reality, and entails the normative enforcement of the 
currently real, its stasis. As this understanding of realism is modified as “absorptive realism” in Bernstein above, 
it later will be specified as “bourgeois realism” by Keston Sutherland (2011, p. 57), and as “police realism” by 
Sean Bonney (2015, p. 142). By situating my use of this term in this context, I would distinguish it from the 
more general meaning – as in, accurately describing things as they are – since the thesis questions this as a 
possibility, and will, as it develops, come to find that “non-realist” forms of writing might come closer to 
depicting actual experience in all its fracture and messiness. 
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Bernstein's thinking often relies on an account of ideology as “a particular and restricted point 
of view” (1992, p. 2), which focusses on the specific mystifications of late capitalism. The 
role he gives for poetry is then to do with ridding language of this ideological baggage, 
attempting to use disruptive techniques which might create conditions for a clearer 
perception: “the word, | & world, made opaque that it may be apprehended” (1992, p. 83). 
This is at odds with my own account after Althusser, in which ideology is universal and 
perception never clear. Whilst acknowledging the constructive function of language within 
ideology, Bernstein’s Language Poetry contemporaries use language with similar 
implications: “In order to lay bare language's inherent capacity to construct belief, it is 
necessary at times to disrupt its convention as communicative transparency” (Silliman et al, 
1988, p. 268). It is the idea of “laying bare” as the function of formal disruption which causes 
problems here, just as they hope to “recharge this neurological scar tissue with some new 
synapses” (Silliman et al, 1988, p. 266), to revivify the possibilities of a damaged language. I 
contend that ideological construction can never be laid bare, nor language in this sense 
recharged. 
Sheppard introduces a number of key terms for common techniques of innovative poetry: 
“indeterminacy and discontinuity” (2005, p. 142); “broken utterance and syntactic rupture” 
(2005, p. 103); “defamiliarisation” and “de-automatising” (2005, p. 92). These techniques, in 
common with Bernstein’s critical impermeability, are all geared, in Sheppard’s analysis, 
towards de-seating or destabilising readers’ (and writers’) relationship with their ideological 
conditions, their internalised perception of social reality. Even “creative linkage,” a key 
concept of Sheppard's with a more positive implication – in which formally and conceptually 
disjunctive combinations, of contents that aren't rationally connected, create new conceptions 
– is attributed the ultimate aim of “counter[ing] absoluteness with plurality” (2005, p. 207). 
At the last, Sheppard’s account of this technique defaults to a generalised destabilisation of 
meaning, falling short of any suggestion of serious positive propositional or imaginative 
capacity. 
The central thesis of The Poetry of Saying, and its analysis of the distinct characteristics of 
Innovative poetics, focusses on the distinction between "said" and "saying", which Sheppard 
derives from the work of Emmanuel Levinas: “Language as saying is an ethical openness to 
the other; as that which is said – reduced to a fixed identity or synchronized presence – it is an 
ontological closure of the other” (Sheppard, 2005, p. 189). Sheppard contrasts the “said”, a 
language of closed statement, of realist intelligibility, with this language of “saying”, in which 
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formal openness – ambiguity or plurality of meaning – is seen as directly entailing an ethical 
kind of “openness to the other”, to the unfamiliar subject or concept. 
This is related to the description Allen Fisher gives in ‘Necessary Business’ – through 
readings of cris cheek, Eric Mottram and J.H. Prynne – of the then emergent poetic tradition 
of the British Poetry Revival and Linguistically Innovative Poetry, which he calls “new 
pertinence” (2016, p. 37). Whilst there is a sense throughout that the aesthetic principles of 
this poetry are undergirded by a resistive drive, by a wish to undermine cultural norms, 
Fisher’s analysis ultimately turns towards freedom, or openness: 
If nothing else, the work reveals the possibility of a freedom. In Heidegger’s terms, it 
reveals that open region within which the participator, with regard to what they are 
and how they are, can properly take their stand and become capable of being said. 
(2016, p. 75) 
The function of the complex vocabulary and cultivation of high levels of reader involvement 
in the texts under discussion 
is to cultivate a plurivocity and thus ensure for the language its meaningfulness, its 
avoidance of co-option by the State. Distinct from the intentions of a possible future, 
their poetry approaches evocations of vision. It dissuades from the competence of 
eidetics and empirics by bringing toward production a relativistic phenomenology of 
vision. (2016, p. 76) 
This is difficult to parse, in the midst of a highly involved and somewhat oblique discussion, 
but I wish to note the emphasis on “freedom”, the “open region”, “a relativistic 
phenomenology of vision”, and the idea that “plurivocity” might in and of itself be anti-State. 
Like Sheppard and Bernstein, Fisher emphasises a destabilisation that leads to openness as an 
end point in itself, as inherently resistive. His poetics seems to believe in the possibility of an 
open, democratic space for new meaning which is in some sense outside of the veil of 
ideology. I think Althusser convincingly shows that such a space is fundamentally not a 
meaningful possibility. Further, it is now perhaps more clear than it was in 1985 that there is 
no contradiction at all between plurivocity and the capitalist state; a superficial plurality of 
voices, the presence of de-natured forms of dissent as protest-spectacle, and an openness to 
supposedly free discussion, is a key logic of the contemporary liberal state and its apparatus. 
This demonstrates that openness is not in fact meaningfully open to alternative possibility, but 
as deeply ideological as all else. 
Another, more recent, and more extreme example of a related thinking is in Keston 
Sutherland’s account of the late work of J.H. Prynne, in Hix Eros 4 (2014). In Sutherland’s 
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analysis, late Prynne sees the idioms of everyday speech as “almost pure cant”, and thus “it is 
only after the language of ordinary subjectivity (tout court an ‘idiom’) has been exceeded and 
ruptured at its furthest edge that poetic thought can appear” (Sutherland, 2014, p. 10). 
Sutherland reads this poetics as one very explicitly about cleansing the language, based on a 
disruptive use of language that removes the vestiges of a general subjectivity which it sees as 
completely complicit in the unthinking instrumentalization of everyday language by dominant 
ideology. 
The common ground between these various positions – as it is characteristic of their thinking 
about the resistive capacity of innovative poetics – is one of the key areas in which I find 
these poetics to deal insufficiently with the problems of universal ideology, and to leave space 
for the argument of this thesis. The holding up of “openness” as the end point of an ethical 
poetics, the lauding of values of ambiguity, “plurality”, and the effects of “defamiliarisation”, 
the notion of clearing out ideological baggage – all this proposes a commitment to formal 
work conceived as having a resistive capacity primarily based on ideological disruption. 
Just as Adorno’s turn towards autonomy, discussed earlier in this chapter, gives only half an 
answer to its own problems, turning towards disruption and revolt against meaning whilst 
abandoning the possibility of some re-figured commitment, this destabilisation, de-seating or 
defamiliarization too only takes us so far. It is an important element of any ideological 
resistance, but stops a little short of theorising how poetry might attempt any positive 
articulation or gesture towards alternative conceptions and relations, how it might specifically 
name the harms of a given situation or experience, or contribute to the active production of 
alternative possibilities in the language of the conditions it opposes. Such defamiliarisation 
responds to the ideological complicity of realist language by using ambiguity, artifice, formal 
disruption, to create interrogatory critical distance from the content of the language, to render 
it uncertain, opening up what ideology closes down. Yet, if ideology is eternal, the ground 
can’t be cleared, and defamiliarisation or uncertainty is not enough. Resistance must be not 
just about disruptive criticism, but also about finding ways to use the formal arsenal of this 
poetry for more positive gestures towards reconfiguration, towards the tentative articulation, 
despite the almost inescapable complicity of our language, of situations which are no less 
ideologically muddied, but are less oppressive, more conducive to general flourishing; this is 
one of the primary contentions of this thesis. 
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In Women’s Experimental Poetry in Britain 1970-2010, David Kennedy and Christine 
Kennedy relate the dominance of these positions which over-emphasise defamiliarisation as 
an end in itself to the enduring high levels of dominance of male voices within the British 
experimental poetic tradition up until at least the early twenty-first century. They characterise 
the dominant strain of masculine experimental poetry as interested in “meta-linguistic and 
meta-poetic” disruption, “concerned with writing and systems of representation” and the 
formation of the social subject, politicised through disrupting processes of meaning itself. 
This “‘meta-’ approach”, they worry, “has often made experimental poetry appear isolated 
from, or not interested in, the energetic contestations of normativities of class, gender, nation, 
race and religion” and “risks ignoring what women experimental poets in Britain are saying 
and talking about in their poetries” (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2013, p. 41). 
A poetry which privileges the resistive possibilities of disruption and openness at the expense 
of the harder task of attempts – in the face of the problems posed by universal ideology – to 
make more positive kinds of propositional or diagnostic articulations is seen here to be a 
poetry more easily favoured by people who occupy more hegemonic subject positions; its 
insufficiencies are made more palpably obvious to those whose oppositional politics emerges 
from or is supplemented by a lived experience of oppression and marginalisation. 
Kennedy & Kennedy expand on this criticism in a way which neatly sums up some of my 
own scepticism about the limits of this kind of resistive poetics as an end point:  
The materiality/disruption argument becomes even more problematic when one 
attempts to attach it to ideas of revolutionary agency. How can something that can 
only be experienced and identified as disruption of an established order be the starting 
point for a radically different system? (2013, p. 42) 
This hints at the problem I’ve been getting at, and places it specifically in this context of 
women’s experimental poetry, that a radical poetry needs not just to be premised on 
disruption, but needs also to find a way through the problems that need disrupting, towards 
some proposition of the new, the alternative. 
It is precisely the aim of my project to think about how the disruptive and critical action of 
works which break away from the reproductive function of realist, empirical, easily 
naturalised language, can attempt to contribute to the imagination – and in some small way, to 
the realisation – of radically different systems. I also wish to think about how such a poetry 
can address itself to specific instances of oppression, and oppressive ideological formations, 
can engage in specific critiques and attempt to point to the direction out of those problems, 
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without falling back into the problems of vulgar realist commitment. If conventionally 
intelligible language reproduces the world from which it emerges, then poetry that wishes to 
be resistive in this way cannot make programmatic political propositions for alternative ways 
of being, thinking, acting. So, accepting that any resistance to the ideological conditions in 
which our subjectivities, our language, our entire framework for thinking and action are 
formed must begin through forms which resist intelligibility on the terms of preceding 
ideological conditions, I yet wish to examine how poetry uses such forms to gesture towards 
some alternative in a way that is not just completely abstract. I see this resistive work of 
poetry as a purposive reworking of the constraining ideological conditions through which it 
emerges – knowing that the attempt is a slow one even at its most urgent, that the gesture to 
other possible worlds is so easily folded in to safe comprehension under the logics of our 
time. 
In keeping with this commitment, the poetry under examination in the following chapters may 
not appear as ‘difficult’ or linguistically disruptive as the above critique of ‘realist’ forms 
might lead one to expect. They will be hard to pin down, will resist ready naturalisation, slip 
away from static meanings, build up through contradictions, form possibilities of thinking on 
the hoof, but they will also do so in language which is often readily ‘readable’, which pushes 
towards the possibility of an intelligibility just over the horizon, which builds towards that 
which we don’t yet know, from specific critiques and attacks on that which is already-known. 
Their difficulty and resistance to prior forms of intelligibility operates on a variety of levels, 
in the twists of an apparent argument, the balance of phrases, some confounding structure in a 
work as a whole, and not only in the more immediately visible difficulty of, for instance, the 
syntactically disrupted line. 
This move towards a resistance which, having learnt from the foundational critiques that 
underlie the formal disruptions of the experimental poetic traditions, yet wishes to turn away 
from the valorisation of open, ambiguous, plural kinds of meaning as ends in themselves, is in 
concert with similar drives in recent generations of poets working in this context. I see 
younger, more contemporary poets as turning towards a poetics of more direct engagement 
and intervention, where an interest in concrete political action contrasts with the more 
aestheticised political poetics of defamiliarisation. 
As an example, Towards. Some. Air., an anthology of interviews, articles, poems and poetic 
statements, published in Canada in 2015 and edited by Canadian poet Fred Wah and British 
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poet Amy De’Ath, is one of the most concerted efforts in recent years at articulating the 
poetics of the contemporary experimental poetry milieu in the UK and North America, in both 
its diversity and its elements of collectivity. The book links its poets together into a wide web 
of interconnection, interaction and shared concern across difference and distance, including 
tracing connections back through the lineage of the trans-Atlantic innovative tradition. It 
contains pieces from two of the poets I will be discussing in this thesis, Sean Bonney (who 
elsewhere has written on Anna Mendelssohn) and Lisa Robertson, as well as a large number 
of their contemporaries of both young and older poets from the UK, Canada and the US, a 
number of whom will come up in the course of this thesis: Andrea Brady writing on Denise 
Riley, Caroline Bergvall, cris cheek, Fred Moten, Keston Sutherland, Keith Tuma writing on 
Tom Raworth, Amy De’Ath (who elsewhere has written on Bhanu Kapil) interviewing 
Juliana Spahr.19 
De’Ath writes that the work collected is “a testament to a widespread interest in the relation 
between poetry and social change, or between poetry and revolution” (De’Ath & Wah, 2015, 
p. x). This interest in the relationship between art and social change is in itself a modest claim, 
and one which is enduring across time and tradition; to the additionally emphatic reference to 
specifically the radical social change of revolution, she adds that the book “implicitly turns 
away from” “the right to some sort of purely aesthetic form of confrontation that strives to 
resegregate art from other political concerns” (2015, p. x). The political drive shared by the 
works collected in this book is here cast as specifically opposed to the autonomy of a “purely 
aesthetic form of confrontation”, is emphatically not only “meta-”, and instead wishes to find 
ways to more directly address political concerns, implicitly looking to engage with specific 
contemporary problems, struggles and occasions.  
Two conferences that took place in 2013 illustrate a particular moment of heightened radical 
energy, and an increased wish to think about where poetry sits in relation to specific material 
problems and possibilities of intervention: Militant Politics and Poetry, at Birkbeck, 
University of London on 18th May 2013, and Poetry and/or Revolution, across UC Santa 
Cruz, UC Davis and UC Berkeley on October 3-5 2013. These conferences and the 
 
19 In his contextual essay Peter Jaeger explicitly makes the links between this book and the interconnected 
traditions in which it sits: “The relationships formed among language, social activism, and politics have of 
course been an ongoing focus of innovative poetries in both the North American and British contexts since at 
least the time of the New American Poetry of the 1950s and the British Poetry Revival of the 1960s. What seems 
new here is a more supportive form of pluralism, which is not so much marked by a specific school or 
movement, but by a shared sense of cultural critique, produced in relation to formal innovation.” (De’Ath & 
Wah, 2015, p. 2) 
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discussions that surrounded them speak to one another (sometimes directly, through online 
open letters) of the possibilities, or lack thereof, of poetry to intervene and participate in 
revolutionary activity and material social change, in the context of lived experience of 
community activism, street protest, direct actions and riots. The position of a general 
militancy for the readership and writership of the experimental poetry community is often 
taken as a given. Justin Katko writes: “Our poetry has an obvious readership in the militants 
with whom we have organised, demonstrated, and occupied” (Katko, 2013, para. 13). Danny 
Hayward asks: “Would it be useful to organise ourselves? In what way? e.g. form a faction; 
produce agitprop material; create a website; produce collective statements for website, 
perhaps weekly” (Hayward, 2013, para. 1). Will Rowe prefaces a statement about an 
argument among poets with “in a revolutionary epoch like our own” (Rowe, 2013, para. 5). 
I would like to suggest that the emergence of this particular strain of militancy, with an 
enduring influence on these poetry scenes and their shared sense of identity and poetics, can 
be partly, tentatively, traced to a series of political events which a great many poets were 
involved in, some as already established writers, others at an early and formative stage. Sean 
Bonney describes a shift whereby his work, and his thinking on subjectivity within it, 
“became [even more] politicized during the brief period of insurgent struggle that took place 
in the UK between 2010 and 2011. I started thinking about the lyric subject as a collective” 
(De’Ath & Wah, 2015, p. 284). At the Militant Politics and Poetry conference, referring to 
this same period, Jennifer Cooke describes the importance of “the figures who danced down 
Oxford streets [sic] during the student protests” (Cooke, 2013, para. 4), as well as mentioning 
readings at riots, and the events at Millbank Tower in central London in November 2010, 
when the very first of the national student protests against the rise in tuition fees brought 
about by the newly elected Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition ended with the 
Conservative Party headquarters being occupied and trashed by protestors. David Grundy 
mentions the riots which happened in London and subsequently across the rest of the country 
in the summer of 2011, following the murder of Mark Duggan by police, as well as the street 
parties which accompanied the funeral of Margaret Thatcher in April 2013 (Grundy, 2013). 
This is all on the backdrop of the initial spur of resistance to the inauguration of an austerity-
based economic policy with the election, of sorts, of the coalition government. In the 
American context, Chris Chen, Joshua Clover and Juliana Spahr, as well as David Buuck, 
write very explicitly of their involvement, and their involvement as poets, in the events of 
Occupy Oakland in the winter of 2011 (Chen, Clover & Spahr, 2013; Buuck, 2013). 
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Whilst these particular flashpoints of heightened militant political struggle, and the 
involvement of these poets in them, have been swept up and diffused in the ongoing 
movements of recent history, it is undoubtable that they have left a legacy. These collective 
experiences and conversations might be taken – as Bonney makes explicit for his own writing 
– as having an influence on the writing and thinking of many of those who were involved. In 
the UK, the ‘student movement’ involved a great many poets who were at that time based at 
universities, either as academics or as students, who organised and attended protests but also 
read at occupations, on picket lines, published pamphlets, and built personal connections 
within this context. 
I might hypothesise, partly from my own personal experience, that this was especially 
formative for that generation of poets who were students during this time; as an undergraduate 
myself from the start of this period in 2010, just beginning to explore what a poetic 
community in which I could be actively involved might look like, I took part in occupations 
and protests alongside a number of poets, and witnessed a body of work unfolding in the 
context of these events from my older peers. This period has also left a trail of subsequent 
publications – including most notably Bonney’s Letters Against the Firmament, which I will 
be discussing in this thesis, and Keston Sutherland’s Odes to TL61P, but also, say, Danny 
Hayward’s People (Mountain Press, 2013), Marianne Morris’ DSK (Tipped Press, 2013), 
Timothy Thornton’s TRAILS (Deterritorial Support Group, 2011), Lisa Jeschke and Lucy 
Beynon’s David Cameron: A Theatre of Knife Songs (Shit Valley, 2015). In a US context, 
Juliana Spahr’s That Winter the Wolf Came (Commune Editions, 2015) and Jackqueline 
Frost’s The Antidote (Compline, 2013), for example, partly come out of the context of events 
in Oakland during a similar period. 
This is all to say that I consider the context for this thesis, for my writing it and for the 
conversations to which it hopes to contribute, to include a not yet thoroughly documented 
move towards a greater wish for direct political address and instrumentality, of what might be 
seen as a more vulgarly committed kind, in contemporary experimental poetics, with more 
direct relations to community and street activism in which its poets are also involved. This is 
all on the backdrop of the well-established critiques of realist commitment and the limitations 
of those forms that I have already detailed; an ongoing reassessment of the problematic 
relationship between these conflicting drives and ideas is the conversation into which I insert 




 At first we didn’t mask up. We were poets. 
 Then slowly one by one we did. 
  (Juliana Spahr, ‘Turnt’, That Winter the Wolf Came, 2015, p. 82) 
 ~ 
The conversations at the conferences mentioned above had a tendency to focus on 
instrumental activism, and the relatively narrow question of whether or not poetry can 
contribute towards street activism, conceptualised often in terms of the cataclysmic event of 
the riot, the protest, the insurrectionary moment. The short answer to this question can only 
really be ‘no’ – leaving these conversations a little frustrated and frustrating. I have no wish, 
in my exploration of the ways poetry can contribute towards the ongoing and complicated 
process of resistance, to posit it as in any way equivalent to more material forms of activism, 
community support, redistribution of resources, etc. The question itself contains a narrowness 
of thinking about political instrumentality, just as, I think, the claim to a poetic resistance 
which stops at an overly aestheticised sense of linguistic defamiliarisation is also insufficient.  
An angle which more closely reflects the position I begin from and the ways this exploration 
will unfold is that of Amy De’ath, in an interview with Juliana Spahr: 
you agree that there’s a separation between what poetry can do and what activism can 
do, but I’m still wondering if that relation changes if you shift to a politics and a 
theory that are thinking about the domestic sphere, affective labour and emotional 
relationships, bringing up children, things like that. Whether a politics that pays 
sufficient attention to those spheres would also imply that poetry might have a 
different use, a different function. (De’Ath & Wah, 2015, p. 306) 
The work of resistance involves many reciprocal spheres. When I ask about the specific utility 
of experimental poetic practice, and how poetry can be actively resistive, in ways which point 
to specific problems and work towards positive gestures of imagination in terms of alternative 
ways of being and relating, this is not as or instead of activism in any simple sense. I think of 
the question, and the struggle for resistance, as part of the necessary attempt to re-form our 
relations, our sense of ourselves, our possibilities for action, at the level of the everyday also, 
and at the level of our thinking. If the reproduction of material relations are completely tied up 
to processes of ideological reproduction at the level of the subject, then ideological and more 






My criticisms and modifications of older accounts of resistive poetics are made very much in 
the spirit of comradely criticism, in the understanding that they are the legacy and foundation 
upon which I build my own poetics, and that many of the concepts and criticisms which they 
have hacked out ahead of me will remain indispensable. There is one conceptual distinction in 
Bernstein’s ‘Artifice of Absorption’ which is particularly sharp, and which I will make 
significant use of as the thesis develops. 
Bernstein complicates a distinction he identifies in Forrest-Thomson between the semantic 
and the non-semantic – a schema which sees intelligible, absorptive, semantic elements as 
meaningful, and foregrounded artifice, prosodic or formal elements, impermeability, as non-
meaningful: 
the meaning of which I speak is not meaning as we 
may ‘know’ it, with a recuperable intention or 
purpose. Such a restricted sense of meaning is 
analogous to the restricted senses of knowledge as 
stipulatively definable. (1992, pp. 16-17) 
Bernstein’s lines propose a redefined distinction, between forms whose meaning is 
conventionally, easily “recuperable”, and those forms of writing whose meaning is non-
recuperable, which have some kind of meaning-content that cannot be readily explicated, or 
which emphasise through their difficulty this kind of meaning. In contrast with a vulgar, 
realist absorption, Bernstein suggests that it might be possible to be absorbed in something 
other than realism, using an analogy to the very different experience of being absorbed in a 
piece of music to think about the possible action of non-recuperable forms. 
If ideology sets the limits of what can be coherently thought, felt, acted, then forms of 
recuperable meaning acquiesce in current realism and the ideological construction of 
intelligibility. Though still inevitably existing within this same ideological construction, non-
recuperable forms of meaning, which operate through artifice, might offer a starting point for 
divergence from already-known, easily intelligible and explicable kinds of knowledge and 
statements. Such meaning-forms might gesture outside the bounds of that realism, towards 
experience or ideas which are currently unnameable. 
That is not to say that there exists any text from which some elements of conventional 
semantic meaning cannot be recuperated, but rather that meaning-contents which cannot be 
reduced to the semantic – and which are for that reason hardest to talk about – might have a 
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different relation to the ideologically reproductive function of absorptive realism. I’m 
thinking, for example, of the ‘meaning’ of a formal manoeuvre,20 an indefinable sense of tone, 
some non-conceptual response to a text, or the experience of holding in one’s mind 
simultaneously suggestions and ideas which feel conceptually irreconcilable. This concept of 
the ‘non-recuperable’ will be worked at throughout this thesis; the texts I’m exploring posit 
such content more than I am able to show them enacting it, though how one might explicate 
such non-recuperable content beyond merely positing it will, I think, remain an open question. 
I’m using the term “gesture” throughout this thesis – or, mostly, transitive compounds such as 
“gesture outside” (above), or more commonly “gesture towards” – to think about the action of 
this poetry in relation to possibilities of resistive action, and of the function of non-
recuperable elements within a poetry whose imaginative capacity exceeds that which can be 
articulated in pre-figured realist modes. I turn to this bodily metaphor as a way to think 
through my wish for a writing which takes into account all of the essential critiques of the 
reproductive function of recuperable, ‘realist’ writing forms, and which yet can positively 
imagine. Following the relatively narrow communicative sense of “gesture”, I imagine the 
poem as a body, waving its arms vaguely in the direction of the horizon over which some as-
yet-unknown form of living is possible and known. Since these resistive possibilities cannot 
be simple delineated in clear language, the gesture offers a figure for the idea that that which 
can’t quite be pinned down in the experience of reading a poem can begin to evoke in 
necessarily unclear terms the possible shapes of ideas, subjects, and modes of living which 
aren’t yet amenable to more concrete description, and may remain so until such time as they 
are more materially realised through more corporeal action. 
There is a complex recent history of theorisation around the idea of the gesture. Whilst I don’t 
intend to go into this in detail, some remarks from Carrie Noland open up the possibilities of 
these non-recuperable forms of bodily signifying and action – which she sees as at once 
socially pre-figured in their meanings, and always also exceeding that pre-figuration – as a 
figure for the poem’s work. “Gestures are a type of inscription, a parsing of the body into 
signifying or operational unit” Noland writes. “At the same time, gestures clearly belong to 
the domain of movement; they provide kinesthetic sensations that remain in excess of what 
the gestures themselves might signify or accomplish within that culture.” And later: 
 
20 Robert Sheppard explores this idea, and its place in the practice and thinking of experimental poetry, in more 
detail in The Meaning of Form in Contemporary Innovative Poetry (2016), using a series of case studies of 
different formal manoeuvres and practices. 
51 
 
“Performing gestures can generate sensations that are not-yet marked, not-yet-meaningful. 
These sensations exact change; they may be productive of new movements, new meanings” 
(Noland, 2009, pp. 2/17). This is how I am beginning here to conceive of the possibilities of 
the non-recuperable in poetry, involved as it is in ideologically-formed signifying systems, 
and yet producing also the possibility as we move through them for the formation of new 
meanings. As this thesis goes along, this simple bodily metaphor – the idea that the poem 
waves, points, or paints shapes in the air, achieving effects similar to such movements – will 
become somewhat less metaphorical, as I trace the figuration of the relationship between 
aesthetic perception, poetic form, and the thinking-feeling body, and the presence of non-
recuperable bodily performance-actions in the work of Bhanu Kapil in particular. 
 
Agency and construction 
One of the modifications I want to make to many of these accounts of resistive poetic 
possibility that precede me is to do with the seriousness with which I take the problems posed 
by Althusser’s notion of universal ideology. To reiterate: any resistance must contend with the 
fact that we are inside ideology, at the levels of our possible concepts, our subjectivities, our 
actions, our language, and that this is a process that functions to reproduce its currently 
dominant forms. If this means that any claim to resistance through activity which destabilises 
language and concepts – which contains some implicit idea of ‘clearing out’ the language – is 
insufficient, it also means that the possibility of any more positive resistive acts which posit 
even the imaginative possibility of a radically different set of relations seems near impossible. 
As discussed in Chapter One, one potential problem with the Athusserian account of ideology 
as universal and fundamental to subjectification is that it seems to cast subjectivity as 
deterministic, leaving too little space for any kind of agency by which subjects might bring 
about the resistance and change that manifestly does occurs. Indeed, it is a premise of this 
work that meaningful resistance is near impossible, that all actions tend towards the 
reproduction of the ideological and material conditions from which they emerge. 
~ 
Are these, then, our only choices: to slip away into oblivion, or to be left behind, 
clinging to dirty ghosts? We must assume otherwise. 




To begin to find some way out of the near intractability of this problem – to conceptualise a 
resistance which isn’t framed in terms of revealing, de-familiarising, or opening up, but can 
form resistive critique and possibility from always inside its ideological conditions – I need to 
step back to look at the theoretical basis for the possibility of such resistance. This also 
provides a clearer starting point for thinking about what a poetry might look like which steps 
up to that possibility. 
If resistance is to be found within a seemingly total concept of universal ideology, then the 
process of ideology must first be recognised not as an imposition which comes to ‘us’ as pre-
existing subjects, from some external place, figure or abstract agent (e.g. capitalism), but as a 
social process which both involves and constitutes us, which is the condition of our very 
possibility. 
I have already mentioned a direct response of Judith Butler’s to this problem; I further find 
Butler’s account of construction and agency in Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter – 
specifically in relation to construction of subjects as gendered – particularly useful for 
thinking about ideology in this way: “Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the 
necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes 
culturally intelligible” (1999, p. 187). Butler emphasises the way in which the process of 
construction, or ideological subjectification, is not a limit imposed upon subjects – as if there 
was a coherent subject preceding this process – but is the “constitutive constraint” (1993, p. 
xi) which allows all else to occur. 
Within a discussion of self-description, as a specific linguistic iteration of something like 
Althusserian interpellation, poet and philosopher Denise Riley posits that the idea that 
language or ideology is coercive, that they oppose agency, relies on a distinction between an 
essential interiority and a language or ideology acting from outside. She refuses this 
dichotomy; the idea of our language and our understanding of ourselves coming ‘from the 
outside’ becomes the notion of “outside from the start” (Riley, 2000a, p. 44), after Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s formulation: “Nothing determines me from outside, not because nothing acts 
upon me, but on the contrary because I am, from the start outside myself and open to the 
world” (Riley, 2000a, p. 44, quoting Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception). This “short-circuits my convictions of my innerness” (Riley, 2000a, p. 44). The 
very grammar of the question that supposes a subject upon which ideology or language could 
act is a cause of error here: “Some ‘truly psychological’ element cannot be cleanly isolated 
53 
 
and extracted from the language, syntax and grammar of self-description” (Riley, 2000a, p. 
35). Rather than being coerced by language, or ideology more generally, we are produced by 
it. 
Ideology can then be re-envisaged as a process of inscribing repetition, performed not simply 
by or to individuals but at the level of the social or collective. Describing the way in which an 
individual’s language is always ideological, Riley says: “your word is already not ‘half’ but 
wholly ‘someone else’s’—is already everyone else’s” (2000a, p. 63). The formulation 
“already everyone else’s” suggests the way in which the collectivity in general perpetuates the 
conditions of its production, whilst creating a sense of exteriority from the individual. 
Butler describes this collective process of construction and reproduction as “a process of 
reiteration by which both ‘subjects’ and ‘acts’ come to appear at all. There is no power that 
acts, but only a reiterated acting that is power in its persistence and instability” (Butler, 1993, 
p. 9).  
The reworking of the false dichotomy between the ideas of construction as inherently 
deterministic and of a total non-determined freedom, between external and internal agency, 
opens up the space for resistance, reconfiguration and agency in this instability. Butler states: 
“it is also by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and fissures are opened up as the constitutive 
instabilities in such constructions, as that which escapes or exceeds the norm” (1993, p. 10). 
For example, “The injunction to be a given gender produces necessary failures, a variety of 
incoherent configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and defy the injunction by which 
they are generated” (1999, p. 185).  
Riley echoes this, directly addressing the criticism of over-determinism in Althusser’s theory 
of ideology, and further describing the way in which the failures of ideology’s injunctions are 
felt at the level of the individual subject: 
The individual subject can’t quite either be or not be in the collective category; these 
aren’t genuinely open linguistic alternatives. Then is Althusser’s idea of interpellation 
blind to the facts of its provisionality? No; a degree of failure is quietly built into the 
model. Because it announces ‘you are this category’, it’s structured as accusing, yet as 
soon as it’s pronounced, the way is thrown open to partly refuse it, because no one can 
always quite so smoothly submit to subjectification. (2000a, p. 85) 
These refusals of submission arise in the cracks in the process of subjectification. For Riley 
they arise in response to the strictures of a pronouncement in language, though the refusal 
may not itself have a strictly coherent linguistic form. 
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We see in both of these accounts that the provisionality, the insufficiencies and cracks in 
ideology as a process are to do with the ways in which ideological subjectification 
interpellates individuals into identity categories: “it announces ‘you are this category’”, “the 
injunction to be a given gender”. We are all interpellated as particular types of subjects, with 
all the baggage this interpellation entails about what social roles are afforded to a given 
subject in the overall reproduction of the ideological and material relations which make up the 
social whole. 
Riley develops an idea that the grounds for resistance and divergence from those social 
categories which are felt as though coming from outside the individual originate in a kind of 
affectively felt uncertainty, a chafing against the strictures of these categories. She suggests 
that any language, built as it necessarily is from collective categories of understanding, and of 
subjectivity – that is, necessarily ideological – is always insufficient to describe the much 
more various ways in which people actually exist and experience the world. Any categorical 
description doesn’t truly fit the self, or is a lie, because it comes from the outside (as 
ideological subjectification renders all individuals outside themselves), because the limits of 
descriptive language can be felt to only contain a rough, false, projected version of ourselves. 
Any language used to describe our most sincerely felt emotions in their specificity comes 
prepackaged, pre-used, referring only to generalities. 
This inherent instability of subjectification, this source of uncertainty and the potential for 
change, is encountered as a feeling of “imposture”, “imminently generated as feeling by the 
everyday machinations of interpellative language” (Riley, 2000a, p. 83). Eve Sedgwick and 
Adam Frank provide a useful formulation in their ‘Shame in the Cybernetic Fold’: “it is the 
inefficiency of the fit between the affect system and the cognitive system […] that enables 
learning, development, continuity, differentiation” (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995, p. 511); our 
(ideologically constructed) conceptual basis for understanding is narrower than, and has the 
inherent capacity to be mismatched with, the reality of our affective experience. 
 ~ 
     Why shape 
 
 these sentiments, prosecution witnesses 




For Riley, this affective source of uncertainty and change is evoked in the act of self-
description (as a type of ideological interpellation) through a recognition that it is always 
false, and could be otherwise. She explicitly connects this to political change, saying that 
“alongside the submissive guilt that makes me walk in to an interpellation with my hands held 
high”, there is a corresponding retort, “‘actually, no, I’m not an x as you understand it, and I 
don’t like your terms’”. This retort, this cry of felt dissatisfaction, “makes possible, and is also 
produced by, those objections to collective identifications which both shape and erode 
political movements” (Riley, 2000a, p. 88). Whilst such collective identifications are 
necessary for liberation struggle – she discusses in particular the foundation of feminist 
struggle around tentative understandings of the category of “woman” – it is the felt 
dissonance with the fullest strictures of what such a categorical description might mean for 
the individual that produces the possibility of the struggle, and a reconfiguration of those 
relations. It is this felt dissonance which is the basic starting point of ideological instability, 
and therefore of resistance. 
The specific iteration of this affective disjunction in relation to the resistive force of fractures 
in language Riley calls “linguistic unease”, which she says is “naturally endemic to self-
depiction” (2000a, p. 17). The constraints of collective language also produce the openings 
whereby they can be refused. This begins to offer some space for thinking about the 
relationship between the affective fractures in ideological subjectification and the possibilities 
of poetic language. One of the questions of my project is how this “unease”, these affective 
fractures, can be articulated in the language which is itself the source and focus of that unease; 
how the feeling, and the internal distance it implies or provokes from the reproductive force 
of ideology, can be critically examined and turned towards radically divergent ways of being.  
Butler offers an initial conceptualisation for how this might work, in an idea of citation. Since 
the mechanisms of ideological “reiteration” are already inherently unstable, containing their 
own inconsistencies, incoherence and failure, simple reiteration and reproduction can be 
disrupted, and change propagated, through “constrained appropriation of the regulatory law” 
(Butler, 1993, p. 12).  This becomes the generative question, “What would it mean to “cite” 
the law to produce it differently?” (1993, p. 15). This notion of ‘citation’ can be seen as a 
reformulation of Althusser’s ‘internal distance’. The notion of repeating the constraint of 
language in modified form, gives an initial impetus for thinking about how poetry specifically 
might have a felicity for discovering, heightening, or putting to use the incoherencies and 
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failures of our ideological formation – the unease that it already generates at the level of 
language – to produce new possibilities. 
These concepts, linguistic unease and citation, yet remain somewhat inconclusive in the 
resistive actions they propose for poetry; what they offer here is a way in, an opening onto the 
possibility of resistance in the face of its overwhelming difficulty, on which I can build. 
 
Affective dissonances 
I want to press a little harder on the notion that emerges in the above accounts, that the 
moment of change, the moment of “citing differently”, of re-combinations or configurations 
which might lead to newness, is rooted in or emerges from moments of affective dissonance. 
In The Politics of Affect, Brian Massumi further details how space opens up between the ways 
any given subject or subjects experience the processes of inscribing repetition which make up 
our existence in the social world, and between the ideologically constraining function of these 
repetitions. 
Similarly to Butler’s account of “reiteration”, Massumi emphasises the way that social 
relations must be continually re-produced at every moment; they are maintained only through 
the lived repetition of their forms in ‘events’, instances of relation between subjects. This is a 
question both of collective relations, and of subjects themselves, in a sense much like the 
Althusserian process of ideological subjectification (though Massumi would likely protest this 
comparison): “What is in question is precisely the emergence of the subject, its primary 
constitution, or its re-emergence and reconstitution” (Massumi, 2015, p. 52). He describes this 
event: 
There’s always an event, and the event always includes dimensions that aren’t 
completely actualized, so it’s always open to a degree, it’s always dynamic in re-
formation. To be in effect, ideological predeterminations have to enter the event and 
take effect […] Their effectiveness is always an accomplishment, a renewed victory, 
and what needs to be accomplished can fail. (2015, p. 58) 
This builds on the accounts I’ve already given, where the idea of ideology as a process of 
ongoing inscription between subjects, rather than a monadic power, allows the possibility for 
disruption, change, and new formulations. But Massumi goes beyond the sense of unease, 
dissonance and refusal with being categorically or rigidly identified, describing a greater 
instability at the heart of each of these moments. Every moment of inscribing repetition holds 
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alternative potentials because, for Massumi, bodies hold a vaster array of potential ways of 
being than those conceivable within any codified understanding or expression, and because 
the moment of experience which constitutes the event occurs at the porous and unstable 
boundary between individuals. 
To understand this, we need to explore Massumi’s iteration of the concept of “affect”. I have 
been using, and will continue to use the term in a relatively non-specialised way, as a broad 
term for something like feelings or sensations, felt states of ‘internal’ being. The term might 
sometimes be near-synonymous with “emotion”, but is broader, less categorical; Riley’s 
“linguistic unease”, for example, is a way of attempting to describe a particular affect or set of 
affects. “Affective experience” might then simply refer to the experience of a subject, but 
with a heavy emphasis on the way in which the things that occur to that subject are felt as 
interior experiences and have interior effects. 
The much more specialised definition which Massumi develops – not always in accord with 
my usage – can however add some detail to the specificity of what makes up this experience 
and how it operates in relation to ideology and the ongoing process of inscription. 
For Massumi, affect is an inherently relational capacity, after Spinoza’s definition: “the power 
‘to affect and be affected’” (Massumi, 2015, p. ix). It is not merely individual sensation: 
“Affective thinking-feeling […] pertains directly to what is passing between individuals” 
(2015, p. 94). It is the often unclear sensation of change felt in the body at any moment of 
interaction. Occurring at the threshold between individuals, this shared sensation involves a 
partial dissolution of the self as a coherent and contained entity: 
when you affect something, you are at the same time opening yourself up to being 
affected […] You have made a transition, however slight. You have stepped over a 
threshold. Affect is this passing of a threshold, seen from the point of view of the 
change in capacity. (2015, p. 4) 
Each moment of affective interaction is for Massumi both an inscribing event for the subject, 
and a more significantly unstable moment than in previous accounts. Not only is interpellation 
fundamentally fractured, containing its own openness to failure, but the ideological subject is 
constitutionally unstable; it is constantly being dissolved and reformed in the process of 
inscribing interactions – with all of the other subjects, objects, structures and occurrences in 
the collective world – in a wavering field of relation. 
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This pushes further towards an understanding of how the instability of the subject is precisely 
the fracture in any initially apparent determinism of Althusser’s ideology. Affect, as the 
dissolving sensation of the event, is “the virtual co-presence of potentials” (Massumi, 2015, p. 
5). It is the overflow of potential in the interactive moment of becoming, or re-becoming, and 
contains in it the potential for alternatives alongside the particular relations which are 
actualised in any given instance: “Affect is simply a body movement looked at from the point 
of view of its potential” (2015, p. 7). Every moment of inscribing repetition, every meeting of 
subjectivities, might then produce slightly different affective results, and with them slightly 
different possibilities for being and acting: “There are potential alter-politics at the 
collectively in-braced heart of every situation” (2015, p. 57). 
If each event has the potential, in instability, to open up space for newness and divergence, 
Lisa Robertson’s essay ‘Perspectors/Melancholia’ can help to think about how this potential 
might be more actualised at specific moments, how we might find the root of resistance and 
change in particular kinds of affective experiences. This begins to make this whole framework 
more usable, in the sense that it begins to show where a resistive thinking, and a resistive 
poetry, might take its initial experiential basis. 
I’ve already described this essay’s sceptical understanding of sensory perception. From this 
point, Robertson describes the “synthetic interior space”, the space which perceives, in which 
affect and melancholy occurs, as “the soul”. She follows Robert Burton’s description of this 
space as autonomous only through its capacity for “phantasy”, which “examines images 
perceived by common sense and newly recombines them”; phantasy is “autonomous only in 
its recombinant function”, through combining sensory data, rather than originating 
conceptions in itself (Robertson, 2012, p. 53). Robertson goes on,   
When, as in melancholy, the soul is afflicted by the black bile of the body and the 
socius, by bitterness, doubt, grief, injustice and loss, phantasy is dangerously more 
free […] Melancholic skepticism admits vulnerability as the encompassing condition 
of extension and change. Without edge or frame, this unstable synthetic space that 
melancholy is intuits propositions about change, propositions that begin from the 
scattering and smashing and remixing of the knowledges of the body or the polis. 
(2012, pp. 53-4) 
The general premises that ideological reproduction contains the possibility of its own refusal, 
and that re-inscription is an ongoing process which can theoretically fail or be disrupted, tell 
us initially only that resistance, though difficult, is not entirely doomed. Robertson here adds 
the notion that the experience of the destabilising “vulnerability” of affects such a melancholy 
59 
 
heightens our capacity for “phantasy”, such that we are most able to find new, liberatory 
recombinations of our received data, to put our perceptions, actions, “knowledges” and the 
ideological frameworks which contain them into unstable relationships. 
Robertson states, “the soul is the site where the political and the affective exchange 
vulnerabilities. Like a prosthesis, its autonomy is false and necessary” (2012, p. 52). If the site 
of subjective instability is also that of political instability, then the potential for attempts at 
deliberate modifications of our formation begins at points of heightened vulnerability – and 
this, therefore, is where a resistive writing might wish to begin. 
It is important to temper the suggestion here, which runs particularly through Massumi’s 
account, that affective responses have some inherently resistive capacity, with a return to one 
of my guiding principles, that the processes of ideology mean that actions, relations and 
subjectivities in general have a primary tendency towards the reproduction of the conditions 
which enable them. That is to say, most affective responses, even at their most challenging 
and unstable, still tend towards reproduction of their dominant ideological and material 
conditions. 
In her essay ‘Grief work in a war economy’, poet and critic Andrea Brady describes how, 
after the World Trade Centre attack, the ritual of collective public mourning was harnessed by 
and in the service of the ideological cause of the Bush administration, to create senses of 
inclusive community bound around nationalism and war. In her account this was abetted by 
the liberal perception of grief as privately emotional. This perception led people on the 
political left, including poets, to treat that grief as a space for non-contestation, and in doing 
so cede ground to more reactionary influence. 
“Grief”, Brady says, “far from being a spontaneous and private outpouring, is a socialized 
response whose power in galvanizing populations has long been recognized” (2002, p. 7). 
Affective responses are neither privately unpolitical in the liberal sense, nor are they 
necessarily or simply a private source of dissonance or resistance to hegemonic forces within 
the collective.  
Instead, as Brady emphasises, affective responses are social battlegrounds, which are easily 
won by hegemonic powers. Emotions are conditioned and become articulable through the 
social rituals and preconceived notions of their conditions, and are primarily sites of 
ideological inscription, even as we recognise that inscribing process to be an unstable and 
potentially open one. 
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Massumi too acknowledges, in one of the more ideologically aware moments of his text, that 
power and capital are structured in such a way as to fold any apparent resistances, or affective 
deviations, back towards their own reproduction: 
[(power) structures] are always running after different-order movements in the 
collective field of embodied activity in order to funnel them back into their own 
channels […] [This] means that they find ways to feed their own alimentary operations 
back into the field of emergence. They contaminate the field. They convert 
movements afoot in the field to their own ends. (Massumi, 2015, p. 102-3) 
The variations, dissonances, potentials, transitions into otherness, produced by the unstable 
processes of affective experience and interaction are still, Massumi says, always “susceptible 
to capitalist capture” (2015, p. 108). 
The pertinent question, then, is how to specifically direct the volatility of our affective 
experience, and the potential for re-constitution in each event; how to specifically push 
through this theoretical possibility for resistance, towards its actuality. What particular kinds 
of affective experiences, what particular elements of an experience such as melancholy, might 
be especially pertinent in relation to this resistive potentiality? What modes of attention, 
language use, representation, might have some chance of activating the possibility of 
difference which is inherent here? 
All isn’t lost for grief in Brady’s account: 
Grief is never an unmediated feeling. But neither is it just a plodding through 
conventions, a rhetorical performance. If mortuary ritual is a communication system 
which uses symbols to convey information, it is subject to noise. Grief can be 
subversive. Ritual mourning confirms the bonds within a community; it can also vent 
dissent and fears of exclusion or change. (Brady, 2002, p. 12). 
If we start from a pessimistic stance on the dialectical nature of emotional experience – 
articulable only within the bounds of its ideological situation, yet exceeding these bounds in 
actual experience – the concept of “noise” is the positive inverse, the excess beyond that 
which is articulable, the potential for resistance. As grief and melancholy remain, like all 
experience, primarily liable to ideological capture, yet they are most noisy experiences, which 
have an increased potential to destabilise us and to open us up to alternative ways of being. It 
is this noise, the subversive interferences that occur on the least articulable edges of these 
experiences, to which I wish to attend, and urge attention. 
61 
 
Massumi’s description of affect pushes further on this idea of it as a potential for excess, for 
overspilling the bounds of our prescribed selves (reminiscent of Butler’s formulation of the 
gaps in reiteration as “that which escapes or exceeds the norm”): 
You can think of affect in the broadest sense as what remains of the potential after 
each or every thing a body says or does – as a perpetual bodily remainder […] this 
perpetual remainder is an excess. It’s like a reserve of potential or newness or 
creativity that is experienced alongside every actual production of meaning in 
language or in any performance of a useful function – vaguely but directly 
experienced, as something more, a more to come, a life overspilling. (2015, p. 8) 
Since affective experience occurs at the level of felt sensation which is intertwined with but 
doesn’t strictly map on to the conscious elements of thought – bodies and the interactions 
between bodies hold always a much vaster array of potential ways of being than those which 
can be held within any particular linguistic expression, or any codified understanding. Even 
within ideology, our interacting bodies latently contain the potential for all alternatives and 
alterations which don’t actualise, or which aren’t conceivable at any given time, as well as 
those which are most obviously written across those bodies. 
I take these texts, then, as suggesting two slightly different ideas about the relationship 
between affective experience and ideological construction. First is the notion that our affect 
system, our bodily, experiencing, feeling selves, are more complicated and variable than can 
be contained within any codified system, within the particular social understandings and 
instrumentalisations into which they are put. This leads to the development that certain kinds 
of affective experience are of a particular nature which is de-seating, creates or amplifies an 
internal instability of the socially constructed self, which opens up space for new knowledge, 
new thinking, for the self to be constructed a little differently. 
 
Infra-linguistic experience and non-recuperable poetic form 
As these experiences express some fracture from their ideological formation, they do so in 
forms that necessarily begin as inarticulate; the meaning of these noisy elements of 
experience, I will argue, can be related to the concept, from Bernstein, of forms of meaning 
which are “non-recuperable”. This relationship to poetics, the relationship between 
ideological reproduction in language and the divergent potential of moments of affective 
instability or dissonance, can be brought into focus and clarified through the concept of the 
“infra-linguistic”, which I draw from Massumi as one of my key concepts. 
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He talks of “the myriad of sub-threshold experiences, or microperceptions, populating the 
body’s every move” (Massumi, 2015, p. 210), naming these as “infra-” (as opposed to “pre-”) 
linguistic, referring to “what actively lies below a certain threshold of appearance on an open-
ended spectrum” (2015, p. 212). These affective experiences are felt in the body, they are 
experienced but are not articulable or recognisable in the language of recuperable sense, 
within the particular set of ideological conditions in which the feeling subject exists. I’ve 
already described an example of this kind of sensation in the feeling of “unease” named by 
Denise Riley, which might result in nothing more articulable than a rejection, specifically of 
the language that allows any description at all – it is a felt rejection of that which is above the 
threshold of articulable, linguistic recognition. 
Robertson articulates this a little differently, positing the idea of a “listened-to body”, as a 
basis of resistance: 
listening to one’s own, impossible body is a resistance. It disarms the projections, in 
order to turn the girl into oneself, into the jostling variousness of one’s own thinking. 
The listened-to body is the one that reconstitutes itself continuously in relation to 
conditions, material, affective, social, and historical. It resists in order to move 
forward. (Robertson & Walker, 2013-14, p. 22) 
That which is felt in the body is seen as having the potential to open up gaps between the 
strictures of ideological formation and the much wider spectrum of actual affective 
experience, showing how subjects can deviate from any given set of ideological limits, or can 
move within those limits and alter them. The inarticulable or not-yet-articulable, sub-
threshold, felt dissonance between the permutations of affective experience – particularly at 
destabilising moments of vulnerability – and those ideological ‘projections’ which prescribe 
the parameters of subjects’ available identities or responses – the experience of that inherent 
incompleteness of strict subjectification which was described by Riley and Butler – the infra-
linguistic, is the originating point of resistance.21 
 
21 From “infralinguistic”, I follow an association, of sound and sense, to Marcel Duchamp’s concept of 
“infrathin”. This concept, Duchamp claims, is beyond description, and can only be defined through examples. 
Two such examples: “Infra thin separation between / the detonation noise of a gun / (very close) and the 
apparition of the bullet/ hole in the target....”; “just touching. While trying to place 1 plane surface /precisely on 
another plane surface / you pass through some infra thin moments—" (Perloff, 2002, pp. 101-2). Marjorie Perloff 
describes the infrathin as “the most minute of intervals or the slightest of differences […] to be perceived” 
(Perloff, 2002, p. 102). This can be brought into close relation to Massumi’s concept. Erin Manning, a 
collaborator of Massumi, describes the infrathin as “the potentiation of a relational field that includes what 
cannot quite be articulated, but nonetheless can be felt” (Manning, 2017, p. 99); “the differential that marks the 
rhythm that is the oscillation between what is perceptible and what is imperceptible yet felt” (2017, p. 101). In 
Manning’s account, the representation or engagement with Duchamp’s infrathin in art is a way to activate the 
potential for change that exists in the imperceptible but felt difference, by showing that there are possibilities 
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This can be directly related back to the critique of realist, naturalisable, recuperable language 
which I delineated earlier. Massumi suggests that  
affective expressions like anger and laughter […] interrupt the flow of meaning that’s 
taking place: the normalized interrelations and interactions that are happening and the 
functions that are being fulfilled. Because of that, they are irruptions of something that 
doesn’t fit. (2015, p. 8-9) 
Certain artistic language uses can create such interruptions, can “bring that inadequation 
between language and experience to the fore […] in a way that actually fosters new 
experiences” (2015, p. 13). These are described like experimental poetry: “words that burst 
apart and lose their conventional meaning” (2015, pp. 44-5). This bears a similarity to 
Adorno’s claims about “the shock of the unintelligible” in “a text whose language jolts 
signification”; Massumi’s articulation adds to the idea of shock and disruption the positive 
possibility of an irruption at these moments of affective extremity of some barely recognisable 
other – “something that doesn’t fit” – from the body. 
Those forms that were critiqued as most strongly and compliantly reproducing the ideological 
conditions which have produced them – realist, empirical, readily, clearly intelligible and 
recuperable, as naturalisable message on the terms of their pre-existing ideological framework 
– correspond and refer to those experiences which are above the threshold of that which is 
recognisable within that ideological framework. That is, if the bounds of intelligibility are 
ideological bounds, produced by and reproducing the ideological and material conditions of 
their possibility, then this is true not just for intelligible language per se, but also for those 
experiences and affects which can be intelligibly named.  
I have already claimed that those elements of meanings which are “non-recuperable” hold a 
potential to diverge from the ideologically reproductive function of realist-intelligible 
language, and to gesture towards alternative ways of being in the world, towards that which is 
currently unnameable. I now posit that if these non-recuperable forms are to have specific 
faculty for moving towards positive gestures or articulation, towards newness – as opposed to 
previous figurations of non-recuperable forms in poetry as primarily disruptive or 
defamiliarising – it is through a correspondence with the affective sources of dissonance, 
change, and potentiality which are to be found in those experiences and disruptive capacities 
 
which exist outside of the ones we perceive now, and also which already co-exist alongside them: “What the 
infrathin contributes, as a concept, is a way of thinking the both-and of double articulation. That extra patch of 
red does make a difference: it creates a new world. The infrathin makes felt how both worlds might briefly 
coexist.” (Manning, 2017, p. 104) 
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that can be labelled as infra-linguistic. If we are to find some ways to refer to and resistively 
activate the potential of affective disruption, destabilisation, “something that doesn’t fit”, then 
we must work towards bringing these experiences into some form of communicable 
articulation, within a linguistic and ideological framework which by definition almost entirely 
precludes that. I again posit the non-recuperable, as the formal counterpart and potential 
poetic basis to the infra-linguistic, as the experiential basis, of this possible resistance and 
divergence; it is through non-recuperable forms that the infra-linguistic might come to be 
‘communicated’. As this thesis develops, and this position is taken up and explored through 
my close readings of poetic material in the following chapters, this relational distinction 
between the two will become even less obvious, as the similarities between these concepts 
and that which they describe become more apparent. 
I might explain the potential of this relationship between the non-recuperable and the infra-
linguistic by reference to John Keats’ concept of “negative capability”: “when man is capable 
of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and 
reason” (Keats, 2002, p, 61). By “non-recuperable” I don’t mean a simple negative, in the 
sense of the impossibility of recuperating meaning, since some element of meaning can 
always be recuperated from a text. Rather, I posit “non-recuperable meaning” as the positive 
presence of a meaning-content which is a kind of negativity, which is outside of current 
understanding, and I urge the necessity of being, like Keats’ “Man of Achievement”, inside 
those mysteries and the possibilities they might begin to propose, if we could find a way to 
hear their propositions. 
Language and form that utilises non-recuperable elements might allow us to attempt such an 
endeavour, to gesture to those experiences which are infra-linguistic, in order to make a kind 
of positive imaginative gesture from inside the language and forms of ideology, as we all are. 
Rather than folding back to proposition on the terms which are already readily complicit in 
that ideology, such a gesture attempts to alter the boundaries of intelligibility, as part of the 
ongoing struggle to alter our ideological situation, to shift the premises of being and acting in 
such a way that we can also simultaneously work towards altering our material conditions.  
 
A reprise 
To bring together some reiterative summary and synthesis of some of the key elements of the 
framework so far then: 
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Combining the initial position, that the primary site of ideological formation and reproduction 
is the subject and the process of subjectification, with the argument that resistance and its 
possibility emerges from the affective dissonances in this process, we come to the correlative 
claim that poetic resistance might root itself in an exploration of the affective subject. This is 
further combined with a critique of the heightened ideologically reproductive function of 
empirical-realist language uses which emphasise easily recuperable meaning; this critique 
enables the notion that forms which reach towards non-recuperable meaning can best gesture 
towards noisy, infra-linguistic affective experiences. Brought together, this brings me to posit 
that the kinds of poetry which I might best look to for possibilities of and contributions 
towards resistance is a poetry of non-recuperable affective subjectivity. 
Two distinct aspects of this suggest themselves at this point. The first is the use of fracture 
and unintelligibility, irony, shock, and other techniques of discontinuity to provoke and 
emphasise the necessary instability in the process of ideological interpellation and in our 
language of the world – to emphasise the pre-existing unease, to create uncertainty or 
affective instability at the level of the response of the reader. This is closely related to the 
notion of destabilisation which I have already discussed. 
An example of a specifically poetic evocation of these kinds of destabilising affective 
experiences is the ‘wrongness’ that Keston Sutherland describes in his essay ‘Wrong Poetry’. 
Sutherland describes the affective experience of encountering and struggling against that 
which seems bad or wrong in poetry, that which isn’t recuperable by prior formulations of 
knowledge and which produces shame or despair: 
‘Wrong poetry’ means […] a trial of doubt that confounds identification, the perdition 
of confidence in being right, passionate unease about what will qualify or matter, a 
compulsion to sublate first reactions under the pressure of sheer insistence on 
whatever most emphatically escapes them, and irreversible resistance of whatever 
thought seems most nearly conclusively acceptable or is in any measure already 
familiar and satisfying. Unlike ‘autonomous art’ or ‘committed art’, it is a category 
with no fixable content. The criterion for belonging to it is to exceed it. (2011, p. 147) 
In Sutherland’s account, much like Robertson’s account of melancholy, the force of this 
confrontation, and the attempt to reassert the prior stability it challenges, is a process which 
can produce new knowledge, radical or divergent thinking. 
The second aspect goes further and is more useful to me – the question of how one might talk 
about those affective experiences which don’t fit with our codified language. I wish to explore 
how poetry could attempt to use language and forms of non-recuperable meaning, and the de-
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seating nature of unintelligibility and affectivity, to tentatively contribute towards altering our 
ideological landscape by altering the bounds of the expressible, taking our own divergent 
affects as the source of this newness. In this way we might hope to recombine and reconfigure 




a poem is not going to give precise answers. 
 you mustn’t touch the hiding places. 
 they address a different world 
where trees are decorated with diamonds 
(Anna Mendelssohn, ‘to any who want poems to give them answers’, 
Implacable Art, 2000, p. 34)  
~ 
I scream the colors each to each 
(Bhanu Kapil, ’[13 Errors for Ban]’, Ban En Banlieue, 2015, p. 23) 
 ~ 
If the non-recuperable meaning-contents of poetic work have the (at least theoretical) capacity 
to gesture towards infra-linguistic elements of affective experience, the question of how it is 
possible to talk about this kind of content, and how we might bring it into an articulation 
which has some active, resistive currency in the social world, or is in some sense 
communicable, needs further exploration.  This question can be provisionally re-framed as: 
how might we talk about the content of the aesthetic, or the prosodic, in poetry; how can 
poetry reach towards aesthetic contents, feelings, experience? 
In ‘Why Rhyme Pleases’, Simon Jarvis asks: 
Can there not be a musical or a prosodic thinking which is not simply a little picture 
of, nor even a counterpoint to, that more familiar kind of thinking whose medium is 
essentially semantic and syntactic, but whose medium, instead, is essentially prosodic: 
a kind of thinking in tunes? (2011, p. 24) 
Jarvis relates this kind of thinking to “those features of natural-historical experience which are 
at once the most elusive and amongst the most important” (2011, p. 25). 
I take this idea of “prosodic thinking” which can reach out to our most elusive experiences as 
something of a distillation of elements that have been present throughout the previous 
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discussion. Adorno suggests that his desired autonomous works of art are “knowledge as non-
conceptual objects” (1974, p. 88), a kind of thinking which might closely resemble the 
thinking of prosody or music. The possibilities Veronica Forrest-Thomson posits for poetry to 
challenge the ways our language and perception of the world is mediated is precisely “through 
artifice”, through the work that can be done at a formal, aesthetic, organisational level in the 
poem, through that which she designates non-semantic. The non-semantic becomes non-
recuperable in Bernstein, who turns repeatedly to musical metaphors in order to describe its 
function or contents. Some version of these ideas about musical thinking have already been 
integral to the relation I have been attempting to forge between non-recuperable meaning and 
infra-linguistic affect. 
My conception of non-recuperable meaning is hazily continuous with the question of aesthetic 
content from the start then. I mean ‘aesthetic’ here in a very general sense, to refer to that 
register of appreciation and engagement which is concerned with beauty, with artificed and 
formal properties, considered in terms of effects that aren’t to do with their conceptual or 
semantic signification as such (these include those elements in poetry which I’m talking of as 
musical and prosodic also). The significant overlap of this with the concept of the non-
recuperable as I have outlined it can function to begin a process in this thesis of re-framing 
and dismantling any conventional distinction between what is seen as aesthetic and what is 
seen as meaningful, and claiming instead that it is in these aesthetic registers of engagement 
where kinds of meaning-content which lie outside of current realism can be located, precisely 
because of their divergence from the more articulately conceptual. 
Jarvis pushes further on the line of thinking which looks for ‘musical’ or aesthetic kinds of 
thinking in his two essays, ‘Why Rhyme Pleases’ and ‘Prosody as Cognition’. He argues for 
the cognitive contents of the prosodic elements of poetry, and for the falsehood of any 
separation of cognitive content from its formal embodiment, in a way which makes this claim 
dependent on the ideas in ‘Undeleter for Criticism’ of subjective experience as the starting 
point of all knowledge. For Jarvis, the same move wrongly separates the idea of a scientific 
language – one which contains objective, verifiable, generally useful knowledge – from the 
formal or prosodic, and from subjective experience; it is the same move which evacuates 
cognition of both beauty and subjectivity: 
The notion that a scientific language, a language carrying cognition, would be, 
amongst other things, a language stripped of all prosody, as of its entanglement with 
‘merely’ subjective and with intersubjective experience alike, is an idea which took 
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some time to take a grip, but which has in many quarters become an article of an 
inexplicit, and thus all the more rigidly adhered-to, faith. (Jarvis, 1998, p. 9) 
Jarvis argues that the experience of prosody is necessarily not entirely describable in the terms 
of dispassionate critical discourse – it is too idiosyncratic, too closely tied up with the 
individual experiencing subject: 
It would be possible to begin thinking about the birth of prosody only upon condition 
that we stopped thinking of the bodily, and of the musical, as the non-cognitive vessels 
for a cognitive content. (1998, p. 11) 
For Jarvis, the content of prosody faces, and challenges, the difficulties of a metaphysical 
framework that deems knowledge to be inherently propositional – this is the same framework 
that limits the expressible to that which is recognisable on the terms of that which is already-
known. 
In ‘Marx in Jargon’, Keston Sutherland adds a Marxist facet to the critique of this framework. 
He uses a close reading of certain key terms in Capital, and elements of style and satire which 
surround their deployment, to claim that “bourgeois readers are compelled, in order to make 
their own kinds of sense of [a text, in this case Capital], to separate its contents from its style” 
(Sutherland, 2011, p. 50). This separation is an inherently bourgeois move, to turn all of the 
complicated stylistic and aesthetic elements of a text into “an array of undifferentiated 
concepts for theoretical consumption” (Sutherland, 2011, p. 39). Such a reading (of Capital, 
but with more general implications) “performs what Marx describes as the invariable work of 
bourgeois ideology: it occludes real social contradiction by reductively neutralizing satire into 
‘concepts’” (Sutherland, 2011, pp. 49-50). 
The reduction of aesthetic, prosodic, artificed, contents merely to their most intelligible and 
recuperable forms, to concepts, is bourgeois in the sense not merely that I have already 
described it – that it neatly acquiesces in the passive reproduction of existing conditions, and 
is only able to address what is already known within the ideologically produced and 
reproducing bounds of intelligibility – but also because seeing concepts as free-floating and 
disembodied is related to the conception of the bourgeois subject who also claims to be 
disembodied, whose ideas are independent, rational, free from ideological mystification or the 
material contradictions of their conditions. The realism which Adorno criticised earlier 
becomes here specifically “bourgeois realism” (Sutherland, 2011, p. 57). 
Sutherland claims that Capital itself is a refutation of the bourgeois form/content distinction, 
and a demonstration of the possibilities of the resistive content of formal work, since, despite 
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consistent misreading to the contrary, the “risks and failures of style are arguments in 
themselves, irreducible to theoretical propositions” (2011, p. 36). Sutherland gives close 
readings of what he mostly describes as the satirical elements often missed in the uses of the 
jargon words “bourgoisdom”, “gallerte” and “fétischisme”, to demonstrate that there are 
truths or thinking-content in Capital which can’t be reduced to concepts, but which are 
embodied and enacted in the text and its reading. 
Sutherland argues that the stylistic and formal work done in Capital which is irreducible to 
intelligible concepts under current ideological conditions is essential to its critique of capital 
and to its revolutionary force. Following this logic through, his essay can be taken to suggest 
that kinds of writing which attempt to do difficult formal work to gesture towards contents 
outside of the bounds describable within “bourgeois realism” are a constitutive element of 
Marxist writing. 
The notion of the “irreducible” content of prosody, style, the aesthetic or musical elements of 
artistic work – as it directly relates to the singular, subjective nature of aesthetic judgement, 
by a subject who is nonetheless wholly within their material and ideological conditions – 
offers a development of the notional claim that non-recuperable contents might in some sense 
correspond to infra-linguistic experience. If thinking and feeling are not meaningfully 
separate, just as cognition is not meaningfully separate from prosody, formal work does not 
merely refer – albeit through different mechanisms – to sub-threshold kinds of cognitive 
content. Rather, aesthetic responses might be thought of as also affective ones, as a kind of 
thinking-feeling which is necessarily not containable within clearly recuperable language. As 
Lisa Robertson suggests, quoting Trish Saleh, in an interview with Charles Bernstein, 
“aesthetics are desire” (Robertson & Bernstein, 2016, 23 min.); the aesthetic begins to lose its 
distinction as a concept, and become a mode of thinking and feeling with artworks that moves 
fruitfully outside of the constraints of realism.  
In his survey of the question of aesthetic meaning in The Meaning of Form in Contemporary 
Innovative Poetry, Robert Shepperd poses this affective singularity as a problem: “there is an 
incommunicable core at the centre of response” (2016, p. 20). This might be a problem for 
any critical endeavour (including this one); yet, in the theoretical argument it brings us back 
to the idea of negative capability, to suggest that it is precisely that which is unknowable or 
indescribable in affective-aesthetic content which might gesture to as yet mysterious new 
possibilities, or unarticulated ways of being. 
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Robertson develops further the resistive potential of the interface between affective 
experience and irreducible kinds of formal content in her book Occasional Work and Seven 
Walks from the Office for Soft Architecture, through a series of studies of different kinds of 
material surface or adornment in the essays ‘Rubus Armeniacus: A Common Architectural 
Motif in the Temperate Mesophytic Region’, ‘How to Colour’, and ‘Doubt and the History of 
Scaffolding’. 
Colour is seen as “the affective potential of the surface […] an indiscrete threshold where our 
bodies exchange information with an environment” (Robertson, 2011, p. 123). The coloured 
surface is the point at which the brute matter of buildings directly intersects with the uncertain 
inflecting processes of the affective, perceiving person, at which hard matter is revealed as 
unstable, if not inherently, then in its relation to the perceiving subject. “The affective 
potential of the surface” begins to articulate a very useful pivot between affect and form; the 
moment of affective perception, as expressed in aesthetic response, is the moment where 
subjective instability becomes a potential kind of objective instability. 
Following the logic of colour as an affective interaction with material surface, Robertson 
develops an understanding of ornamentation (“style”), as a way to attack certainties and offer 
up new understandings, by bringing all the resistive potentials of affect to bear on the 
decorated object, allowing it to be felt or seen differently. Rubus Armeniacus, the Himalayan 
Blackberry, is “an exemplary political decoration, a nutritious ornament that clandestinely 
modifies infrastructural morphology. Here affect invades the centre. Rubus inverts and puns 
upon the proprietous subordination of affective expenditure to intelligence […] This is the 
serious calling of style” (Robertson, 2011, p. 112). “Political decoration” is then posited as a 
mechanism for propelling change from the basis of the uncertainty of affective experience. 
‘Doubt and the History of Scaffolding’ has this understanding of surface speak of all actions 
in the world. Robertson uses scaffolding as a metaphor for the uncertain conceptual 
framework on which we found our lives – “we live on this temporary framework of platforms 
and poles” (Robertson, 2011, p. 138) – potentially analogous here with the inherent 
mystifications of ideology. Literal scaffolds too have a kind of metaphorical relationship to 
the buildings they clad: “Scaffolding is analogy. It explains what a wall is without being a 
wall” (2011, p. 139). The resistive explanatory possibilities of this combining image are 
expressed when Robertson says that scaffolding “rhythmically expresses the vulnerability of 
the surface by subtracting solidity from form to make something temporarily animate. It 
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shows us how to inhabit a surface as that surface fluctuates” (2011, p. 140). Scaffolding 
reveals the uncertainty and instability of the buildings it both hides and implies, in an allusion 
to their crumbling impermanence and to their possibility for fluctuation by conscious human 
action. As with the blackberry, or coloured surface, the scaffold clads the certainty of material 
in an uncertainty which demonstrates the interactivity of these materials with human affect. In 
‘How to Colour’, Robertson relates this to possibilities of altering the conditions of our world: 
“In the tradition of meaning, if the idea of internal structure could be temporally expressed as 
the past perfect, the idea of the surface would be the future conditional” (2011, p. 129). 
The interrelation between aesthetic contents and affective experience, as an interface through 
which poetry might gesture towards or bring towards articulation possible new ways of being, 
or productive critiques of our material and ideological conditions, will be substantially 
developed through the close poetic encounters which will follow, and in particular through 
my reading of Robertson’s poetry. 
 
On subjectivity 
I’d like to briefly address directly any possibility of an emerging contradiction, between an 
account of ideology that holds subjectivities to be shaped by collective conditions which 
obfuscate their own limits – bringing the very concept of the coherent, free, integral, 
individual psychological interiority into question – and a focus on individual experience as 
our basis for criticism, resistance and knowledge. 
An understanding of universal ideology does indeed contradict the predominant bourgeois-
liberal understanding of individual experience as rational, free and unconstrained, as capable 
of some clear or objective understanding of the self and of the world around it; it puts the lie 
to any belief in the bourgeois individualist subject. I do not see the subject in this way at all. 
Instead, I see individual experience as a site of exploration precisely because, as Althusser 
teaches, ideology is inscribed on every one of us at the level of our individual experiencing 
subjectivities. Through this process, each individual subjectivity is simultaneously also 
collective. This is clear, for example, in Andrea Brady’s account of grief after 9/11; there it 
was precisely the perception of grief as private, the refusal to recognise what seems private as 
also a space of contestation, which allowed it to most easily be ceded to the politically and 
ideologically dominant paradigms. 
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Massumi’s account of affect offers further detailed ways to talk about “private emotion”, 
solipsistic and particular sensational experience, as collective, as pertaining to the relations 
between people, and the way these relations influence the more or less codified 
understandings we have of ourselves: 
Affect is transindividual. It is ontogenetically prior to the distinction between the 
individual understood as separate unit and the collective understood as a molar 
aggregate of separate units. It is ‘collective’ in the sense that it expresses itself in 
collective individuations (emergent populations of individuals whose formation is 
processually correlated at a distance, across their difference). (Massumi, 2015, pp. 
205-6) 
Our intimate affective responses are determined by the social and conceptual frameworks in 
which we operate; the solipsistic, ‘interior’, individual experience is ideological, collective, 
‘outside’ in its ongoing formation. Yet this determining collectivity is itself constituted by the 
inscribing interactions between individuals who can’t ever be quite wholly contained by its 
determinations. The individual subject is at an intersection between the private and the social, 
but this cycle of mutual formation is not smooth. Tensions, fractures, uneasiness between the 
individual and the collective become also tensions internal to the collective-individual subject 
– in the relationship between their affective experience and the collectively formed limits of 
its articulation. The individual experiencing subject – all individual experiencing subjects – 
become, then, not a source of resistance inherently, but rather a key battleground upon which 
we resist or fail. 
Whilst this is true in general, it is also the case that the individual experiencing subject is an 
ideological battleground particularly amenable to the resistive contributions which might be 
made or attempted through the writing and reading of experimental poetry. This is particularly 
true of a kind of resistance which attempts to make positive imaginative gestures and step 
beyond the bounds of critical defamiliarisation, as that which I am exploring here. 
~ 
I’m not interested in pushing subjectivity nor historicity out of the field that I’m 
working in, and I believe that our relationship to subjectivity and historicity needs to 
be continuously transformed and translated and renewed, & the terms need to be 
shifted, but that material itself, I believe, absolutely ought not to be rejected from 
serious thinking in poetry. 
(Lisa Robertson, interview with Charles Bernstein, Close Listening, 




I have explained in Chapter 2 that my own method will begin from my subjective experience 
as reader-critic, because objectivity and generality are rendered neither possible nor desirable 
by the Althusserian account of ideology, and because that experience – no matter how 
constrained by the ideology which enables it, how partial, muddied, only tentatively 
articulable – is the only grounds for any knowledge whatsoever. This is knowable as lived 
experience, but not clearly, or outside of its formative limits; an experiential position is 
simultaneously our best grounds for tentative, exploratory knowledge, and no sure ground at 
all. Individual subjects are absorbed within their ideological situation, but, precisely because 
ideology acts to form the subject, any attempt at resistance must begin from the subject, on a 
critique and re-formation of subjectivity as it is lived and experienced. 
The claim I also made in the previous chapter – that kinds of writing that attempt generality, 
objectivity, or a voice which is divorced from subjectivity, erase the experience of marginal 
subjects, and perpetuate the hegemony of dominant identity categories – has specific 
importance for the relationship between subjectivity and poetry. The poetry I’m reading, and 
much of the contemporary experimental poetry which makes up the context for this study, 
reacts to a perception that experimental poetry was for a long time dominated by a strongly 
anti-subjective strain. These anti-subjective poetries followed some of the arguments I have 
made or quoted above – that both our language and our experience as it is articulable in that 
language are complicit in and reproduce our ideological situation – to the conclusion that 
subjective expression in general was to be abandoned. This is a key component of what David 
and Christine Kennedy characterised, and heavily criticised, as a “meta-poetic” approach. 
The accuracy of this account, in terms of describing the variety of things that experimental 
poets have actually been doing, is highly debatable, but I would argue that it does correctly 
characterise an influential, if not dominant, strain of the theorisation of experimental poetry 
and the possibilities of resistance. 
Examples of this anti-subjectivist strain might include the moment in ‘Necessary Business’ 
where Allen Fisher discusses the “move against the Romantic, lyric ego”:  
Such a move may well be to make concise the poetic statement without a dominating 
drag on the consistency of the self. There is a liberation of the self in the complex of a 
meaningful multiplicity, provided by the interrupting shifts of different voices, which 
simultaneously avoids a discarding of that integrity that the becoming of the self 
perpetuates. (2016, p. 56) 
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Or else, in ‘Aesthetic Tendency and the Politics of Poetry: A Manifesto’, co-written by 
Language poets Ron Silliman, Carla Harryman, Lyn Hejinian, Steve Benson, Bob Perelman 
and Barrett Watten, they discuss criticisms of their work: “The individual is seen as under 
attack, and this is largely true: the self as the central and final term of creative practice is 
being challenged and exploded in our writing” (Silliman et al, 1988, p. 263). Marjorie Perloff 
wrote that “One of the cardinal principles—perhaps the cardinal principle—of American 
Language poetics (as of the related current in England, usually labeled ‘linguistically 
innovative poetries’) has been the dismissal of ‘voice’ as the foundational principle of lyric 
poetry” (1999, p. 405), and goes on to argue that this position “must be understood as part of 
the larger poststructuralist critique of authorship and the humanist subject” (1999, p. 406-7). 
It’s not my intention to discuss the pros and cons of these specific positions in their fine 
details. The arguments made are complex and invoke a variety of distinct terms, and the 
poetries of those who make them often more complex, or with a more nuanced relationship to 
the subject than their manifesto claims might imply. Rather, I invoke them here as illustrative 
examples of a strain of thought, in order to point to what is much more unarguable, which is 
the contemporary prevalence of poetics that directly responds to a perception of an anti-
subjective dominant. A sympathetic reader might rightly point out that these older poetics are 
generally opposed to particular, bourgeois, configurations of the authorising expressive 
subject or the singular artistic genius, rather than the subject per se. Yet, contemporary 
responses often find (also rightly, in my view) that the various disparate cases made against 
versions of the poetic subject share some common problems, in practice often ceding poetic 
subjectivity to precisely the forces and configurations which it wishes to resist. This reaction 
in turn brings contemporary poets to a position which explicitly demonstrates the importance 
of retaining some form of subjectivity – as a matter of investigation, not as a stable authority – 











I’ve always been interested in subjectivity, at first because certainly in the London 
avant-poetry scene, when I first showed up lyric expression was a real no-no […] 
dogmas against the lyric subject in poetry – from Olson on – always assume that we’re 
talking about a middle-class, usually male, usually white subject, as if the only people 
who could be interested in the “avant-garde” would be white posh men. It’s easy to 
deny subjectivity when yours is dominant. There’s no need to assert it because it 
permeates the entire atmosphere of social reality. 
(Sean Bonney, from Sean Bonney & Stephen Collis, ‘We are an Other: Poetry, 
Commons, Subjectivity’, Towards. Some. Air., De'Ath & Wah, 2015, pp. 283-284) 
 ~ 
In David and Christine Kennedy’s account, the ‘meta-’ approach, which focussed on language 
itself and was criticised as unable to make positive articulations, was also and relatedly seen 
as unable to deal with “the energetic contestations of normativities of class, gender, nation, 
race and religion” (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2013, p. 40). An unwillingness to deal with 
subjectivity locked it off from being able to seriously engage in the work of liberation politics 
which are based on experienced and enforced differences between subjects interpellated into 
different identity categories. Where this poetics is associated, as Bonney so bluntly puts it, 
with the writing of “white posh men”, by contrast Kennedy & Kennedy suggest “subjectivity 
is a key issue for women’s experimental poetry in Britain,” and that the authority of the 
individual voice is “an important act of reclamation after centuries of denial” (2013, p. 40). 
They quote Caroline Bergvall’s claim that “experimental poets […] have been, and still are, 
guilty of ‘[dispensing] with identity-seeking when positive female identification is still 
culturally and politically so vulnerable’” (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2013, p. 40).22 
The inability of a de-subjectified poetics to deal with the necessary work of recognising 
differing experience and following-through that recognition towards a liberatory shift in 
unequal conditions is further demonstrated in some arguments which flared up about 
experimental poetry and race around 2015. In her essay ‘Not a British Subject’, poet and critic 
Sandeep Parmar claimed: “The so-called avant-garde poetry of the United Kingdom relies on 
an unstable and purposeful decontextualizing of the lyric ‘I,’”, which “leave[s] little room for 
expressions of complex identity and difference” (2015, para. 5/27). In ‘Delusions of 
Whiteness in the Avant-Garde’, Cathy Park Hong goes further (referring to an American 
context), saying: 
 
22 Quoting from Caroline Bergvall, ‘No Margins to this Page: Female Experimental Poets and the Legacy of 
Modernism’, Fragmente 5, 1993, (pp. 30-38), p. 33 
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The avant-garde’s ‘delusion of whiteness’ is the specious belief that renouncing 
subject and voice is anti-authoritarian, when in fact such wholesale pronouncements 
are clueless that the disenfranchised need such bourgeois niceties like voice to alter 
conditions forged in history. (2014, para. 1) 
To even begin to resist the particular conditions in which certain subjects are both materially 
and ideologically dominant over others, these writers suggest, poetry and criticism must be 
able to engage with individual subjectivity, rather than obscuring it in favour of a 
decontextualisation which has, in practice, similar effects to claims of objectivity in criticism 
as discussed in Chapter 2, to obscure both marginal identities and ideological formation in 
general, and implicitly declare certain dominant subject-positions to be general or neutral. 
Keston Sutherland’s ‘Theses on Antisubjectivist Dogma’ adds a further element to my 
argument that a basis in affective subjectivity is not only non-contradictory with, but is 
actively necessary for, a poetry that wishes to be resistive in the face of a situation in which 
we each are subjectified by and within our dominant ideological conditions – specifically 
where these conditions are dominated by bourgeois ideology. He connects “antisubjectivist 
poetries” as a strain of avant-garde writing most strongly with the “so-called ‘conceptual’ 
poets” (whose influence and voice spoke more loudly in 2013, when Sutherland’s piece was 
published, than it does today), before suggesting that: 
Capital itself is the fundamental “antisubjective” force in the world and the pattern of 
all the others. Marxist revolutionary theory is about restoring the subject to society and 
abolishing the coercion that actually and in material reality desubjectivises workers. 
(Sutherland, 2013, para. 10) 
I wish for a poetry which can, counter to this, believe in and recognise the varying 
experiences, desires and affects of all subjects, without reverting to a bourgeois-liberal 
conception of those experiences as purely internal, apolitical, sacrosanct and free from the 
possibility of radical critique. 
Purportedly radical dismissals of the subject in poetry must partly rely on a false dichotomy 
between an expressive poetry of stable, pre-established notions of the self as held in readily 
articulable language, and a disruptive, defamiliarising language which is therefore stripped of 
that subjectivity. I instead posit – as a necessity for any poetry that has the potential to make 
serious resistive contributions, which also include positive articulations of a situation more 
conducive to general, equitable and liberatory flourishing – a base in the affective, 
experiencing subjectivity. This can cut through that false dichotomy, and work to avoid 
reproducing pre-existing understandings of identity within dominant ideological formations 
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by beginning from an acknowledgedly unstable, incoherent, non-authoritative subject. The 
subjective experiences towards which such a poetry would look are those that hold the most 
potential to gesture towards resistive alternative ways of being, and challenge the dominant 
ideological situation in which they exist, precisely because they are least articulable; the 
language and form of this poetry would be expected, therefore, to retain much of its 
traditionally inherited antagonistic relationship to clear articulation. 
A contemporary landscape which is highly amenable to the possibility of an avant-garde 
practice that folds in affective subjectivity as a problem to be explored – against the backdrop 
of an actual or perceived previous neglect or rejection of the subject – makes up the context 
for the particular version of such a poetics which I articulate in detail in this thesis. This 
context can be seen partly in the list of influential contemporary experimental poets enlisted 
in the argument above: Bonney, Robertson, Brady, Sutherland, Parmar, Park Hong, Bergvall, 
as well as the general thrust of the Kennedy and Kennedy account of women’s experimental 
poetry. In his contextual essay to Towards. Some. Air., Peter Jaeger also articulates this move 
towards the resistive capacity of the expressive subject in contemporary poetics, suggesting 
that “the collective desire of this anthology” might be a “desire for a return to a poetics of 
militant sincerity, as an affect dangerous to neoliberalism” (De’Ath & Wah, 2015, p. 8). A 
further example of the currency of these ideas in the current landscape would be the 2016 
conference ‘Contemporary Poetry: Thinking and Feeling’ which took place at the University 
of Plymouth. As well as this conference in general speaking of a contemporary interest in a 
poetry that deals with the possibilities at the intersection of thinking and feeling, which are 
closely related to those I have explored under the notion of affect, a panel on ‘Post-
Confessional Poetics’, for example, discussed an interest in “the subject as a body that feels” 
(Carbery, 2016, para. 14, quoting Kat Peddie) and the idea of “embodiment as a mode of 
confession” (Carbery, 2016, para. 14). 
I am in this thesis attempting to theorise and examine some of the potential of this strand of 
tentatively feeling experimental poetry, both as they are currently suggested and actualised in 
existing works, and as they can, through readings of those works, be posited for a future 




Chapter 4: Sean Bonney, Letters Against the Firmament 
 as our co-ordinates are magnetised, & as our exits have been seized 
 we have vanished, we heavy stones of destruction & light 
(Sean Bonney, ‘[untitled poem]’, Happiness: Poems After Rimbaud, 2011a, p. 
21) 
 ~ 
Sean Bonney was based for many years in London, and latterly in Berlin, and published 
poetry from the 1990s right up until his death in late 2019.23 Esther Leslie described Bonney 
in 2011: “He is known as somebody who spits out his work, rages as he shouts and stammers 
his lines. He performs his poems in the upstairs rooms of London pubs or on the streets during 
anti-war demonstrations” (Leslie, 2011, p. 25). Had Leslie written even a few months later, 
“anti-war demonstrations” might have been lightly updated to mention readings at 
occupations and picket lines, in the context of the “period of insurgent struggle” around that 
time which I have already discussed as influential on Bonney’s work – that period in which, 
following an initial wave of intense student activism, the despondent anti-war movement 
came to be replaced by broad anti-austerity politics as one of the primary fronts for politically 
resistive activity in the UK. The biographical note to Happiness states that “Bonney is in 
complete agreement with the surrealist poet Benjamin Peret that ‘the poet of today has no 
other choice than to be a revolutionist or not be a poet’” (Bonney, 2011a, p. 71). In his 
obituary for Bonney, Will Rowe wrote: “No other contemporary work destroys so thoroughly 
the universe of resurgent fascism” (Rowe, 2020, para. 1). 
 ~ 
 here is a landscape 
 here is ‘all hell’, 
 the distance between each line 
 some kind of ‘celestial snarl’ 
 redistributes the city 
 a strange and bitter crop 
 furnace / numbers / Christians 
 yeh / yeh / yeh: 
  (Sean Bonney, ‘The Commons’, Letters Against the Firmament, 2015, p. 69) 
 ~ 
 
23 Major works include: Blade Pitch Control Unit (Salt Publishing, 2005),  Baudelaire in English (Veer Books, 
2007), The Commons (Openned, 2011), Happiness (Poems After Rimbaud) (Unkant, 2011), Letters Against the 
Firmament (Enitharmon, 2015), Our Death (Commune Editions, 2019) 
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Letters Against the Firmament (Enitharmon, 2015) brings together a selection of works 
previously published across multiple pamphlets, as well as long extracts from the book-length 
poem sequences The Commons (Opened, 2011) and Happiness: Poems After Rimbaud 
(Unkant, 2011). Whilst these are sequences of fractured, frantic, scattered and explosive 
lineated poems, the majority of the rest of the book is made up of prose ‘letters’ which, 
though drawn from a range of previous publications, function to provide the book with a 
structuring principle as a kind of epistolary sequence, as well as a relative consistency of tone, 
speaking voice, form and thematic address. Whilst there is no direct indication of speaker or 
addressee, there is some sense of consistency. The speaker is throughout a highly politicised 
poet, struggling with closely related despondencies about his writing, the political situation, 
and his own personal and financial difficulties. “Anyway, I’ve totally changed my method”, 
opens the first letter in the book (Bonney, 2015, p. 8); “Obviously I’ve not been getting much 
writing done”, Bonney writes at the beginning of the second letter, which ends, “Now send 
me some fucking money” (2015, pp. 10-11); “I’ve been thinking about the riots again lately”, 
opens another (2015, p. 37). Given that many of these pieces first appeared on Bonney’s own 
blog, a context which posits the voice as more straight-forwardly aligned with Bonney 
himself, they feel situated in a reasonably continuous poet-identified speaking subjectivity. 
While there is less to mark out any addressee in these pieces, they are written with a tone of 
familiarity, as if in an ongoing conversation – “we both know what that means”, Bonney 
writes in that same opening letter (2015, p. 8) – with a close, politically sympathetic, if a little 
less radical and slightly more well-off friend or family member – they are chastised, “yours 
was such an obvious bourgeois response” (2015, p. 10). 
Thematically, these prose letters, and through a less direct form and mode, the verse poems 
also, are extremely close to the concerns of this thesis: they deal directly with the difficult 
question of the efficacy of resistive action in the face of the seemingly intractable 
reproduction of the current state of things, and of poetry’s role in both this resistance and this 
reproduction. This is situated in specific events, and through the epistolary form also in the 
poet-speaker’s immediate experience of working through these questions in practice. This 
includes mention of specific contemporary events: the opening three letters are all dated 
August 2011 and written as if from London; a discussion of riots as political resistance in the 
first letter becomes more concrete in the second, due to the occurrence of the biggest riots in 
London for several decades, in the time between their respective dates. Similarly, the poem 
‘Corpus Hermeticum’ specifically mentions Theresa May and David Willets (Bonney, 2015, 
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p. 27), who were Home Secretary and Universities Minister respectively at that time. 
Contemporary political references of this sort, including specific dates and occasions, are 
littered throughout, amongst references to more historical insurrectionary events. The book’s 
acknowledgements further situate this poetics of political struggle in the context of actual off-
the-page political activity: the list of prior places of publication includes “various flyers 
distributed at demonstrations and other disturbances”, and the poems are dedicated to “those 
whom, over the past years, I have struggled and fought alongside against those dogs of hell, 
those vampires of capital who continue to dictate the terms of our lives” (2015, p. 144). 
I read these pieces, the prose letters in particular, as hybrid forms, as a poetry which is also a 
political poetics. They fold specific, pointed and highly sophisticated description and analysis 
of events and of political or theoretical problems into a form which can hold wide-ranging 
kinds of contradiction, doubleness and ambiguity. The poems construct a consistently 
dialectical thinking in which moments of vehemence are framed in a self-negating language, 
or clear propositions about possibilities of resistance clash against the equal truth of some 
antithetical fact of impossibility, alongside wildly imaginative hyperbolic treatments of 
political events, grotesques of violence and destruction, and glittering cosmological 
metaphors. 
 ~ 
And we have no foothold, and we stumble, backward and backward, hour by hour, as 
stars or buildings collapsing, into the abyss, of their hearts, the inheritors of the law, 
and we sing there, unimagined, in the ice of our silence, falling. 
 (Sean Bonney, ‘Lamentations’, Letters Against the Firmament, 2015, p. 17) 
~ 
My reading is in sympathy with the hybridity of these texts: I see them as containing elements 
of conventionally propositional content, albeit tentative and contradictory, in the development 
of a series of sophisticated arguments about political poetics; yet they are also highly non-
sequential, and subjectively involved, with the prose letters and the verse poems alike 
returning to certain concerns, concepts, and language patterns, shifting and modifying them in 
relation to other patterns which occur in parallel or unevenly intertwine. Despite its sometime 
essayistic tendency, the form of the overall work is absolutely irreducible simply to concepts, 
to use Sutherland’s terminology; it is the effect of all these manoeuvres which is their total 
content. The argument that follows is one I pull out of this experience, a necessarily highly 
incomplete account of some of the elements that are given to me in the sum total of reading 
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through Letters Against the Firmament. If it takes on an appearance of sequential argument 
here it is not to suggest anything so stable in the text itself, but only to elucidate patterns of 
connection which arise out of the text, and to give some sense of what they produce in my 
own reading. 
What I find in Bonney’s work is the possibility of a communication which doesn’t aim to be 
generally coherent, but is based on the attempts at articulation of specific, marginal kinds of 
affective experience – experiences that might fall outside of that which is recuperable within 
the language of current ideological conditions. Bonney’s work finds moments of affective 
extremity to act as sites of potential ideological rupture which can activate resistance, and 
uses the wide ranging musical and cosmological metaphor of ‘harmony’ to think about how 
these ruptures might be recognised or created in poetry and in action. 
 
Ideology, the law, police realism, and the failure of resistance 
Within the context of his own investment in political activism and agitation, Bonney’s work 
directly engages with the problems of the enclosing matrix of ideology, with the way systems 
of power reproduce themselves at every level, and with the huge problems this poses for 
resistance. Through all its incendiary drive, the book is highly despondent about the 
possibilities of protest to break out of the patterns of domination and reproduction which 
characterise both social existence in general and the conditions of neoliberal capitalism in 
which we currently live, and it is through the grim reality of this despondency that it looks 
towards more hopeful possibilities. 
‘Lamentations’ develops a motif around the idea of “the law”, introduced on the opening page 
with “The law is a mouth. | Glossolalia” (Bonney, 2015, p. 16), and then followed up a few 
stanzas later: 
It breathes, the law, and those it protects it sings inside, and they are like flowers, 
chaste and tranquil as glass. 
It stares at us, the music of the law, and its fingers, they pluck us, as if we were 
strings, golden, and we are their songs, the inhabitants of the law. (2015, p. 17) 
I meet this with the context of the familiar radical critique which says that the primary role of 
the legal system is to violently enforce capitalist relations, with particular emphasis on the 
inherent racism of those relations. This is my own position, and whilst Bonney doesn’t make 
this claim explicitly, it is strongly implicit as a basic premise; the book’s strident and 
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abundant hatred of the police particularly, extended right through to magistrates, judges and 
the judicial system in general, allows me to enter the text with my sense of this as a shared 
understanding, as a comrade in political struggle. “Here’s a statistic for you, a class metaphor” 
Bonney writes, “not one police officer in the UK has been convicted for a death in police 
custody since 1969” (2015, p. 115). The final page of ‘Corpus Hermeticum’ opens: 
 for ‘i love you’ say fuck the police, for 
 ‘the fires of heaven’ say fuck the police, don’t say 
 ‘recruitment’ don’t say ‘trotsky’ say fuck the police 
 for ‘alarm clock’ say fuck the police (Bonney, 2015, p. 29) 
Building to a kind of litany over another twenty-one such lines, this piece, originally 
published on its own as ‘ACAB: A Nursery Rhyme’24, speaks viscerally to me, to a bodily 
memory, as I think perhaps it does to any of us who, for all the many possible reasons, have 
encountered the police directly as violent antagonists. 
In this context “the law” in “the law is a mouth” already suggests a kind of enforcement that 
contains both violence and class antagonism – the way in which the rules by which everyone 
is collectively bound nonetheless serve the interests of some in the subjugation of others – and 
associates it with language, with acts of speaking. The second iteration expands on this 
antagonism: there are those who the law protects, “they”, and there are those it plucks, “us”; it 
sings inside the former, while the latter are its songs. Their different positions in relation to 
the song of the law might speak of the differing relations to the benefits of the law’s 
perpetuation. Yet the relationship to the voice of the law still shares a basic structure: the 
concept of “the law” in either case is further abstracted away from a direct enforcement, by 
some upon others, and is instead cast as a discursive force which inhabits and is inhabited, 
which acts through and in the very voices of its subjects. I read this as having significant 
similarity with the Althusserian account whereby ideology perpetuates unequal material 
conditions through a process of subjectification which is equally formative and mystifying for 
all subjects, where that ideology is also reciprocally formative of the conceptual limits of 
language. Following Butler’s earlier use of the phrase “regulatory law”, I find the law as a 
concept here at the intersection of ideology, discourse, material oppression and the violent 
state. 
 
24 See Bonney’s blog, December 2014: http://abandonedbuildings.blogspot.com/2014/12/acab-nursery-




This figuration of ideological regulation is accompanied by repeated characterisations of the 
way that activity which aims to resist the current conditions and dominant ideological 
situation has a tendency towards failure, or towards folding back into reproduction of those 
conditions. The very first letter states that:  
The main problem with a riot is that all too easily it flips into a kind of negative 
intensity, that in the very act of breaking out of our commodity form we become more 
profoundly frozen within it. (Bonney, 2015, p. 8) 
With specific reference to the all-encompassing function of the logic of capitalist 
commodification, Bonney describes how dominant ideological conditions structure the forms, 
as well as the social function and perception, of acts of resistance. The sentence which follows 
details some specific aspects of that function in this instance: “Externally at least we become 
the price of glass, or a pig’s overtime” (2015, p. 8). This is not exactly Bonney’s metaphor per 
se, but rather points to a pre-existing metaphorical logic operating within the collective 
conceptualisation of these rioters, and the material structures around that conceptualisation; 
all action is reduced to its monetary cost and its potential for shock or disruption is absorbed 
through those mechanisms, re-assimilated into the logic it refuses, and rendered toothless.25 
This exemplifies a pattern, or rather an anxiety, a dismay, which pervades these texts. 
Moments of rebellious possibility, of ecstatic disruption, eruptions of anger, any flashpoints 
which rise up with real hope of resistance and appear momentarily to produce a break in the 
reproduction of oppressive conditions, are seen to be almost immediately rendered 
imaginatively impossible, unreal, distanced from the conscious present of a quickly 
reasserting stability the moment they are over.  ‘Lamentations’ speaks of “yesterday’s 
rebellions” and asks that readers “insist that it really happened, we are not at all imaginary” 
 
25 I hear echoes of Marxist thinking about the alienation of human labour and creativity. Under the capitalist 
mode of production, this activity is reduced to a commodity, both in terms of the exchange value into which such 
labour can be distilled through the production of goods and services, and in terms of the necessity for each 
individual to sell and expend their labour in order to survive. In each case, the creative potential of this labour is 
effectively stolen, as it becomes only the commodity value that can be extracted from it. See, for example, the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844: “Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself and 
the worker as a commodity […] Under these economic conditions this realization of labor appears as loss of 
realization for the workers […] How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were 
it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but the 
summary of the activity, of production. If then the product of labor is alienation, production itself must be active 
alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In the estrangement of the object of labor is 
merely summarized the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labor itself. […] the worker’s own 
physical and mental energy, his personal life – for what is life but activity? – [is] an activity which is turned 
against him, independent of him and not belonging to him. Here we have self-estrangement, as previously we 
had the estrangement of the thing” (Marx, 1988, pp. 71-75). In a sense, the idea that exchange value is labour is 
itself a metaphor, but one with concrete structuring power, which imposes itself forcefully upon the worker. 
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(Bonney, 2015, p. 18); in one of the letters dated January 31st, [2012],26 the week of the 
August 2011 riots “has been compressed, buried somewhere in the distant past” (2015, p. 37). 
Later, explicitly despondent on a particular recent historical moment of possibility: 
It’s as if the ruling class, sheer power, whatever you want to call it, whatever it’s [sic] 
local franchise likes to call itself, had, via some kind of sadistic alchemy, taken the 
moment (around 2 in the afternoon) on 27th March 2011 when the Black Bloc had 
gone running up Oxford Street, and had basically erased that moment, replaced it with 
a long and uninteresting parade of babies, flags, cupcakes, brooms, victims, 
mummifications, the UKBA on every street corner. (2015, p. 106) 
In a pithier evocation of the same logic of capitalist capture, the revolutionary vision opened 
up by strikes by Walmart workers becomes a mere image: “if they are not actually won, 
strikes will simply take their place among the racks of DVDs” (Bonney, 2015, p. 44). This is 
how the structures of power, representation, collective imagination and dominant ideology 
function to erase or recuperate potential resistive divergences. 
A later letter expresses the pervasive dismay, loss, and sense of inevitable failure of examples 
such as this, in the form of a general problem: “protest is useless only because it stays within 
the limits of the already known” (Bonney, 2015, p. 33). I recall here the “already-known 
world” in Forrest-Thomson, where she is specifically commenting on a poetry which makes 
claims about the world that take as solid the pre-existing conditions and limits of that world. 
Reading some conceptual continuity between these usages, I find here a suggestion that action 
alone, without any mechanism for critiquing the terms which make action intelligible – the 
conceptual limits by which certain actions become possible and others barely even thinkable 
at all – will always reproduce those same limits and the conditions that form them. Protest 
actions, the implication is here, must be non-recuperable – taking forms that are not yet 
known, challenging the terms by which they might be comprehended, fracturing those 
mechanisms of conception – as well as materially disruptive. 
Yet this isn’t a defence of poetry, or of esoteric thinking in general, weighed against the 
complicity of material kinds of political activity. Poetry is treated far more harshly by 
Bonney; it too is subsumed by this constant, near hopeless tendency, even at hopeful 
moments, towards violent ideological complicity. In ‘Letter on Silence’ – following a “thesis 
on the nature of rhythm” which describes, from the point of view of a first-person direct 
 
26 The date given in the text is January 31st, 2011, but since the letter is in between others dated December 16, 
2011, and April 5th, 2012, and refers directly to the riots of August 2011, it seems safe to assume this is an error. 
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witness, the police beating someone to death, as “a fairly conventional metrical system”, 
Bonney writes: 
Poetry transforms itself dialectically into the voice of the crowd – René Ménil made 
that claim way back in 1944 or something. But what if it’s not true. What if all it can 
do is transform into the endless whacks of police clubs. (2015, p. 12) 
Whilst this formulation sets up an opposition between “the voice of the crowd” and “the 
endless whacks of police clubs”, this simple opposition – and the sense it might imply of the 
inherently resistive nature of “the crowd”, as an abstraction for non-ruling class people 
activated in collective resistance – is tempered, in the context of the anxiety about the efficacy 
of protest, by an ambiguity as to what the voice of that crowd might be. “The crowd” is not 
inherently oppositional, but is itself an area of antagonism. For the most part, the processes 
which subjectify each person within a general collectivity recruit their voices in the 
perpetuation of systems which do harm to most of them; those who direct their voices against 
those systems do so in a pre-given language, their articulated opposition unable to save them 
from acting as set-pieces in the cycle of reproduction. It is not only that it is difficult for 
poetry to convincingly represent the side of the crowd against that of the police; the crowd’s 
voice and the police clubs, whilst engaged in a very real antagonism in the moment of striking 
and being struck, might also, at a structural level, be non-contradictory facets of the social 
whole, and poetry’s voicing can no less replicate this than the crowd itself. 
At the extreme end of this despondency, Bonney moves towards the conclusion of one letter 
by bemoaning that “none of the above is likely to help us to understand, or break out of, or 
even enter, the intense surges of radio emissions we’re trapped inside” (2015, p. 39). I have 
heard responses to this work of Bonney’s which find the cumulative effect of these repeated 
turns towards despondency to be paralysing, too deeply involved in despair to be able to point 
them towards a way out;27 my experience is rather that, coming from a shared understanding 
and anxiety about the extreme, almost intractable difficulty which any resistance must face, 
these poems are desperately motivating. “What if all it can do is transform into the endless 
whacks of police clubs” is then one of the animating questions of the whole collection, which 
is never fully resolved or turned away from, not a worry that can be fully assuaged, but which 
 
27 I’m thinking in particular of a paper on ‘Poetry and Despair’ given by Joe Luna at the Anna Mendelssohn 
Symposium, University of Sussex, February 4th 2017. The talk is since unpublished, but my own notes 
paraphrase Luna suggesting that Letters Against the Firmament goes over the edge of despair, into an anxiety 
and self-destruction which overwhelms it. By contrast, Luna suggests that Anna Mendelssohn’s work keeps just 
to the other, more productive side of despair. 
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pushes all of Bonney’s thinking towards the possibility of a poetry that can do something else. 
It is precisely because these poems are really unsure about the capability of themselves, or 
any other poems, to be anything except one cultural facet of the violence endemic to the world 
as it is already known, that they reach harder, and more convincingly, towards some 
possibility that they might not always be that. 
Some avenue for hope comes where this despondent question turns into the more solid 
suggestion: “police violence is the content of all officially sanctioned art” (Bonney, 2015, p. 
12). This is at once more strident, more definitively condemning, and also offers a 
clarification, in the term “officially sanctioned”. There must, this formulation suggests, be 
some poetry, or art, that can operate in ways which aren’t recuperable by official sanction, 
and whose content is not merely police violence.  These poems are not certain that they are 
such a poetry – that they don’t perpetuate a stable theatre of dissent and opposition – and nor, 
in reading them, am I, but they hope to be, and ask in the doing what that poetry might look 
like, as they activate me in the same asking. 
The work of responding to this problem begins by embedding at the level of the form of 
propositions that which obsessively pervades these texts at a thematic level – that recognition 
of all resistance’s over-arching tendency towards failure. As if always within an acute 
awareness of the extreme difficulty of making any positive claims against current conditions 
that aren’t complicit in those same conditions they oppose, these texts turn their own claims 
against themselves, disowning them and contradicting them in the process of their being 
claimed. 
For example, a claim that death has the capacity to “[open] up a gap in social time”, “from 
which new understandings and arrangements of social harmony may be imagined”, is 
immediately countered, “while I’d like that to be true, it’s essentially hymn-singing” (Bonney, 
2015, p. 38). Another letter begins “Thanks for your list of objections. I accept most of them” 
(2015, p. 43). Where the former example makes a claim and then contradicts it, the latter 
doesn’t even need the specific positive statement to be present in the text for it to accept the 
logic of self-contradiction, to allow for the general rule that any given statement is at least 
partially a failure, and to accept objection in general. 
As well as through this self-contradiction, the awareness of the complicity of simply 
recuperable statements manifests through claims which are made in highly provisional forms, 
such as when the statement “the enemy is non-material, we are not” is preceded by its own 
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bracketing off, or disowning as mere thought or invention, with “Think stuff up:” (Bonney, 
2015, p. 18); or when the suggestion of a simple symbolically subversive artistic act – playing 
Leadbelly’s ‘The Gallis Pole’ on a supermarket radio – is followed with “I mean, obviously, 
nothing would happen. But, I dunno, let’s pretend” (2015, p. 43). 
I don’t read this merely as an acceptance and expression of the matrix of complicity in which 
these texts, like all attempts at resistive expression, find themselves caught. This is also a 
productive response, in creating texts which, whilst heavily engaged in a descriptive, 
diagnostic, propositional poetics of resistance, often dealing with concrete events in relatively 
comprehensible language, nonetheless attempt to shift away from the reproductive function of 
that language. All positions are at arms’ length from any stable position of author or text, and 
instead are tentative, mutable, attempts at formulating imaginative possibilities without 
reifying those positions on the terms of the already known. The thinking is dialectical, in the 
sense that it allows for the possibility of statements to be both true and untrue, for a statement 
and its opposite to be true, for resistance to be possible and impossible, action both complicit 
and resistive, in a contradiction which is simply a condition of living in opposition to the 
conditions that form us. This thinking asks then, how these oppositions can be broken 
through, or how the content of a thinking which simultaneously holds these contradictions 
might be the tentative production, in imagination at least, of a resistance that can maintain 
itself before the moment of recuperation. 
So far, however, this picture I have painted, the despondency of Bonney’s vision of the state 
of things, militates most strongly towards a destructive poetics, a poetics of defamiliarisation, 
in the sense that it paints little available possibilities beyond doubt and shattering, a wish to 
tear everything down. Whilst this is one of the dominant moods which runs through this work, 
I yet believe it steps off from its own hopelessness, as a position from which to build: 
metallic, musical screeches as systems of thought pushing away from, and through, 
the imposed limits of the conventional harmonic or social systems, thus clearing some 
ground from where we can offer counter-proposals. (Bonney, 2015, p. 34) 
This move from “clearing ground” to “counter-proposals” works as a concise formulation of 
my distinction between the ideologically disruptive resistive action that I have described as 
dominant in much experimental poetry – as a necessarily preliminary step, but one of which I 
am also sceptical, since the ground can never be clear – and a poetics which nonetheless 
attempts to make some more positive imaginative and assertive gestures towards radical 
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alternative possibility. These become sequential stages in a resistive thinking or artistic 
production. 
In this work then, to briefly recap, the notion of the reproductive function of realist-
intelligible, readily recuperable language, which I have delineated from the point of view of 
radical poetics, is followed through to a ruthless stance on the efficacy of poetry as resistance. 
This stance is built in to the work’s formal structure in the form of pervasive tentativeness, 
self-doubt, contradiction and dialectical argument – and also, in the same breath and using the 
same language, stretched from the poetry out into a critique of the efficacy and reproductive 
function of protest activity. 
The overlapping critique of word and action is even more closely captured in the concept of 
“police realism”, as in: “I’d like to write a poetry that could speed up a dialectical continuity 
in discontinuity & thus make visible whatever is forced into invisibility by police realism” 
(2015, p. 142).28 I’ll return to the rest of this essential statement of purpose later – for now I 
want to think about how “police realism” conceptually ties together much of the project of 
this book, or the anxiety of inefficacy, and the urgent attempts to cut through it, which is at its 
centre. The term contains a strong version of the claims made in the previous chapter, that 
simple realism is in service of the police and all they represents about the violent state and the 
upholding of the inequalities of capitalism, which is to say the upholding of all that is painful 
about current conditions. Further, it also suggests that the question of realism is not simply 
one of literary or artistic representation, but of action and thinking too. 
 ~ 
any plausible poetics would be shattered, like a shop window 
(Sean Bonney, ‘Letter Against the Firmament’, Letters Against the Firmament, 
2015, p. 113) 
the protests did what in relation to Fucking realism 
(Sean Bonney, ‘Corpus Hermeticum’, Letters Against the Firmament, 2015, p. 
27) 
~ 
The need to break out of the “already-known”, as my reading of the failures of protest and 
poetry has already suggested, argues for the reciprocal necessity of both protest and writing to 
actively disrupt the limits of this ‘realism’ in their efforts at resisting the ideological and 
 
28 He also uses the term “police reality” as a description of poetry which is diametrically opposite to that of Anna 
Mendelssohn (Bonney, 2011b, p. 17) 
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material forces which oppress. That is, kinds of thinking which can actively disrupt the 
conceptual limits of police realism, as experimental poetry might hope to do, are reciprocally 
dependent upon the hard work of resistance ‘in the streets’ – of protest, riot, industrial action, 
community organising, direct action, etc – in crafting possibilities for resistance which 
intertwine the material and ideological. Bonney’s work seeks protest which stretches out of 
the known forms, and poetry which is outside of the bounds of that which can be officially 
sanctioned; the two, this work demands, must be mutually informing in a project of both 
imagining and actualising resistive ways of acting and being that might avoid total 
recuperation, and in doing so have some chance of altering social relations for the better. This 
reciprocity is expressed in positing a poetics of riot, which is also a poetics as riot: 
Imagine that you had a favourite riot, one that you loved. Tottenham. Millbank. 
Chingford. Walthamstow. I like that last one, but only for sentimental reasons. It’s a 
stupid question, but maybe that will help you see what I mean when I use the word 
‘poetics’ or ‘poetry’. What was Marx referring to when he was talking about the 
‘poetry of the future’, for example? (Bonney, 2015, p. 113) 
A poetry which doesn’t “transform into the endless whacks of police clubs” might seek to 
reach towards embodiment in active forms of intervention; it is the same thinking which 
allows us to conceptualise the forms of transformative poetics and transformative action. 
This merging can be seen in the language with which Bonney describes protest action as he 
might wish it to be. A liberal protest-spectacle might hope instead, at its best, to be “a fast 
alteration in the structural scansion at the city’s core” – though this positive vision is 
tempered, still seen as caught in enclosing systems of power, since “the hidden contours of 
our songs are still a nasty little rich kid” (Bonney, 2015, p. 34). Elsewhere Bonney describes a 
Walmart strike in which “the structure of the supermarket is kept in place, but all of a sudden 
the base astrological geometry of the place is revealed as simplistic, fanatic and rectilinear” 
(2015, p. 44). The strike takes on an operation similar to that of Denise Riley’s understanding 
of the exposing force of ironic repetitions in writing, which demonstrate the instability and 
historicity of conceptual and linguistic formulations that previously have seemed immovable 
or natural. 
‘Letter Against the Firmament’ posits the possibility of a “counter rhythmic interruption”, 
“where language folds and stumbles for a second, like a cardiac splinter or a tectonic shake. 
Again, a cracked metaphor, an abstraction or a counter-earth” (Bonney, 2015, p. 116). From 
the idea of an interruption, a splintering, a defamiliarisation, we move to the more positive 
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alternative possibility of a “counter-earth”, with its connotations of an alternative, 
oppositional possible world. Bonney goes on: “that ‘counter-rhythmic interruption’ refers, at 
the same time, to a band of masked-up rioters ripping up Oxford St.” (2015, p. 116). Protest 
action, at its best, is seen as containing moments of radical conceptual fracture and revelation, 
a kind of embodied revolutionary thinking, in which the act of temporarily breaking out of the 
routines of repetition and habitual movement or activity, breaking through the normally stable 
dictates of the literal law, produces a counter-analysis, opens up the imaginative possibility of 
alternative organisations of the social world, in the active attempt to enact or bring them 
about.29 
We have seen already that these moments of radical possibility are depicted as readily 
recuperable, having this conceptually and materially de-stabilising force sapped from them as 
soon as they have subsided. Bonney here sees (his) poetry as having some capacity to enact in 
textual form similar conceptual fractures, or, in its descriptions and discussions of past 
moments of rebellion, to be able to activate or actualise these impulses and potentialities, in 
the experience of the reading subject. The hope is always that such poetic re-activation of 
these potentialities might move towards making possible further, more effective and long-
lasting instances of such fracturing moments, which are both materially and conceptually 
disruptive: 
As if there was nothing to say about what it was in Rimbaud’s work – or in avant-
garde poetry in general – that could be read as the subjective counterpart to the 
objective upheavals of any revolutionary moment. (2015, p. 140) 
Successful and meaningful revolutionary change must be both subjective and objective, in the 
sense of each being both ideological and material, as the two are intertwined. It is a poetry 
 
29 In all of this discussion, of the interrelation of protest action and art as methods of re-imagining the world, we 
can see the influence of Situationism on Bonney’s thinking (which he has talked about repeatedly, as in e.g. 
bombmagazine.org/articles/sean-bonney/). See, for example, the opening of Guy Debord’s ‘The Situationists and 
the New Forms of Action in Art and Politics’: “The Situationist movement can be seen as an artistic avant-garde, 
as an experimental investigation of possible ways for freely constructing everyday life, and as a contribution to 
the theoretical and practical development of a new revolutionary contestation. From now on, any fundamental 
cultural creation, as well as any qualitative transformation of society, is contingent on the continued development 
of this sort of interrelated approach” (Debord, 1963, para. 1). Or else, we can almost hear Bonney’s voice here, 
on the matter of subverting the city: “Unitary urbanism is […] the living critique of cities by their inhabitants: 
the permanent qualitative transformation, made by everyone, of social space and time.[…] On an immediate 
practical level, experimentation with a new positive distribution of space and time cannot be dissociated from the 
general problems of organisation and tactics confronting us. Clearly a whole urban guerilla will have to be 
invented. We must learn to subvert existing cities, to grasp all the possible and the least expected uses of time 




that can directly involve itself in this reciprocal correspondence which Bonney envisages, 
demands, wishes against his more hopeless impulses to see, to conjure. 
 ~ 
 you will have shimmering 
 a language of the barricades 
(Sean Bonney, ‘The Commons’, Letters Against the Firmament, 2015, p. 73) 
 ~ 
So Bonney’s work is deeply invested in an analysis of conditions which rules out a resistive 
language of general coherence, a language which reproduces the already known forms of 
police realism; what then, might a language of the barricades look like? 
To trace how Bonney’s poetry works to activate the impulses to revolutionary fracture and the 
possibility of action, to examine what a counter-proposal looks like in this framework, I will 
move in turn through three key areas of conceptualisation that emerge from the book. First, its 
handling of the question of communication, which lays the groundwork for a discussion of the 
concept of harmony, and finally the operation of affective recognition in these texts. 
  
Communication 
My conception of how communication works or is envisaged to work in these texts begins 
with its negative expression, in a clear and pervasive sense of the extreme difficulty, or 
impossibility, of communication which results from inequalities of power, and the 
epistemological boundaries they impose: “The rioters are speaking in perfect English. It’s the 
middle-class, the magistrates, and you, who are all talking some weird, ignorant slang” 
(Bonney, 2015, p. 10). This is a claim that makes incomprehensibility not a general condition 
but rather suggests that people with differently situated identities, experiences, class or other 
positions in relation to capital are rendered mutually incomprehensible to one another by their 
radically different perspectives and experiences of the world, and in relation to being 
unequally served by the reproductive function of ideology. This is then a statement of 
allegiance, with the voice of the crowd of rioters as directly opposed to their class antagonists. 
Yet this allegiance, and the collective understanding and sympathy it moves towards, relies on 
the conception of ‘the crowd’ already under suspicion, as if a rioter miraculously had access 
to a non-ideological view of the world. 
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However, Bonney is here developing a re-figuration of the concept of understanding. In 
‘Letter on Harmony and Sacrifice’: “I was talking to a friend a couple of days ago about what 
‘understanding’ might actually mean. ‘Understanding’, he said, ‘is precisely what is 
incompatible with the bourgeois mind’” (Bonney, 2015, p. 37). This statement has more of a 
tone of political-theoretical diagnosis, as a kind of complementary inverse of the claim I 
earlier invoked from Keston Sutherland that an understanding which reduces all to mere 
concepts is a key characteristic of bourgeois thinking. Here the claim might be, not 
incompatible necessarily with Sutherland’s, that the bourgeois subject – the individual 
subjectified under bourgeois ideology, perhaps, but also the thinking of one subjectified 
specifically from the dominant position within that ideology, to benefit most strongly from its 
being upheld – is primed to only be capable of forms of understanding that are fundamentally 
impoverished and reductive. The bourgeois thinking which suggests that the world can be 
rationally and objectively understood, by the free-thinking individual, is not understanding of 
any use at all to those who wish to see a more liberatory set of relations. 
‘Letter on Harmony and Sacrifice’ follows the above lines with a digression into Lindsay 
Anderson’s film If, in which a school headmaster who “thinks he’s such a liberal”, attempts to 
assuage an act of rebellion with “I understand you”, and is, in response, shot in the head. 
Bonney parses this: “that bullet is his understanding, plain and simple” (2015, p. 37). 
Particular kinds of understanding, collective ideas, can themselves be violence; the bourgeois 
form of understanding both posits and depends upon the idea of conceptual and subjective 
commonality which serves the actual individualisation of the subject, by ignoring ideological 
formation, and naturalising the antagonisms by which the materials of life are unevenly 
distributed. This is what Bonney rejects when he excludes understanding from the bourgeois 
subject. 
 ~ 
Within this reactionary net the poem is negation, which simply means that it is false. 
A hopeless omen that longs to rupture the tyrannical banality of the ‘true’. 
(Sean Bonney, ‘Letter on Harmony and Crisis’, Letters Against the Firmament, 
2015, p. 45) 
 ~ 
One response to the attempt to be folded into this form of understanding, recruited by the 
bourgeois collectivity, is violence, and Bonney’s poems are by no means opposed to that. But 
the poems themselves make another response. Their statements of allegiance, uninterested in 
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claiming truth value, not only pick sides, but also make a claim for a different kind of 
thinking. Understanding is not completely ruled out for the bourgeois subjects to whom 
Bonney’s poetry opposes itself. ‘Letter on Riots and Doubt’ asks about “the possibility of a 
poetry that only the enemy could understand” (Bonney, 2015, p. 8). Understanding is invoked 
not as a matter of clarity, of an objective truth independent of the individual mind and their 
own experiences, agendas, subjectivity, etc; it is a directional, always politicised battleground, 
a discursive weapon in a struggle for or against power. The question is not which party in a 
material antagonism has access to clear understanding, but who, and in whose interest, one 
wishes to understand. 
It is in this context, of directional, partisan understanding, alongside the already established 
critique of reproductive realism, that I read the emphatic moment of allegiance to the 
necessity of some form of communication:  
For the vast majority of people, including the working class, the politicised workers 
and students are simply incomprehensible. Think about that when you’re going on 
about rebarbative avant-garde language. Or this: simple anti-communication, 
borrowed today from Dadaism by the most reactionary champions of the established 
lies, is worthless in an era when the most urgent question is to create a new 
communication on all levels of practice. (Bonney, 2015, p. 141) 
This is one of the most direct and clear statements of the book, which appears in the final 
letter, ‘Letter on Poetics’. The placement and title of this ‘letter’ further emphasises the sense 
that its claims operate as something of a conclusion, or a synthesis of the problematics opened 
up in the preceding texts, and pushes the future-oriented poetics which is the culmination of 
the work. 
Its rejection of “simple anti-communication” is couched specifically in terms of a rejection of 
“rebarbative avant-garde language”. It characterises an anti-communicative position as both 
reactionary – by implication because of its fundamental, constitutional inability for oppressed 
people to understand and be understood – and as directly related to avant-garde practice. I 
might take this as an explicit rejection of those kinds of radically-intentioned poetics which 
respond to the impossibility of clear language that is not complicit in the ideological terms of 
its comprehensibility by turning towards a poetry of defamiliarisation, instability, and 
openness, as values in themselves.30 
 
30 Interview comments from Bonney might be taken as something of a counterpoint: “I don’t think of poetry, 
‘difficult’ or otherwise, as elitist at all. […] in Britain at least there’s historically an anti-intellectualism that calls 
anything that’s complex, or a little difficult to understand on first hearing, elitism. In the Blair era, ‘elitism’ 
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“A new communication on all levels of practice” must be a communication which isn’t about 
stable concepts within a pre-existing framework of bourgeois recuperability. Rather, these 
texts suggest and attempt to open up kinds of communication based on explicitly politicised 
understandings and misunderstandings – understanding as solidarity. This is the basis of a 
communication that might actually tell us something about the world in a way which is not 
claiming truth, but is allowing us to make ethical and political choices about how we might 
live differently, or how we might shatter the condition of living, in ways which open up 
towards radical difference. 
But still the question remains, what might a form of communication which can offer insight, 
diagnose social problems, push towards radical ways of being and organising, without folding 
instantly back into complicity with the conditions it opposes – what might this look like, how 
might this communication be constituted? 
 ~ 
We can still understand poetic thought, in the way I, and I hope you, work at it, as 
something that moves counter-clockwise to bourgeois anti-communication. Like all of 
it. Everything it says. We can engage with ideas that have been erased from the 
official account. If it’s incomprehensible, well, see above. Think of an era where not 
only is, say, revolution impossible, but even the thought of revolution. […] But 
remember, most poetry is mimetic of what some square thinks is incomprehensible, 
rather than an engagement with it. 




Part of an answer to this – the possibility of a communication which is radically different 
from the realist, recuperable communication which directly reproduces the already known – 
emerges through the concept of “harmony”, as it is developed in detail through the course of 
this book, particularly across the six ‘Letters on Harmony’. 
 
basically became a synonym for ‘criticising the government’. It’s so obviously repressive, that way of thinking, 
and ultimately very right wing. I read an article in a performance poetry magazine a few years back, where 
somebody or other was going on about how the simplistic crap they were writing was stuff that the ‘working 
class could understand’. That’s the same logic as The Sun newspaper, all the consumerist media really – clever, 
educated people talking down to people – they think proles are thick, basically, and they want to keep it that 
way. It’s stupid – especially when you think about how so many of the really important avant-garde artists 
Britain has produced, Tom Raworth and Derek Bailey, for example, have been from the working class” (Bonney, 
Toda, Eltringham, McDermott, 2011, para. 25). I take Bonney’s criticism of “simple anti-communication” as 
importantly distinct from the simple distaste for language which is ‘inaccessible’. 
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At the centre of this concept is a double meaning, where “harmony” is taken often 
simultaneously or with some degree of ambiguity as referring either to the arrangement of 
parts in the formation of a unified whole, or to combinations of musical notes. Around this 
doubleness, Bonney develops a constellation of ideas which bring together thinking about the 
relation between ideology and what I have been thinking of as non-recuperable meaning-
forms. 
‘First Letter on Harmony’ focusses on the figure of “a judge who, every seven days, pays a 
prostitute to re-enact the crimes of those he has sentenced that week, while he looks on and 
masturbates” (Bonney, 2015, p. 32). My initial instinct is to read this as a psycho-sexual act in 
which the various power dynamics and social causes that produce its possibility are 
internalised and expressed by the judge, as one of the individuals recruited in the direct 
perpetuation of those conditions through the state apparatus: the relationship of the judiciary 
to power and capital; how that in turn, as it exists within patriarchy, produces the 
power/money relation to the sex worker; the place of power imbalances within 
heteronormative sexuality; the sadistic nature of the exercise of power and abjection over 
those, most often structurally disadvantaged by, for example, poverty, race or lack of access 
to education, who are deemed outside the law. I am forced to hold this analysis of mine as a 
latent presence, as Bonney interrupts that expectation with his own counter-reading of this 
image, not as an expression, but as a symbolic action which in itself reaches out into the 
social world: 
what if he was producing these emissions quite deliberately, as the source of a central 
vibration through which the judiciary could impose a new and extremely rigid analysis 
of the city, within which a sterile atmosphere could be maintained for the propagation 
of a limited number of official sentences (say, for example, seven) from which all 
possible thought could be derived. Sex magic, yeh. All of that ludicrous shit. Don’t 
think I’m turning into one of those wankers in David Icke masks: in terms of creation 
myths it’s a fairly traditional narrative structure. What the judge probably doesn’t 
realise, however, is that each of his particle jets will necessarily invoke an adjunct 
sentence, which while in its weak form may only be manifest in certain cries of 
disbelief and fear, in extreme conditions may – and that’s a very big ‘may’ – may 
ultimately manifest as a ring of antiprotons, otherwise known as attack dogs. (2015, p. 
32) 
The disparaging reference to arch-conspiracy theorist David Icke swiftly disowns the 
conspiratorial elements of this image, which tend towards seeing power as emanating from 
the specific and conscious intentions of a small cabal of rich people, as opposed to coming 
from diffuse structures of ideological and material reproduction which are as opaque to those 
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people who they benefit as the rest of us. This becomes an image instead for this diffuse way 
in which coercive, oppressive and unequal systems self-perpetuate, merging the material 
imposition of state apparatuses with the constraint and reproduction which operates at the 
level of discourse, in, for example, the pun on “official sentences”; as this private sexual act is 
an act of mimetic representation, and is in turn made into an image, or “creation myth” within 
this text, it also speaks of the role of cultural representations in ideological reproduction. The 
process of diffuse action through discourse or cultural representations is described in terms of 
“emissions”, “vibration”, “particle jets”, as kinds of beam or transmission as radio or sound 
waves; this begins the motif that connects the musical sense of ‘harmony’ with the sense of 
harmony as the overall relation of parts, in the effect of the specific cultural event or 
reiteration through which the overall structure is continually re-manifested. 
We also see here that ideological determination is necessarily always contested, producing its 
own fractures and refutations, which can be the source of resistance – just as described by 
Riley and Butler earlier – in the form of “cries of disbelief and fear”, which rise up as the 
germ of resistance in response to the impositions of the judge. 
‘Second Letter on Harmony’ develops this connection between the musical and relational 
sense of harmony in more detail, beginning from a reading of Pythagorean harmony, via 
Lenin reading Hegel. This is described as “a perfect cosmology, a hierarchy built on scalar 
realities that justifies social conditions on earth, where everybody is in their place, and 
nobody is able to question the beauty and perfection of these relationships.” It goes on: 
The gravitational pull that holds the entire system together is an untruth, but an untruth 
with the power to kill. But if this untruth is the site of justification and corporate (i.e. 
ritual) slaughter it’s also the site, magnetic as hell, of contention and repulsion, which 
can transgress its own limits until something quite different, namely, crime, or 
impossibility, appears. (Bonney, 2015, p. 33). 
The Pythagorean system of thought becomes here an analogy for the operation of ideology on 
social relations, and the maintenance of harmful conditions by conceptual limits which are 
themselves not ‘true’. That is, rather than thinking of this “untruth with the power to kill” as a 
simple falsehood by a verifiable objective standard, since its untruth still maintains such 
conceptual and material force, since it is stable within the system, I read it as more of a 
negative truth, belying the emptiness of any notion of that objective, verifiable truth, whilst at 
once operating with an effective claim to truth value. I think of these untruths as something 
like Althusser’s ideological “obviousnesses” (1971, p. 172), or else, as intractable metaphors 
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which have a powerful structuring force on our lives. For example, we encountered earlier the 
metaphorical logic of the commodity – a rioter reduced to “the price of glass, or a pig’s 
overtime” – which is precisely the kind of forceful untruth that routinely justifies corporate 
slaughter, and yet which cannot be simply denied. 
This relation to Pythagorean cosmology strongly foregrounds the sense of harmony as a 
particular cosmological system, as the social whole conceived in relation to these kinds of 
transmissions and structures of signals that hold it together. As before, this structure is seen as 
necessarily contested, holding within itself the possibility of fracture, transgression, newness, 
now in the form of “crime, or impossibility”, that which is rendered outside of the law, which 
is impossible but which yet might occasionally occur, or be glimpsed at. 
If the conceptual system that holds the overall social structure together is to do with the 
gravitational pull of its central metaphors, then one of the forms this contestation takes in 
Bonney’s work is through a system of counter-metaphors. Earlier we saw poetic interruption 
take the form of “a cracked metaphor, an abstraction or a counter-earth” (Bonney, 2015, p. 
116); in ‘Second Letter’ Bonney proposes “poetic realities as counter-earths” (2015, p. 33). 
“Counter-earth” here comes directly from Pythagorean cosmology, describing a second Earth 
whose precisely mirroring orbit keeps it always hidden from view on the far side of the Sun; it 
is not then only an alternative, unknown Earth, as I read it earlier, but is also a second celestial 
body whose weight and mass balances against the first. It can become here then the latent 
presence of contestation in any ideological enforcement, the counter-balancing metaphor or 
untruth around which less deadly systems might be constructed, just as the symbolic and yet 
powerful “sex magic” act of the judge produces its “adjunct sentence”, an oppositional 
symbolic presence. 
 ~ 
As in, metaphor as class struggle, also. As decoration for some unspeakable filth, on 
the one hand, or as working hypothesis on the other. A jagged rip through all 
pronouns. The thunder of the world, a trembling, a turbine. Cyclical desperation, 
clusters of walls.  
(Sean Bonney, ‘Letter Against the Firmament’, Letters Against the Firmament, 
2015, p. 114) 
 ~ 
“Harmony” itself here is precisely this kind of counter-metaphorical construction. It slips 
ambiguously between multiple definitions and frames which can’t be reconciled within a 
rational, realist thinking, but which it holds together at once in my mind as I read, opening up 
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connections and possibilities that can become the basis for a wide-ranging new thinking about 
the structure of the social whole and the ways its intractably solid structuring metaphors might 
be broken through. This is why Bonney’s use of this concept becomes so useful for me in this 
thesis. 
From the cosmological then, harmony slips towards its musical sense with: “while we know 
we live within a criminal harmony, we also know we are held helplessly within it as fixed 
subjects, or rather as objects, even cadavers, of an alien music” (Bonney, 2015, p. 33). The 
slippage from “criminal harmony” to “alien music” uses the central semantic ambiguity on 
“harmony” to suggest that there is some close relation – already linked through the idea of 
transmission or vibration – between the social whole and music. The claim that the latter can 
act on the former becomes one of the central claims of this piece. This can be seen in a fuller 
look at one of the above quotations: “Music as a slicing through of harmonic hierarchies etc, 
poetic realities as counter-earths where we can propose a new stance in which we can see and 
act on what had previously been kept invisible etc. Ourselves, for one thing” (2015, p. 33); 
and another of the piece’s clearest moments, also discussed some pages earlier, the “metallic, 
musical screeches as systems of thought pushing away from, and through, the imposed limits 
of the conventional harmonic or social systems” (2015, p. 34). There is a similar movement 
between scales in the account of John Coltrane’s Live in Seattle record as “one of the sonic 
receptacles of a revolutionary moment that was never realised”, and the specific moment 
where someone “blows something through a horn that forces a dimensional time-loop through 
the already seismic constellations set up within the music’s harmonic system” (2015, p. 35). 
There is a slippage between “harmonic hierarchies”, the “harmonic or social systems”, and 
“music’s harmonic system.” The same language is used to describe the totality of social or 
cosmological relations, and the relations between elements in a piece of music – the musical 
relations become a miniature of the whole. 
This linguistic mirroring, slippage and doubleness around “harmony” has embedded within it 
the suggestion of certain claims about the relationship between music and the social structure 
in general. As dissonance, disharmony and shock disrupt expectations of musical form and 
structure – that is, break through the limits of their harmonic system – they also create a 
dissonance in the harmonic, or ideological, forces which hold together and perpetuate the 
material relations of the social whole – or perhaps refer to pre-existing dissonances and 
conflicts, such as the failures of interpellation described by Denise Riley, or the inherent 
“contention and repulsion” which Bonney describes as produced by the processes of 
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ideological untruth that hold the cosmological system together. Taking a step further than the 
idea of counter-metaphor as a resistive force, music is proposed as a non-recuperable system 
of thought which is capable of disrupting imposed limits and proposing alternative positions – 
as a radically different kind of knowledge-transmission to the recuperable language whose 
coherence is formed and directly forming of its ideological limits. The last of the ‘Letters on 
Harmony’, ‘Letter on Harmony and Work’, describes Cecil Taylor’s Unit Structures record as 
“a kind of musical analysis of bourgeois history as a network of cultural and economic 
unfreedom” (Bonney, 2015, p. 46). It makes musical analysis a positive counterpoint of 
semantic knowledge, with the implicit claim to the meaning content of the musical, in its 
inconclusive final remarks: “I read an interview with Cecil Taylor, and he said he didn’t play 
notes, he played alphabets. That changes things. Fuck workfare” (2015, p. 47). 
The content of these moments of musical dis-harmony is explicitly associated with the earlier 
idea of the latent, obfuscated or swiftly erased disruptive potential of particular events when 
the Coltrane piece is seen as a “sonic receptacle” of an unrealised revolutionary moment. The 
musical moment of fracture isn’t merely analogous to the moment of potential social fracture 
here; the two kinds of non-recuperable content share more closely than just by analogy the 
subjective and affective experience of fracture. 
As the vibratory emissions of the judge earlier produced counter-vibrations as “cries of 
disbelief and fear” – inarticulate affective responses in the moment of pain for those whom 
the conditions of life directly disadvantage, as the glimpse of the latent possibility of 
resistance – there is towards the end of the ‘Second Letter’ a notion of “musical emotions”, as 
an irreverent modification of Wordsworth: “the violent conflicts of our age make it impossible 
to recollect musical emotions in tranquillity” (Bonney, 2015, p. 35). The suggestion then is 
that it is where our reactions to music operate at an emotive or pre-linguistic level that they 
are best able to register the feeling of dissonance with the ideological limits in which we live 
and are formed, or to evoke the radical shift in analysis, coherence and possibility which 
opens up and then quickly becomes unnameable again in the unsuccessful moment of 
revolutionary upheaval. 
This can be read in terms of the relation I’ve already posited between non-recuperable, formal 
kinds of meaning, and the infra-linguistic affective experience. Ideological reproduction is 
seen as fractured through these cries, through these emotive moments that are also counter-
transmissions, which is to say, through aesthetic moments also. The fractures in ideology are 
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affective-aesthetic, as represented specifically by the emotional response to challenging and 
dissonant music – the infra-linguistic response to (and content of) non-recuperable form – as 
moments of generative difference of feeling. 
 
 Non-reified affective recognition  
The basis for a counter-proposal, then – for forms of communication which produce or refer 
to breaks in the binding of the system of criminal harmony that holds all of our actions and 
folds all towards complicity – is partly in the notion of harmony, which is to say, non-
recuperable forms of content, dissonances which shatter our relations, which are radically 
disruptive. The focus of this on the infra-linguistic reaction, and the analogy of the musical 
screech to the cry of disbelief, brings me to the culmination of my sense of what the 
meaningful content, the propositional possibility, of such a form of communication might be, 
through the operation in these texts of affective recognition.   
I’ve already described the way in which the form of these letters involves rooting them in a 
dramatized experience of the writer figure, and the way their theoretical and political insights 
are all filtered through specific subjective experience, as well as Bonney’s own presence and 
investment in instances of contemporary political agitation. Bonney directly describes this 
highly subjective filtering of perspective: “I’ve had to filter this idea through my own 
position: a stereotypical amalgam of unwork, sarcasm, hunger and a spiteful radius of pure 
fear” (2015, p. 46). Through this basis in subjectivity, Bonney’s texts portray points of 
affective rupture or extremity as potentially illuminating or activating moments for resistance 
– in a reciprocal relationship with the portrayal of moments of protest, riot or disruption as 
containing the capacity for affective-ideological fracture. 
In ‘Letter Against the Firmament’, Bonney describes the radically de-stabilising shift in his 
perception which results from his experience of unemployment: 
I think I’m becoming slightly unwell. I’ve developed a real fear of the upstairs 
neighbours. Every morning they emit a foul stench of bitumen and bitter, moral 
superiority as they stomp through the corridor on their way to work. A while ago I told 
you I rarely leave the house, now I can’t, they’ve spun a web of 9 to 5 self-worth 
across the door […] I don’t know if this is normal behaviour, if anyone else feels the 
city as a network of claws and teeth […] I’m probably beginning to smell. In fact I 
know I am: a thick cloud of inaudible noises from upstairs, dank growlings from 
somewhere outside the ring of the city. […] Each evening I hear them, walking 
around, stomp-stomp-stomping, tap-tap-tapping out their version of social reality on 
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their floor, on my ceiling. It’s terrible. And since I can’t even leave the flat anymore, 
the ceiling might as well be the whole of the sky, and they’re tapping out new and 
brutal constellations. (2015, p. 108) 
Here the unwellness which results from being unemployed – what might be recognised as 
depression and social isolation, in a situation likely to include material deprivation, alongside 
an abjecting antagonistic relationship to dominant social values of the relationship between 
wage labour and social value or self-worth – creates a new affective perception of “the city as 
a network of claws and teeth”. The neighbours’ own social reality is enforced through the 
harmonics of the sounds they make on the floor above, but these fail to create a mutual social 
reality in which Bonney’s speaker can participate, becoming instead “inaudible noises” which 
speak of the newly revealed violence of the city and the modes of living rendered real and 
necessary within it, through their relation to Bonney’s own state of affective instability, of 
pain. 
This is one of the strongest moments of actual affective recognition which I feel in reading 
this book. During my own experience as an unemployed benefit claimant, I too felt the city to 
be something like “a network of claws and teeth”, and people who I could observe to live 
their lives within the sanctioned and enforced rhythms of productivity, which I had 
temporarily been rendered outside of, seemed aggressively alien, incomprehensible to me. Of 
course, as my wellbeing depended on it and my privilege allowed it, I eventually found work, 
and my unstable and antagonistic relationship to the city once again became, to a large extent, 
stable, functional, reproductive. This yet alludes to a shared, if temporary, experience of 
instability in relation to the ongoing reproduction of capitalist relations. 
This moment of direct affective recognition in my own reading brings into focus for me some 
more general claims which these texts make about the resistive illuminating and destabilising 
possibility of painful events and the affective responses which emerge from them. Bonney 
writes of “The social truths that only those who live far below the hunger line have access to” 
(2015, p. 40); and later 
The perceptual shifts related to hunger as a means of interpretation. Hunger as the 
beginning of thought […] Maybe we can use it, this hunger, this coded swarm. To get 
a sense of what the murderously rotational teeth of a key, for example, actually mean. 
To understand what eating actually is. (2015, pp. 95-6) 
As well as hunger, the experience of proximity to death is described in similar terms, as 
having the capacity to open up the subjective relationship to dominant social and political 
relations in such a way as to create opportunity for fracture and difference: 
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According to some cosmological systems […] when anyone dies – be that Margaret 
Thatcher or Mark Duggan – they take their place among what are called ‘invisibles’, 
traditionally opening up a gap in social time, a system of antimatter in which nobody 
can live, but from which new understandings and arrangements of social harmony may 
be imagined. Music, for example. (Bonney, 2015, p. 38) 
I have used extracts from this quotation before, to show how it was retrospectively cancelled 
out, as “essentially hymn-singing”. Yet even read against the likelihood that on any given 
occasion no revolutionary incident will arise, the articulated and implicit possibilities that the 
dead, or the affective presence of the dead as felt by those still living, might act on and 
through us, remain present as part of an ongoing conceit in these poems. These “new 
understandings and arrangements of social harmony”, and the “gap in social time”, directly 
cross out of the cosmological metaphor and into resistive possibilities in the experience of 
those who are left behind, in an account of a woman whose son has died, she believes, at the 
hands of the police. She speaks at a public meeting after the riots of August 2011, and 
Bonney’s account depicts her own sense of loss, grief and anger directly translating into a 
contentious position of support for those riots: “her voice cracked a little and then she said 
‘and as for the riots, I thought they were fair enough, and I think there should be more of 
them, and more, and more’” (2015, p. 115.) Her own affective fracture at the loss of her son, 
and its circumstances – like the noisy experience of grief proposed by Andrea Brady – pushes 
her to a new and antagonistic relationship with her surroundings, which translates relatively 
simply here as the incitement to riot, and in reading this affecting moment, I feel a reaching 
out in empathy to the story of her loss which is also a reaching out towards her urgently 
fractured perception. 
Hunger, unemployment, bereavement, all here become kinds of experientially based, felt 
critiques, of capital, of state violence, of the conditions which bring about these hurts. They 
are affective knowledge which opens up into an alternative relation, not out of a conceptual 
insight but out of an affective rupture.  
The kind of emotional or affective recognition I find here is radically different from such a 
notion as it is more conventionally based in bourgeois-realist expressivity. I believe the latter 
predominantly finds its recognition through recourse to a pre-existing intelligible language of 
emotions which reproduces pre-existing formulations of possible emotions and their 
functions. Recalling the idea of “musical emotions”, I would suggest that what is encountered 
here is rather a recognition based on divergent, incoherent or not yet coherent – sub-threshold, 
in Massumi’s terms – affective experiences, those experiences which are marginalised within 
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hegemonic discourses and power relations, those affects which can be felt but not clearly 
recognised, which might primarily be expressed through cries of pain or disbelief, through 
noise, which push us towards not-yet-intelligible selves and ways of being. 
I think of this distinction as being between what I might call reified and non-reified affective 
recognition, since the bourgeois form of recognition deals in and reproduces static, 
universalised, reified articulations of emotional experience. Non-reified affective recognition 
begins, by contrast, from a critique of the possibility of any recognition at all – and seeks a 
way to begin to build a basis for resistance from communication which aims towards infra-
linguistic affects, as a basis for solidarity across shared marginal experience, for a resistive 
subjective commonality in difference, (self-)obscurity, and the unknowing of ideological 
mystification.  
A fuller version of the quotation from which I took the concept of police realism goes: 
I’d like to write a poetry that could speed up a dialectical continuity in discontinuity & 
thus make visible whatever is forced into invisibility by police realism, where the lyric 
I – yeh, that thing – can be (1) an interrupter and (2) a collective, where direct speech 
and incomprehensibility are only possible as a synthesis that can bend ideas into and 
out of the limits of insurrectionism and illegalism. (Bonney, 2015, p. 142) 
This is another key statement of poetic purpose that comes towards the end of the ‘Letter on 
Poetics’ which ends the book – I take it as summarising and containing much of what I have 
been trying to describe as coming from my reading of Bonney, whilst only being legible on 
these terms as a result of those readings which precede it. 
Here, Bonney specifically states his wish to heighten existing fractures in the ongoing 
production of social relations – “continuity in discontinuity” – through poetry. We see “the 
lyric I”, the specific deployment of subjectivity within the poem, as the locus for this action. 
This subjective basis might simultaneously represent or evoke the interruption of continuity of 
oppressive dominant conditions, and also reach out, past simple interruption, into the 
possibility of “a collective”, some sense of common understanding and solidarity which is 
built through and on this interruption. The possibility for a collective that might hope to be 
founded on interruption rather than reproduction, to emphasise the continuity in discontinuity, 
the resistive underside or unease produced by the affective experience of rubbing up against 
the limits of ideological subjectification, is necessarily intertwined with the synthesis of 
“direct speech” and “incomprehensibility”, with a speech which is both, which engages in 
direct communication of that which is not, or is not yet, comprehensible. 
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The important development here, of an aspect which has been latent in my discussion so far, 
is in the wish to “make visible whatever is forced into invisibility”, or, to “engage with ideas 
that have been erased from the official account” (Bonney, 2015, p. 142); as in a quotation 
invoked earlier “poetic realities” analogous to music were seen as “counter-earths where we 
can propose a new stance in which we can see and act on what had previously been kept 
invisible” (2015, p. 33). The function of communication, of affective recognition built on 
harmonic signals, emissions which can’t be reduced to pre-existing concepts, might be taken 
as a commitment to bringing otherwise unnameable but existing experiences into language – 
to recuperate the previously non-recuperable, attempting to build through it the grounds for 
alternative realities rather than folding it into current reality, that the landscape of 
intelligibility might itself be altered. 
This is seen to function in contrasting ways: hopefully productive, bringing new or latent 
possibilities into language in order to bring about their collective existence, but also critical 
and revelatory, articulating oppressive ideological and material processes which exist but are 
hidden or obfuscated, that they might be better countered – understood, altered, destroyed. 
The above example is followed immediately with: 
That sounds great, absolutely fucking tip top, until you remember that, equally, the 
harmony of the money fetish is that of the commodity fetish only now become visible 
and dazzling to our eyes, i.e. we don’t have any kind of monopoly on harmonic 
invisibility. (Bonney, 2015, p. 33) 
What are invisible and incomprehensible, rendered outside the limits of legibility maintained 
in the processes of ideology, are both the affective divergences which offer up alternative 
possibilities of being, and also the actual acting assumptions of our ideological situation, the 
conceptions which maintain it and yet are rendered natural, obvious, indisputable. Whilst we 
can never clearly recognise these acting assumptions, the work of shifting them towards 
something better must involve an active attempt to bring them into communicable discussion 
alongside the work of articulating something radically different. 
“Insurrectionism and illegalism” brings me, finally, back to “crime, or impossibility” as it 
appeared earlier. Through all of this then, Bonney turns us towards what is outside and 
rendered illegible by the law. The sounds, affects and forms of anger, hunger, pain, and 
activation in the moment of insurrection, bring in some hope – where something creeps in 
through what is rendered impossible as a negative, and becomes instead crime, illegalism, that 
which is im-possible, as a positive – by which I mean, that which takes its resistive hope, its 
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hope to break through the hard limits of the ideological formation of possibility, precisely by 
being a possibility which is outside the as-yet-recognisable limits of the possible. Bonney 
posits a poetry of subjective communication of the active presence in the felt experience of 
that which is impossible. His poetic formulations aim, like music, to both evoke, and to be, 
those transmissions which shift the reading subject’s relationship to the world as they 
recognise it, if only for a moment. These affective propositions might reciprocally emerge out 
of, and feed into, motivate or form, actual moments of insurrectionary activity, organising, 
resistance. In doing so they hope to begin – or begin again, maintain and participate in – the 






Chapter 5: Lisa Robertson, 3 Summers 
How will I recognise you? The revolution is happening now, everywhere, in the 
bodies and faces that pass by in a blur. Our revolutionary potential is considerable. It 
has not been erased, so much as we have forgotten how to recognize it. Much works 
against us. A grotesquely swelling neo-liberal political economy blocks our potential 
to originate or to live bountiful and joyous collective change, at any scale. What does 
revolution look like?  
(Lisa Robertson & Matthew Stadler, Revolution: A Reader, 2015, p. iii) 
~ 
This is how Lisa Robertson and Matthew Stadler introduce Revolution: A Reader, their co-
edited anthology of annotated essays on revolution. Robertson is a Canadian poet, who has 
been writing and publishing poetry since the early nineties, first from Vancouver, where she 
was a collective member of the Kootenay School of Writing, and now from her home in rural 
France. I take these concerns – with finding ways to figure, imagine, and creatively bring 
forth the revolutionary potential which is suppressed in the reproduction of our current 
conditions, and which might hope to rise against them in the (imaginative, at first) production 
of new “bountiful and joyous collective” conditions and relations – to be central driving 
energies in all of Robertson’s work, through her eight full length poetry collections, as well as 
her prose, art writing, critical and philosophical essays.31 I have already discussed some of 
Robertson’s critical writing, to draw out her thinking on the importance of unstable affective 
experiences as sites of resistance, and on the interface between this affective experience and 
aesthetic material surfaces, forms of resistive ornamentation, all pushing towards generating 
new conceptions of the world, contrary to current conditions of oppression and deprivation. 
These ideas, which we will see run through her poetry too, are formative to the whole 
approach of this thesis; there are already emerging analogues in Bonney’s work, with the 






31 Key poetry collections include: XEclogue (Tsunami Editions, 1993; New Star Books, 1999), Debbie: An Epic 
(New Star Books, 1997), The Weather (New Star Books, Reality Street Editions, 2001), The Men (Bookthug, 
2006), Magenta Soul Whip (Coach House Books, 2009), R’s Boat (University of California Press, 2010), Cinema 
of the Present (Coach House Books, 2014) & 3 Summers (Coach house Books, 2016). Prose publications 
include: Occasional Works and Seven Walks from the Office for Soft Architecture (Coach House Books, 2003), 




I feel it is my calling to annotate the sheathed cadence of life beside power. Yet I don’t 
mean to seem fantastic in the old sense. When I say “life beside power” I mean 
destruct the formal destinies, destruct the phantom body, destruct defunct ritual, 
unlock that paradise I mentioned earlier and give them back a renovated flower. (For 
whose utopia, peopled with sorrow, will annul such mollifying tokens?) 
(Lisa Robertson, ‘Liberty’, XEclogue, 1999 [1993], [unpaginated, p. 40]) 
 ~ 
I bring this background thinking to my encounter with Robertson’s eighth poetry collection, 3 
Summers (Coach House Books, 2016). 3 Summers is a collection of individual poems – lyrics, 
even – originating in some cases from specific and not obviously related contexts, such as 
commissions for magazines, exhibitions or film projects. 
Before even encountering this basic structure though, I notice its insistent and striking 
physical and aesthetic presence, as book-object. The cover is beautiful. Designed by artists 
Hadley+Maxwell, with whom Robertson has an ongoing collaborative relationship, its pastel 
gradients of yellows, pinks and oranges, in and around the outline of a pair of sunglasses 
which wraps around the whole book, evoke high summer relaxation. Each poem is prefaced 
by a woodcut also by Hadley+Maxwell. These are amorphous, soft, smudged pseudo-organic 
shapes which overlay in various combinations the suggestion of skeletons, plants, bacteria, 
furniture, clothing, insects. As with Robertson’s other books published with Coach House, the 
paper itself has an emphasised aesthetic and tactile presence, with its thick, textured cream 
pages; paratext describes the precise materials and instruments from which the book was 




       (Robertson, 2016, cover) 
These physical elements of my experience of reading 3 Summers are the stage on which my 
readings are set, not passively decorating or reflecting the book’s linguistic content but 
explicitly integrated into its conceptual and signifying framework. The cover, for example, 
references both the eponymous summers which crop up across many of the poems, and the 
rose-tinted glasses of ‘Rose’, the final poem, which explores the psychic, aesthetic, and 
conceptual power of pigment to militate towards the imagination of conditions of greater 
collective health and flourishing. The merging and overlay of a variety of representational 
suggestions in these images begins, formally, aesthetically, to make a claim for conceptual 
overlap which becomes important to the book’s logic – both as a general principle of 
dissolving hard conceptual distinctions, and specifically in terms of the overlapping 
significances and possibilities of the body, the landscape, kinds of adornment. The 
foregrounded embodied presence of the book in the affective-aesthetic experience of these 
poems is a central feature of the mode of its thinking, which foreshadows the argument of this 
chapter for the vital embodiment (as physical presences, and as experienced in the body) of 
aesthetics, affective experience, and political resistance. 
In the acknowledgements Robertson thanks the artists and editors, who have “made a group of 
poems into a book” (2016, p. 117). The book’s unifying design elements, and their intra-poem 
referentiality, in tandem with that of the poems themselves, has the structural function of 




arguing for the integration of those poems, though drawn from different contexts. Sina 
Queyras says that Robertson’s work “positions lyric modes in conceptual frameworks and in 
so doing creates a visceral, sculptural transmission of an intimate thinking between speaker 
and audience, between author and reader” (Queryas, 2017, para. 3). As the book is one 
thought-world, it foregrounds a sense of relatively consistent subjective experience, as the 
basis, originary point, and necessary premise of the poems’ thinking. 
This “intimate thinking” is staged explicitly in the opening of 3 Summers’ first poem, ‘A 
Seam’: 
 4:16 in the afternoon in the summer of my 52nd year 
 I’m lying on the bed in the heat wondering about geometry 
 as the deafening, uninterrupted volume of desire 
 bellows, roars mournfully, laments 
 like a starling that has flown into glass. (Robertson, 2016, p. 10) 
This frames the poem, and by extension the book, as directly emerging from the subjective 
experience – from the thoughtful and desirous preoccupations – of Robertson as poet-
speaker(-body), with a high degree of situational specificity. Though without wider context to 
this situation and its circumstances, I as reader am thrust into a sense of this affective space, 
of conjuring the feeling of a thoughtfulness which is also a feeling, relaxed and 
contemplative, with a turbulent and overwhelming intensity. Yet what I conjure here is only 
an identification with the intensity and tone of this thinking-feeling, whose content is 
solipsistically specific to the poem’s speaker. It is, though, the site from which the poems 
claim to come to me. This continues throughout: the following poem, ‘Toxins’, situates itself 
“Walking between the field and the last houses at 10 p.m.” (Robertson, 2016, p. 21); ‘Rivers’ 
begins “In the Summer of 2014 | I’m still in this landscape of quiet poorness | everything is 
becoming geometry again” (2016, p. 86); the poem ‘Third Summer’ calls to these lines, and 
the book’s title, to suggest a specific experience across time. When asked in an interview why 
she wrote the collection, Robertson answers: 
I wanted to represent the passage of time, the different qualities and textures of time in 
the body of the poem. This time is female. It angers and saddens me that the whole 
female body of time mostly passes beneath representation. My own body gives me 
information about this suppressed materiality; so does research, and friendship. 
(Robertson & All Lit Up, 2017, para. 8) 
This subjective-bodily representation is complemented by the tone and style of Robertson’s 
utterances. I hear in Jennifer Scappettone’s description of the prose style of the Office for Soft 
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Architecture a sense of Robertson’s style in 3 Summers, and across her work more generally: 
“The unevenly deluxe phrasing (and consequential theorizing) of her idiolect foregrounds its 
own overreaching; as such it resists what might be confused with posturing” (Scappettone, 
2006, p. 74). The lines, phrases and sentences of Robertson’s writing often combine a 
tendency towards expositional declaration with an abstract, indeterminate phrasing, luxuriant 
and rich in the sense that they combine a palpable aesthetic joy in the formation of a beautiful 
phrase with a richness or over-fullness of potential signification. For example, reading across 
just the next few pages of ‘The Seam’, I come across such formulations as: “Now it’s time to 
return to the sex of my thinking” (Robertson, 2016, p. 10), “There is the sense of women | As 
impairment’s ability” (2016, p. 11), “The pronoun is gratuitous expenditure | as necessity” 
(2016, p. 12). 
The combination of temporal and subjective specificity, an experiential grounding, with this 
expansively indeterminate form of poetic theorising creates poems which present their 
thinking as that which comes from a feeling body in time, and specifically a female embodied 
thinking, the thinking formed by the embodied experience of being interpellated as a woman. 
But the body of these poems is not one which knows itself in advance, which can be readily 
recognised in the pre-given, reified forms of emotive expressivity or biographical storytelling. 
It is a body perpetually in formation, whose most vital experiences, those which point towards 
the fullness of resistance and a newly flourishing collective being, are infra-linguistic, both 
highly specific and not readily pinned down in pre-existing language. As such, the reflections 
and formulations of these poems are often disjointed, non-linear, and indeterminate; the 
language deploys a kind of exploratory, non-realist aesthetic propositionality, asking what 
information is given by the experiencing body, feeling out possibilities of potential 
intelligibility, rather than claims which are already recuperable within current realism. The 
poems repeatedly ask versions of the question “What can really begin?” (Robertson, 2016, p. 
57) 
At the level of the organisation, form, and aesthetics, then, 3 Summers makes some of the 
claims which will be central to the conceptions I pull from it of the nature of resistive 
possibility, stepping off from the conceptual framework already established in the early 
chapters of this thesis, and the thinking in Bonney’s work on a poetic resistance which centres 
non-reified, formal, harmonic modes of communication and recognition: that subjective 
experience and thinking is a site of ideological inscription, a basis of (collective) knowledge, 
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a germinating ground for resistance, and, as a further development, that such experience is 
always of the physical, formal, aesthetic matter of the body and of the world. 
In the rest of this chapter, I will show how, from this heavily embodied, heavily subjectified, 
female-thinking stylistics, 3 Summers develops a positive poetics which responds to the 
problems of ideological subjectification and the possibilities of resistance and change. The 
work develops the already observed aesthetic-embodied poetic presentation – and the claims 
this makes for the signifying and affectively evocative content of the book as a material object 
– to a more explicit figuration of the (feminine) body as a bridge between affect and form – as 
the site of feeling, and as a surface, a point of contact – where form is thought of as a kind of 
embodiment. It makes the claim that affective experience and aesthetic perception are of the 
same kind, are both kinds of sensation in and of the body, of the surface, through, for 
instance, the sensation of touch. The two are seen as parallel and interrelated sources of 
potential for thinking outside of that which is assimilable under dominant models of 
intelligibility, and therefore for divergence from the oppressive ideological conditions which 
form that intelligibility. 
This reading is made possible through the work’s centring of its gendered experience, which 
includes a great deal of anxiety – about survival and flourishing, and the risks of reproducing 
the conditions of one’s own oppression – but also newly resistive potential. 3 Summers 
genders resistive aesthetic-affective thinking-feeling as feminine, as marginalised by a 
capitalist-imperialist patriarchal structure which privileges the rational, objective, and abstract 
over the emotional, experiential and bodily. As such, this is a kind of thinking which contains 
potentials antithetical to the reproductive action of those structures, and which can push 
towards experiences, relations, and subjectivities that are inconceivable and resistive to them. 
 
Gendered interpellation and ideology 
Firstly, the basis of Robertson’s writing in an embodied feminine thinking, in the experience 
of being interpellated as a woman, of being female-identified within patriarchy, is the specific 
primary site of subjectification which, in these works, opens out towards the problem of 
resistance and disruption to the general, universal process of ideological subjectification. To 
expand on an earlier quotation: 
There is a sense of women 
As impairment’s ability 
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That’s how it falls 
Perilous, unoptional 
It’s difficult to sing. (Robertson, 2016, p. 11) 
The contradiction in “impairment’s ability” suggests gender, or the specific experience of 
being interpellated as a woman in patriarchal society, as involving a dialectic of constraint and 
resistance; it suggests both the problems and hopeful possibility for acting and speaking out 
through, against, and despite structures of imposition, which are also self-contradictory and 
internally fractured processes of subject-formation. Where singing is a well-established 
metaphor for the use of poetic voice, or more generally for joyous expression, it is here 
imperilled and limited, just as in Bonney the voice of the law sung through us, as our 
language is constrained to reproduce its ideological pre-conditions. 
This stanza recalls Denise Riley’s claims, discussed in Chapter 3, that the process of being 
subjectified into a particular identity category necessarily produces its own instability in the 
affective resistance to the rigidity of those categories. This connection follows through on the 
next page: 
 Venus breaks a dew at the borders of everything. 
 Right now when I think of her 
 I have no problem with the feminine pronoun. 
 I’m stupid against its animate insult 
 […] 
I think of girls saying I in novels 
people saying we in plazas and restaurants 
students and cops 
[…] 
The pronoun is gratuitous expenditure 
as necessity. (Robertson, 2016, p. 12) 
Having made this connection to Riley’s thinking, it becomes even more emphatic for me here. 
We have seen that Riley’s discussion of the potential resistive force of the failure at the edges 
of categorical interpellation in The Words of Selves is based in an exploration of the problem 
of self-description, particularly in the context of the self-description “I am a woman”. This 
dates as far back as 1988’s ‘Am I That Name?’: Feminism and the Category of ‘Women’ in 
History. Riley summarises the positions in this earlier work as they influence The Words of 
Selves: 
the category of ‘women’ as both an inescapably ambiguous irritant to, yet the grounds 
for, feminist politics and the corresponding need to tolerate and exploit this ambiguity 
through a tactical agility and foxiness. (Riley, 2000a, p. 21) 
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in declaring myself a such-and-such, I may tacitly separate myself from the 
communality you had expected to inhabit with me […] in brief, ‘I am an x’ may 
function to exclude: ‘and so you are not an x’. (Riley, 2000a, p. 24) 
Riley cuts succinctly to the ways that the necessary occupation of a pre-existing identity 
category always also folds back towards the essentialising force of that category, the ways its 
very existence depends on its constitution as delimited and exclusionary.  
When Robertson talks about the “animate insult” of the “feminine pronoun”, and of “girls 
saying I”, it builds in my reading on this constellation of problems opened out by Riley’s 
foundational account; the pronoun – the internalised claim to the category which precedes the 
individual, but which they live inside – is too much, is an insult, is brutal, but is inescapable.32 
Intimations of the experience of girlhood – of growing up in a certain way, as a girl, with all 
the expectations, impositions and resistances that comes with – places the individual “I” 
against and alongside the collective, “we”. “Students and cops” then begins to imply a 
connection between the individually internalised, social formation of collective identities such 
as gender, and the kinds of collective identity-formation which lead to, or occur at the point 
of, the more visible set-piece forms of political struggle in the confrontation between 
protestors and the state apparatus of their repression. The poem creates a world where the 
problem of living in an individual subjectivity, within the confines of its pre-existing 
ideological and material relations, is co-extensive with the problem of a claim to collective 
identity in the struggle against state power; this becomes a problematic for the work as a 
whole. The notion of “gratuitous expenditure” pushes further on the constraint/resistance 
dialectic at the heart of (gendered) identity-formation, balancing the idea of the gendered 
pronoun as a harsh and unnecessary imposition, made necessary, with an idea of joyous 
overspilling (recalling Massumi or Riley’s discussion of the failures and excesses of 
ideological formation), where some of the energy expended in that identification moves out 
beyond what can be rationally recognised of it. 
The lines that follow further situate the poem in relation to the specific experience of being 
interpellated as a girl, and coming into full adult subjectivity through that experience, as one 
which shapes the capacity to relate to the world: 
  
 
32 Though it’s not, strictly, necessary to my argument to demonstrate that there’s a line of intention or authorial 
knowledge – so much as a line of interpretive reading – which draws these together, it is nonetheless interesting 
to note Robertson’s familiarity with Riley’s work, to add further weight to this interpretive connection. See 
Robertson writing on Riley here: http://lemonhound.com/2013/06/04/lisa-robertson-on-denise-riley/ 
114 
 
I was a daughter in blouses 
 a sucker in stairwells 
 I was the only human to ever feel desire (Robertson, 2016, p. 12) 
And continuing on across the following page: 
 – it’s hard not to play this as testimony – 
 I was a sucker in blouses, I was the only human 
 to ever say we, I sat at frugal tables and 
 I undertook the ceremony of brutality 
 or pronouns (2016, p. 13) 
These experiences become a subjective location for the poem’s thinking, on which all else is 
dependent. It is through the experience of coming into the possibilities of personal desires, 
and the brutality of their proscription, that the poems think about the construction of 
possibility and limit generally. The meeting of an implied biographical specificity with the 
expansive indeterminacy of description reflects, at a formal level, the centrality of those 
affective experiences which are at once highly specific, and not-quite or not-yet recognisable 
within current realism, to push towards what I described in Bonney’s work as non-reified 
affective recognition. 
This particular subjective, experiential feminine/ist framework then allows for a specific 
thinking about resistance to dominant conditions of patriarchy, capital, imperialist violence, 
and their reproduction. For example, ‘On Physically Real Being and What Happens Next’ 
opens: 
I feel ambivalent about adoring 
The sex of Mars  
Like America it basks 
Exempt from dolorous stuff 
The imperium’s fucked up 
How can we kiss and think? (Robertson, 2016, p. 40) 
The poem dwells in a discomfort and anxiety about female heterosexual desire, in the context 
of patriarchy. Mars counterpoints Venus, as a symbolic representation not just of masculinity 
but also war. The comparison of America and “the imperium” then suggests a whole history 
of global military aggression. These are coded-masculine by the same patriarchal structures 
which form the possibilities of gender and desire. The final couplet then evocatively elides the 
question of how women can reckon with heterosexual desire under patriarchy with that of 
how joy and desire can be realised under general conditions of strife. This connection persists 
through the poem, which goes on to describe  
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[…] natality’s ornate 
quiescence tied to fear’s 
superb circumference at 
home in the dominant expressive (Robertson, 2016, p. 44) 
“Natality’s ornate quiescence” crystallises this anxiety: that the oppressive enforcements on 
women by patriarchal structures around love, coupling, birth and childrearing also perpetuate 
the general dominant ideological and material conditions; that an acquiescence into desire as 
it is formed within patriarchal structures is concomitant with perpetuation of the ongoing 
oppressive formation of our thinking and action in general, across the whole spectrum of 
brutalities including but not limited to this patriarchal oppression. 
 ~ 
What is it to open upwards towards the men 
hospitably to make something factless from the spurious 
craving for men 
 (Lisa Robertson, ‘Men Deft Men’, The Men, 2006, p. 12) 
 ~ 
A couple of pages later in ‘On Physically Real Being’, the idea of the reproductive force of 
conditioned desires is expanded out to a clear formulation of a general conceptual problem, of 
the slim possibilities of resistance to conditions which are prior to and pre-figuring of the 
individual subject: 
 Here is Marx’s big dilemma, the reason he goes to Lucretius: 
 practice arises from conditions 
 yet these are the conditions we must change (Robertson, 2016, p. 47) 
This firmly roots the anxieties about the conflicts between the resistive and the reproductive 
possibilities of the affects produced by the experience of being gendered female, in a neatly 
all-encompassing conceptual problem which is, ultimately, the problem of resistance within 
ideology. Robertson figures this problem slightly differently later as “the extreme difficulty in 
separating out external compulsion | from the experience of desire” (Robertson, 2016, p. 65). 
These two quotations in combination offer a potential summary of the central problems not 
just of Robertson’s book, but also of my own thesis (you may already have noted that, for this 
reason, the first of these quotations appears at the very opening of the thesis). Robertson’s 
thinking about the specific problems of female flourishing within patriarchy offers itself up 
explicitly as working also through the problems of how differences of desire and of relation 
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can be purposively recognised and produced, from within the conditions which shape the 
possibility of our producing anything at all. 
 ~ 
All you can usually say about a poem or a picture is, ‘Look at it, listen to it.’ 
(Basil Bunting, Basil Bunting on Poetry, 1999, p. 1) 
 ~ 
This reading attempts to recognise and to make wide ranging conceptual connections within 
and across these poems, as a way to come to understand some of the possibilities of their 
thought-world. Yet the forward momentum of my argument here threatens to carry the 
discussion too far into conceptual naturalisations of these poems, and away from my primary 
experience of aesthetic joy and highly generative bewilderment. These poems do not, of 
course, make linear arguments. It is rather from within their consistent claim to the centrality 
of the aesthetic, of the beautifully formed, of the experience of feeling with it, and through 
what I have described as a luxurious indeterminacy, that these thoughts on gender, ideology, 
resistance and possibility are made possible here, and continue to stretch beyond what I can 
coherently articulate. 
I want to look again at one example to briefly show the coincidence of many of the different 
aspects of what I have described in the poems so far. Look at it, listen to it: 
and natality’s ornate 
quiescence tied to fear’s 
superb circumference at 
home in the dominant expressive (Robertson, 2016, p. 44) 
Firstly, I find these lines beautiful. They show how the insistence on foregrounded formal and 
aesthetic presence I described earlier, starting with the design of 3 Summers, runs through 
each line.  I can’t pin down this beauty, but can only reach towards what I think are some of 
its contributing factors or constituent parts. They play with patterns of sound: the shared “n” 
“a” and “t” sounds in “natality’s ornate”, echoed and softened later in “dominant”; the 
internal rhymes on “quiescence” and “circumference” and the increased heavy “s” sounds in 
“fear’s | superb circumference”, all again softly echoed in “expressive”. This combines with 
syntactic and rhythmic effects: as well as the rhyme, the two phrases “natality’s ornate | 
quiescence” and “fear’s | superb circumference” share a grammatical structure, and some 
common stress patterns – I read each word in these three word phrases as containing one 
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strong stress – which runs across the structure of line-breaks, creating a counter-rhythm in 
reading. 
The patterning which partly produces this aesthetic pleasure for me further produces the effect 
of these poems as performing a kind of live, formative thinking, the uncertain thinking-feeling 
of a body in time. This moment of particularly intense patterning gives these phrases a 
material solidity which suggests itself as also conceptual, as if each phrase describes 
something conceptually or experientially highly specific. As the sound patterning falls away a 
little in the fourth line, the phrases still ring in my mind, settling into the place they, or the 
feelings they name, might already have been, “at home”, had I noted them. 
Yet this same patterning also increases the indeterminacy of these phrases’ specific meaning. 
For example, the “a” sounds have me initially mistaking “quiescence” for “acquiescence”. 
This slippage emphasises the idea of ideological complicity which I have focussed on above, 
but another reading, more alert to “quiescence” without the “a”, could equally emphasise the 
sense of a more peaceful quietness, without erasing the former reading; their combination 
might further suggest the insidiousness through which pleasures traditionally figured as 
feminine always also contain and perpetuate their oppressive formation within patriarchy. As 
these concepts seem to come into a verbal solidity, the slippage and the play of possibilities it 
opens up – the conflicting affective contents, between the despairing sense of ideological 
acquiescence, and the possibility of gentle pleasure – still maintains an expansive and 
indeterminate suggestion. It is as if the poems are newly coining terms for important yet 
previously ethereal feelings which still will not settle, as if these lines are making new sense, 
as if there exist further possible senses which these lines are yet to make. 
The process of expansive formation continues in all directions. So for example, these four 
lines – just one moment in an eleven line stanza – break into a new syntax and sense in the 
line that follows, as “the dominant expressive | housekeeping of the street” (Robertson, 2016, 
p. 44). These lines re-figure what I have taken as an anxious – if beautiful – crystallisation of 
the difficulties of resistance, and turns them towards the possibility that those same 
oppressively gendered functions, of which housekeeping is emblematic, might also be a 
source of expression and resistance, gesturing to the classic space of protest and political 
discord, “the street”. This gestures to the sense – which I will explore further in the following 
section – that the beauty and expansiveness of these formulations, and the joy of reading 
which is also an affective perception of that beauty, are a key part of the poems’ resistive 
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method, through which they hope to break through the reproduction of oppressive conditions 
in our own desire, and to open up the possibility of new and liberatory sense. 
 
Affective ornamentation 
 Doubt, eros, melancholy: affective ornaments. 
  (Robertson, ‘Perspectors/Melancholia’, Nilling, 2012, p. 51) 
 ~ 
The work’s tentative answer to its problems of reproduction, through a specifically bodily 
understanding of (female) affective experience, begins in ‘The Seam’. The passage quoted 
earlier which deals in my reading with the experience of being interpellated into girlhood 
ends: “I shelter my lesion” (Robertson, 2016, p. 13). This fits into a wider linguistic pattern 
where experiential splits or breaks meet a language of bodily rupture and recombination: “her 
silken rupture” (2016, p. 44); the idea which “seems to crack open time” (2016, p. 105); 
“suture”, as in, stitching together, of a wound particularly (2016, pp. 23, 32, 38, 63); the title 
‘The Seam’ too, “suture” being to the body what “seam” is to the fabric that clads it. The 
catalogue of body parts which runs through ‘On Form’ begins with the “coronal suture” 
(2016, p. 32) – the joining point between bones in the skull – situating the idea of bodily 
rupture and reconnection in the area of the body which most obviously thinks, suggesting that 
affective-bodily breaks are key to the work of thinking. This through-line also connects the 
claim that “this experience can constitute a break” (2016, p. 37) towards the poem’s close, 
with its final injunction, “send us action thriving foray touch | this suture right now” (2016, p. 
38); experiential and bodily rupture come together here with a sense of political urgency 
which is physically intimate. 
Returning to ‘The Seam’, Robertson’s poet-speaker goes on to state: “Within the problem of 
lamentation | is my perennial resistance-sensation” (2016, p. 14). The emergence of resistance 
from lamentation recalls my reading in Chapter 3 of Robertson’s ‘Perspectors/Melancholia’ 
essay, in which she argues that emotive states can create an instability, a process of potential 
break and recombination of our received data and of the ways in which our understanding is 
conditioned. The addition of “-sensation” here adds a certain physicality to the affect which 
generates or is provoked by (political) resistance, or the disrupting sense of discomfort with 
something in particular (as with Riley’s “unease”). Reading this against the pattern of bodily 
metaphors, of wounds and sutures, the resistance-sensation – the moment of affective rupture 
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which destabilises the subject’s relationship to their ongoing reproduction – is envisioned as 
also a feeling of physical, bodily rupture, a wounding, a break in felt sensation. 
‘The Seam’ further develops the work’s intertwining of the political potential of affective 
impulse and the materiality of the body – thinking specifically about how poetry can activate 
the disruptive and productive potentials of desire and pain – through the figure of 
“hormones”, which becomes another key conceit of the book. Shortly following the statement 
that “the poem is a hormone”: 
We press out these voices from the inmost parts 
to be able to start. 
Sometimes desire awakens a whole crowd 
with copious particularity 
with the urgent motions of membranes 
with the mystic dialectic of toxins and hormones (Robertson, 2016, p. 11) 
This section of the poem pre-empts “people saying we in plazas and restaurants | students and 
cops” and its implication of the crowd gathered in protest on the following page. The voice of 
that collective “we” is juxtaposed against “the inmost parts” to suggest that at the root of any 
collective action, of any crowd acting together in public, there is some interface between the 
solipsistic experience of desire and the possibility of its social, shared understanding; this is 
again suggested by “copious particularity”. I hear this crowd, this “we”, as an echo of “the 
voice of the crowd” in Bonney, only here the anxiety of the reproductive force of its (singular) 
collective voice is replaced by a hopeful possibility, of starting, as if the individual and 
particular desires of its participants might, as they come together, bring about some form of 
resistive collective beginning. “Toxins” and “hormones” then emphasise the physiological 
aspect of this activation of social desire, as something which happens in the body, and in 
bodies coming together. 
The poem ends: 
The great health is unknown gratuitous expenditure towards 
      the material ideal. 
It is not a metaphor. 
From now on, everything will be called The Middle, everything 
       will be called The Seam, everything will be called Toxins, 
       everything will be called The Great Health. 
 Everything will be a hormone. (Robertson, 2016, p. 17) 
This ending casts over a sequence of titles of poems from the book, presenting itself as 
something of a preface, before moving into “a hormone” as the culmination of that list. It 
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suggests that the poems will act as “hormones”, or that the figure of “hormones” – and by 
extension also “toxins”, implicitly their more painful counterpart in the “mystic dialectic” – 
comes to stand for the possible action of the poems. This proposes that the poems conceive of 
themselves, in aim at least, as working towards an activation of desires, and of disruptive 
capacities of pains, as ways to generate or give voice to resistance-sensation. These 
resistance-sensations operate politically at the interface or “membranes” between the 
subjective experience of the individual body and crowd, pushing towards a change of action, 
relation, conception, which operates at and through these membranes. As in Bonney 
experiences of death or hunger might open up possible connections between the crowd whose 
riotous activity hopes to break out of the already-known, Robertson here expands the affective 
range of sensations of synthetic rupture also into the realm of desire. 
This is not, however, a kind of political thinking which happens in the body as opposed to at 
the level of thought. Rather, it is a mode of bodily or embodied thinking. The following poem, 
‘Toxins’, states: “That time we called our theory Toxins | we became adepts of its excellence” 
(Robertson, 2016, p. 27). These concepts negate any distinction between the intellectual and 
the bodily, between thought and affect, suggesting that radical thinking is that which happens 
of and through the desires, pains, and ruptures of the feeling body. “Hormones and toxins” 
then become figures which blend the linguistic, the affective, the theoretical and the bodily, 
representing a kind of activating signal transmitted to and between bodies – through 
discursive means in the poems – analogous to the figure of “harmony” in Bonney’s work, but 
more heavily emphasising the bodily nature of this exchange of energies. 
“Hormones” joins “harmony” as a closely connected key concept for this thesis. Both carry 
some of the most vital work of thought of their respective works, through an emblematic 
conceit or figure which operates both metaphorically and metonymically: “hormones” stand 
in for an array of exchanges of bodily, aesthetic, and political drives and affects, related to but 
much broader than any literal understanding of the physiological processes involved in 
emotive sensation, just as “harmony” suggests exchanges and transmissions of energy whose 
relation to the actual vibrations of sound and music shifts in and out of focus. Through the use 
of such figures – alongside other modes of expansiveness, contradiction and indeterminacy – 
rather than through more recognisably disrupted language, these poets gesture towards and 
conjure ideas and experiences which can’t be explicated in rational, empirical, ‘realist’ forms 
of writing, but which might nonetheless be ‘understood’ or felt, in some sense, in the reading. 
“Hormones” is not just a conceptual reference to the presence of resistive infra-linguistic 
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affects then, but also an attempt to use the poems’ expansive metaphorical framework to give 
such thought-sensations a presence, a provisional coherence within the poem, in unstable 
contention with the already-known coherence of the language outside and preceding it.33 
The third poem, ‘On Form’, adds to the conception of the radical potential of embodied 
thinking and feeling a close relation to aesthetic form, through its attention to the feeling 
surfaces of the body, and those of its felt or perceived objects. This builds on the arguments 
from Occasional Work and Seven Walks from the Office for Soft Architecture, as outlined in 
Chapter 3, in which Robertson describes “the affective potential of the surface […] an 
indiscrete threshold where our bodies exchange information with an environment” 
(Robertson, 2011, p. 123). Physical surface is seen in that text as unstable and liable to change 
through its interaction with affect at the level of the perception of colour or other forms of 
decoration; decoration itself – or ornamentation, style – is seen as a way to create affectively-
driven uncertainty in material and social structures. Where the earlier text discussed primarily 
the surfaces of buildings, ‘On Form’ focusses on the surface of the body, as its own kind of 
threshold. 
The poem opens: “You could say that form is learning” (Robertson, 2016, p. 32), echoing the 
refusal of a binary between bodily sensation and cognition in ‘Toxins’, with a claim that the 
formal, aesthetic, non-semantic, also does thinking. “Form” then becomes not only aesthetic 
form, but also the body, or the meeting point of the two in the bodily movements of a dancer; 
the poem was commissioned for a documentary about dancer Jane Ellison, to whom it is 
dedicated, and ranges across a great many small parts of the body, examining it in great detail 
through a series of incongruous comparisons to animals, objects, architectural features. The 
 
33 In ‘Concepts and Conception in Poetry’, JH Prynne describes “the concept of concept”, through which poems 
can create internal conceptual frameworks for themselves, whose mediation of our understanding of the world 
pushes ever further from the obfuscated ideological mediation present in more supposedly direct modes of 
representation. Concept “can be distinguished from a free-standing idea or moment of insight because it implies 
a frame or context of structure, often in relation to a scheme or system of mental procedures or representations”. 
Rather than being concerned with observation directly, “the relational framework supervenes above the atomic 
content of ‘making an observation of a thing or event in the world’” (Prynne, 2014, p. 13). As concepts seen this 
way can be deployed in poetry, “The reader is placed into temporary removal or suspension from the field of 
action or its direct imitation, and is invited to act as at least in part proxy to representations that are external to 
the reader’s natural self”, “sharing this intermediate framework with the poet-author as a territory of the 
imagination where validation rules can be reformulated or even suspended altogether” (Prynne, 2014, p. 14). As 
that which appears “direct” and “natural” is itself completely inside the mystified and mystifying conceptual 
frameworks of ideology, Prynne describes a process whereby poems might set up conceptual counter-
frameworks. I see this as a work of recombination not distinct from the work of recombination which occurs 
through the instabilities of affective extremity; “hormones” and “harmony” are both exemplary felt-concepts 
which create the possibilities of new meanings through and against the ideological pre-figuration of the language 
in which they’re written. 
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move which makes resistive theoretical thinking happen in the body is the same move which 
suggests that learning happens at the level of aesthetic form; both refuse the same false binary 
between the formal or embodied and the conceptual or cognitive. This false binary is the same 
one which Simon Jarvis refuted, in my discussion of his work in Chapter 3, where he 
demonstrates that the logic which separates subjectivity from knowledge is the same one that 
separates aesthetics from knowledge – both wrongly suggest that conceptual content is 
something free standing, disembodied, regardless of the body that recognises it or the form 
which it takes. 
A page later in the poem: 
the repeat carries between bodies 
what’s made in this space is theories 
and thymus a rising of beneficial 
smoke as thorax as guitar the hairs 
exact and between bodies form’s 
not ever without a stupendous body 
so the repetition is never exact 
this is why form is always learning 
as it moves across surfaces as 
on the cleft above the lips (Robertson, 2016, p. 33) 
In between its catalogued body parts are claims about the theoretical, thinking possibility of 
interacting bodies such as “the repeat carries between bodies | what’s made in this space is 
theories”. “the repetition is never exact” echos the language of the theoretical account I’ve 
laid out in chapter 3, from Massumi, Butler, and Riley, suggesting the possibility of a 
“learning” focussed on the body as the site of the failure of totalising ideological inscription. 
In the final two lines, “surfaces” becomes not just the material objects of the world, familiar 
from the Office for Soft Architecture, but also presents the possibility of the surface of the 
body, the skin. The movement across surfaces suggests a tactile interaction, as fingers over 
skin, or as the body touching against other material surfaces – where the physical sensation of 
interaction with material is a point of thinking, of learning, of generating newness. As the 
poem focusses in on the lips at this point, it flashes up with the possibility of that movement 
as the amorous movement of lips on skin, or fingers on lips, adding the presence of desire into 
the concept of tactile, material bodily learning. This is picked up again strongly a few pages 
later: 
between our nerve endings and our motor units 
like the female sex that thrives behind 
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the earlobe there is a bony poppy 
fucking wildly at the edge of capital 
this experience can constitute a break (Robertson, 2016, p. 37) 
Here Robertson explicitly builds the positive claim for the politically disruptive capacity of 
sensuous activity into her poems’ thinking about the body as a subjective membrane between 
thinking-feeling surfaces. Specifically, those disruptive experiences are “wild” desires “at the 
edges of capital”, suggesting that the sensuous activity which is most incomprehensible to the 
ideologically and materially dominant structures of capital is also that which brings us closest 
to the possibility of envisaging and living something different. The “break” that is constituted 
must then be an experiential one, from what is familiar in desire, in order to also be a political 
one, from the structures that create those familiar desires. If “the poem is a hormone”, if 
“form is learning”, then these poems are not merely working to activate or evoke these 
affective breaks from the already-known, but also wish to be the kind of formal objects the 
aesthetic perception of which is itself a point of disruptive affective learning. They wish to 
use their formal capacity to create sensation at the edge of what is known within the logic of 
current conditions. 
The long central poem ‘The Middle’ pulls together echoes of previous poems into an 
increasingly entangled web of conceptual relation, interplay and recombination which makes 
up these poems. ‘The Middle’ takes a step further from the interrelated conception of the 
disruptive capacities of aesthetic perception and affective sensation, to the stronger claim that 
these are essentially the same kind of experience. One pivotal passage begins: 
The work will be called the linguistics of the hormone. 
As for the completely human and dandiacal gland, trans-corporeal 
    and trans-historical 
it became literature 
and the body is impersonal, in contradiction 
which is form. (Robertson, 2016, p. 64) 
The passage then suggests a cinematic panning over “poverty, illness, death and brutality | 
building and action interpenetrating”, moving into a description of what seems like an art 
installation, of mirrors, flowers, light and video projections. Then, implicitly referring to this 
artwork or arrangement: 
 
It is the general system of the formation and transformation of 
    borders. 
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It is simultaneously an aesthetic of perception and an ethic of 
    conduct, these being inseparable. (Robertson, 2016, p. 64) 
Added to the notion of the body as a bridging point between affect and different kinds of form 
– to the vital embodiment of aesthetic, affective and intellectual activity, as deeply 
interconnected activities whose connection is their strongest site of potential for rupturing the 
reproductive force of ideological subjectification and producing the imaginative possibility of 
newness and transformation – is the idea of “an ethic of conduct” here. The poem moves 
smoothly from “the linguistics of the hormone”, gesturing to the resistive capacity of 
affective-bodily sensation as already established in the book, to transformative ethical 
possibilities of aesthetic perception, with the suggestion of the art installation as somehow 
intervening in or disrupting the banal violence which precedes it. 
This merging of aesthetic, affective, bodily, ethical, and political, locates itself on the felt 
surface, which, as in ‘On Form’, might be both the surface of the touched or feeling skin, or 
the surface of material objects, structures, pages, artworks – all surfaces being points of 
interaction. So: 
Minute perceptions speeding along a dirty surface 
will say something else 
about the way every pronoun is absurd (Robertson, 2016, p. 67) 
chimes closely with 
Ceaselessly, invisibly, they unwind from things rippling and radiating towards 
somebody’s skin. In turn, the surface of the body fountains impalpable emanations. 
What tininess! Excellent! Next to this riot, most human love is so wrong and stupid. 
(2016, p. 68) 
Perception moving across the surface of an observed object, and sensations on the surface of 
the body are described in closely related terms. Each is an area of uncertainty, where the pre-
conceived forms in which we operate – the strictures of pronouns, or our conditioned desires 
& narratives of love – become, or are revealed as, unstable. Aesthetic, formal perception is of 
a kind with those unassimilable affective experiences which show the fractures in our 
ideological formation – both refer to encounters between the formal, embodied and felt in the 
world and in our own sensations, to the elements of perception and experience which remain 
uncertain and irreducible to the already-known. 
‘A Coat’ uses clothing, as another instance where aesthetic forms are embodied, on the 
feeling body, to culminate this merging of the potential political force of affective experience 
125 
 
and aesthetic perception in the notion of political decoration. This was an important part of 
the original account from The Office for Soft Architecture, but here operates in the new light 
of this conception of the aesthetic-affective thinking-feeling body. 
The poem begins with references and extracts of Marx’s classic example of “twenty yards of 
linen and one coat” (Robertson, 2016, p. 74), and surrounding passages, which he used to 
explain the relationship between labour, use value and exchange value in Capital. As the 
poem goes on, this meets extracts from a tailoring guide (dated to around forty years before 
Capital) meticulously detailing the acts of measuring the body, and a series of differently cut 
coats, emphasising in addition to the use or exchange value of the coat its aesthetic function, 
as an item which decorates the body. 
In between these citational passages, Robertson writes: 
But I think poetry is nice 
 because of my body 
 the insurrection of my unplaced body I mean 
 […] 
 And the enjoyable gland also 
 dribbles a politics (2016, p. 77) 
Aesthetics, and politics, are rooted in the feelings of desire in the body, with “the enjoyable 
gland” gesturing towards the figure of hormones. With a sound echo across the poem, on 
“commodity”, “commodious” and “community” – “no community is for a body” (Robertson, 
2016, p. 76), “the body of a friend is commodious only | and so extinguishes all named 
commodities” (2016, p. 78) – the poem wonders about the interactions between the privately 
feeling body, the collective political sphere, and the objectifying structures of capital. As the 
poem moves into thinking about “a friend”, by implication Robertson’s deceased friend 
Stacey Doris to whom the poem is dedicated, it echoes the above quotation, referring to the 
“inevitably insurrectionary motions of specific elaborate perfumable bodies like hers” (2016, 
p. 82). It is as if, through the figure of clothing, and the praise of the insurrectionary power of 
her friend’s body in sensuous and decorative terms, the poem makes the claim that the body, 
with its specificity and sensations, can act as a refutation of oppressive structures, if it’s 
decorated in the right way. As this poem is ‘A Coat’, this seems to offer up a model, a poetics, 





‘Show me something unknowable’  
I hope it is relatively clear from the above discussion that the interface in Robertson’s work 
between aesthetics, bodily sensation, affect, and the possibilities of breaks from our prior-
constituted experience and subjectivity, is a further development of what I have previously 
described as the relationship between non-recuperable form and infra-linguistic affects, where 
the former, in music, poetry, and the non-semantic elements of representation or cultural 
production is best able to gesture towards the latter, as it exists in actual experience. The 
thinking of Robertson’s poems brings even this complementary distinction into question, 
suggesting that aesthetic perception, affective experience, and even political and ethical 
thinking, are all completely interlinked. They are, these poems tell us, primarily not rational 
or even semantically articulable processes, but kinds of thinking-feeling which occur at the 
level of the feeling, desiring body interacting with the material surfaces and objects of the 
world. 
Alongside the patterns that build up this interconnection in the poems (and the concomitant 
argument for their interconnection in the wider world of experience), is a focus on the idea of 
that which is outside knowledge, which begins to make the argument for the vital nature of 
the infra-linguistic in all these perceptive capacities more explicitly. 
In ‘The Seam’ again, towards its conclusion: 
 I start a school called how can I live. 
 
 In my school called how can I live 
 in my theory of appearing 
 I lay out my costume. 
 We don’t belong to culture. We’re sunsets. 
 We simplify thought 
 until it resembles 
 stripes. 
 I beg you – show me something unknowable. 
 I don’t believe in the possibility of knowing. 
[…] 
 Tell me about shame and isolation 
 the shame that has not even 
 a vocabulary. (Robertson, 2016, pp. 16-17) 
Towards the end of ‘Toxins’: 
Health is unlegislated 
it unfurls raw on the table 
the extent to which its meaning does not exist ripens 
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a thousand years pass. 
 
The movement, just outside perception 
traverses limbs, skin, organs, hair 
as if it were the purpose of this sentiment not to be expressed. (2016, p. 29) 
The first example is antagonistic to the possibility of certain knowledge, in favour of an 
allegiance with that which is “unknowable”, and yet which, it suggests, can still be shown. 
This appeals to kinds of understanding or perception which aren’t reducible to rational, 
codified knowledge. This couplet on “knowing” is preceded by hints at the possibilities of the 
aesthetic to do serious thinking, in the thought which “resembles stripes”, and in the 
“costume”, as a form of aesthetic adornment of the body. It is then followed by an explicit 
invocation of what I have been calling infra-linguistic affects, of those feelings of “shame and 
isolation” which are felt, but outside current language. This is expanded in the second 
example, which makes the claim that the conditions of our “health”, our flourishing, are 
outside of the bounds of those expressible meanings that currently exist, “unlegislated”, where 
legislation as a figure unites the idea of codified language and the reproduction and 
enforcement of current conditions (as with “the law” in Bonney). What does exist is 
“sentiment”, a feeling here implicitly opposed to “meaning”, made both bodily and 
imperceptible. The “school called how can I live” that precedes this then is one which 
replaces traditional scholastic learning with a kind of negative knowledge which emerges out 
of the unknowingness of aesthetic form and of inexpressible feeling.  
It is important to remember here that it is a specifically female subject who speaks in these 
poems, who asks “how can I live”, and the “shame that has not even | a vocabulary” is by 
implication a shame felt by women specifically. The theoretical possibility of the bodily, 
aesthetic and affective, to produce the possibility of subjective rupture and to reach out into 
collective rupture and change, is specifically from the perspective of a gendered subjectivity. 
The stance taken against knowledge, in favour of the “unknowable” in the aesthetic and 
affective is a gendered critique. These arguments are not only abstract and esoteric – as the 
poems go on, they directly link more specifically political critiques, of war, violence and 
capital, with a masculine-gendered rationalism which is opposed to these aesthetic-affective 
bodily modes of thinking-feeling which are gendered feminine. 
I’ve already touched on the use of the gendered figures of Venus and Mars in ‘On Physically 
Real Being…’ to represent the relationship between the construction of gender and desire 
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under patriarchy, the perpetuation of the oppression of women, and imperialism and war. 
Later in that poem: 
 I want a pause in vocation. Venus 
 chatoyant in the formal dream 
 please tranquilize efficient Mars and his 
 efficient interest. (Robertson, 2016, p. 43) 
Mars is not just imperialist warmonger, but also business owner and boss, and Venus – 
“chatoyant”, exhibiting the cat’s eye glow of a gemstone – is invoked to oppose specifically 
his drive to labour, and a logic of efficiency which is implicitly for his benefit alone. The 
extraction of value from the labour of workers under the logics of capitalist economics 
becomes another form of domination inextricably tied to patriarchy and war, and Robertson’s 
aestheticised resistance is accordingly gendered. 
‘The Middle’ picks up and develops these ideas, of the relationship between resistance to the 
hurts of gendered subjectification for the individual, and the wider question of resistance to 
this constellation of oppressive structures. It opens: 
I had thought 
to be a woman breathing 
through the door of my body 
I would begin to bark 
so as to violate my preferences. 
 
I began to bark through the door of my body. 
Its future’s untenable. 
Now I have extra organs. 
I get lost here to transform myself. (Robertson, 2016, p. 54) 
“To be a woman breathing” rings similarly to “how can I live”, but is even more explicitly 
gendered. The following line brings into the whole constellation of form, body, aesthetics and 
desire a reminder that, historically and presently, woman as a category is more closely 
identified with her body, to oppressive effect, than man to his.34 The body then becomes both 
the socially pre-determined space through and in which she struggles, and, in the switch from 
“breathing” in the first stanza to “bark” in the second, also the weapon which can be turned 
against its own predetermination, against the structures that hurt and limit it. 
 
34 In ‘Am I That Name’, Denise Riley gives a detailed account beginning before the Renaissance of how in the 
body/soul distinction women are conceptualised as closer to their bodies – which also means closer to nature, to 
animal instinct, further from mastery through a separate wilful intellect, and relates to being alternately 
dominated by sexual appetite, and passive sexual object (Riley, 1988, e.g. pp. 18-43) 
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The ongoing dialectical position on gendered interpellation as both oppressively pre-figuring 
and also as a source of divergence and resistance then extends out, into a wider view of 
resistance to oppressive structures not only limited to the axis of gender. So, following this 
opening, the poem speaks to “the bankers” (Robertson, 2016, p. 55): 
Cease what comes from ships 
rats, grain, hunger and death 
quite terrible partial fructifiction in armfuls cease 
the feral sorrow incubating in money 
spectral aura of booties cease 
cease eveningness and floral dandling or nibbling 
and pabulum of the love-gouged domus 
begetting begetting begetting (2016, p. 56) 
Here trade, commerce and war are seen as coded-masculine antagonists to women, as all that 
pre-figures in opposition to the possibility of “breathing through the door of my body”. 
The pun on “booties”, as both stolen goods and also (sexualised, women’s) buttocks, makes 
this point forcefully, in a suggestion of the overlapping logics of capital and of female-
objectification, where all is rendered an object for the extraction of different kinds of value to 
the masculine merchant-lover. This is accentuated by the move into a language reminiscent of 
the patronising harassments of one-sided love-making – “floral dandling and nibbling”. The 
“booties” pun also adds to “ships | rats, grain, hunger and death” the shadow of a reminder 
that the formative history of modern capitalism includes a very literal reduction of human 
bodies to shipped commodities, in the form of the slave trade. This line of continuity from the 
logic of capital, and the dehumanisation of women’s bodies and black bodies, as things which 
have, under different and also overlapping historical conditions, been considered ownable as 
property, is recalled again later in ‘Party’ with “a | female slave a gift a wife a girl”, 
reminding us that the logics of capital, patriarchy, and white supremacy are deeply 
intertwined, and the moves which resist one must resist them all. 
~ 
If the proletariat was thought capable of blowing the foundations sky high, what of the 
shipped, what of the containerized. What could such flesh do? 
(Fred Moten & Stefano Harney, ‘Fantasy in the Hold’, The Undercommons, 
2013, p. 93) 
 ~ 
“begetting begetting begetting” brings into this question of the violence done to bodies 
through patriarchal-capital an implicit pun on “reproduction”, as in, both sexual and 
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ideological. “Begetting” can mean both the procuring of goods, and procreation, seen not 
through the female body in which it primarily takes place, but through the agency of the male; 
the reproduction of the conditions of living is cast, as earlier, as something which happens 
through the female body, whilst simultaneously enacted violently upon it. 
These moments are countered by the possibility of a different sort of thinking, gendered 
feminine: ‘The Middle’ proposes “perfunctory women | as the image of a new conception of 
language | to leverage emotion” (Robertson, 2016, p. 58), and later “some female documents” 
(2016, p. 64); the above lines from ‘Party’ are immediately followed by “being believed as a 
state of relationship” (2016, p. 92). These explicitly counter the idea of the now masculine-
gendered matrix of oppressive structures with the idea of a feminine-coded discourse. 
This builds on the poems’ valorisation of the unknown or unknowable in affective experience, 
that which arises from the body, from its sensations, from the perception of form – against 
that which can be known and legislated – as a basis for flourishing and resistance. As this 
body is always feminine in these poems, this fits into a wider history of the construction of 
rational, objective, logical forms of discourse as coded-masculine, and therefore superior, 
under and by patriarchy, against emotional, partial, subjective discourses, gendered feminine. 
The ‘feminine’ discourse is dismissed for being irrational and unverifiable, while appeals to 
emotion and experience are dismissed for being ‘feminine’, in a mutually assuring process. 
The notion of “being believed” brings me to the way in which this logic operates to dismiss 
women’s voices and accounts of their lived experience, particularly in accounts of what is 
done to their bodies by men. These relationships between rationalist discourse, the 
reproduction of gendered (and also racialised) violence and oppression, and “being believed” 
will be key also to the chapters which follow. 
The poems at these moments directly link the claims of the potential for emotion (and a 
language rooted in emotion) as a positive force in the face of oppressive systems of capital 
and patriarchy to the nature of emotional discourse as coded-feminine. It is through a focus 
specifically on the marginalised experience of women, and through modes of thinking 
rendered feminine by patriarchy – the bodily, the emotional, the aesthetic – that these poems 
wish to reach outside of the bounds of current knowledge, and into the imagination of 
alternative possibilities of being. Yet, in Robertson’s poems, this doesn’t arise out of any 
‘natural’, which is to say essentialising, condition of womanhood; she writes “to continually 
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explode the psyche in this excess || would include a total refusal of each existing narrative of 
femininity” (2016, p. 59). 
Instead, the claim is that the conditions of patriarchal dominance produce and are produced by 
patriarchal, masculine-gendered thinking, and that modes of thinking which are marginalised 
and feminised by that dominance, which are rendered outside the bounds of its structures of 
comprehension, also contain the capacities to undo it. In so undoing, these modes of thinking 




I don’t mean a fucked-up mirage of happiness as unlimited consumption. I mean the 
opportunity to experience living as having all dimensions. To feel the body as fully 
present, having a place within politics. To accept the body, its lumpy, needy, intense, 
aging, explosive, wayward, frictive alwaysness. Which can include illness also. I don’t 
want to confuse flourishing with consumption and profitability, which only really 
diminish corporality. Capital doesn’t want our bodies to flourish. It wants to define 
desire, circumscribe need, and oppress agency. It is capital that wants to anesthetize 
despair. To flourish would be to roar, to resist. 
 (Lisa Robertson, from Ken L. Walker and Lisa Robertson, ‘I Want to Reclaim 
Every Part of Living Including Illness and Death’, Poetry Project Newsletter, (237), 
2013-14, p. 21) 
~ 
 
35 I have been careful to make this distinction, between claiming a resistive capacity in some discourse which is 
inherently or ‘naturally’ feminine – this being a fundamentally essentialising claim that perpetuates rigid gender-
roles and concomitant oppressions – and claiming a resistive capacity for discourses which are designated 
feminine within and by the oppressive structures of patriarchy. 
I say this in the large shadow of canonical accounts of feminine writing and thinking, such as Hélène 
Cixous’s in ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’. This earlier account of the possibilities of “female-sexed texts” (Cixous, 
1976, p. 887) has a large implicit presence in Robertson’s writing, and is vastly important for opening up the 
possibilities I’ve described here. A passage from this text is also used as an epigraph to one of Bhanu Kapil’s 
works, The Vertical Interrogation of Strangers. Yet Cixous slides into precisely these problems of 
essentialisation, of relying on an idea of what women intrinsically are, of “her native strength” (1976, p. 880). 
Cixous writes, for example, “a woman is never far from "mother" […] There is always within her at least a little 
of that good mother's milk” (1976, p. 881). 
The suggestion of an essentialising element might remain in my account, or in Robertson’s work, since 
I have often jumped fluidly from her use of the more biological term “sex” to a more social discussion of gender. 
As in, “the sex of my thinking”. Yet even here, I think the suggestion of an essential (i.e. bodily determined) 
femininity begins to fall apart. This line, as these poems in general, begs the questions of the social significance 
of the gendered body, which is another way of looking at the role of sex in the world; the discussion of the social 
function of sex, or the perception and experience of being sexed, is so close as to be almost indistinguishable 
from a question of gender. The question of the social formation of the body then folds in both sex and gender as 
related areas of ideological formation. 
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The poetics of resistance which draws on connections between the affective, the bodily and 
the aesthetic, in order to suggest the disruptive possibilities of artistic forms which activate 
and reach towards unknowable desires – dance, tailoring, poetry – and which contradict the 
oppressive logics of masculine-rationalist thinking, contains its own implicit ethical positions. 
In particular, these poems’ thinking about subjectivity, female time and experience in the 
world as a woman suggests a particular conception of the relationship between individual 
subjective experience, irrational and uncertain as it by necessity must be, and the collective. 
Just as resistance in the poem arises from the experiencing subject, the possibilities of general 
collective flourishing arise from the point of individual survival.  
To re-examine a key moment in the making of the argument as I have built it so far then: 
recall that an avowal of the “unknowable” in ‘The Seam’ begins from “a school called how 
can I live”, in a poem which deals with the pains, oppressions, joys and desires of being 
interpellated as a woman, and explores the relationship between individual subjectification 
and desire and the political force of collective desires. The poem makes its claims about the 
force of the non-recuperable and infra-linguistic specifically through the frame of the problem 
of survival and flourishing in the world as a woman, and also, as a particular “I” within the 
limits of the collective. As “how can I live” becomes “the great health” which is “unknown 
gratuitous expenditure towards the material ideal”, on the following page (Robertson, 2016, p. 
17), and as this question of individual survival is envisaged in the setting of a school, the 
poem claims that subjective experience of personalised resistance to painful conditions can be 
generously offered as tool for a more general, social reassessment of possibility. 
This is developed in ‘An Awning’. The poem was commissioned to accompany an art 
exhibition, and begins with the suggestion of walking through a shimmering, brightly 
coloured space, as “women who undertake experimental meta- | physics while walking in 
gardens” (Robertson, 2016, p. 105). Then, in a later passage: 
 in an economy withheld from duration 
 […] 
 we think in the car 
 with the grace of these assistants 
 to live as freely as possible. 
 The flat warehouses extend forever 
 (warehouses made of cinderblocks, containing cinderblocks) 
 Let’s decorate their warehouses 
 with our anciently scorned thinking. (2016, p. 108) 
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This makes a bold and explicit call for a gendered aesthetic thinking (recalling “the sex of my 
thinking” at the very start of the book), as a way to decorate and re-figure the banal logistical 
landscape of capital. Yet it also comes from the question of how, or the desire, “to live as 
freely as possible.” The next and final poem, ‘Rose’, follows this pattern, giving a more 
concrete articulation to “the great health”, as a reference to Nietzsche: “stronger, more 
seasoned, tougher, more audacious, and gayer than any previous health” (Robertson, 2016, p. 
114). Robertson’s poems envisage the possibility that a basis in subjective struggle, in the 
struggle to survive and flourish on an individual level, to activate and reach towards one’s 
not-yet-knowable desires, is our most hopeful starting point for envisaging a collective 
situation in which we might engage in more generally socially disruptive activity together. 
The desire to live freely is not an individualist desire, because the affective-aesthetic 
capacities deployed in and through that desire are always also offered as resources of 
solidarity and general disruption, and a more general flourishing. 
“Let’s decorate their warehouses | with our anciently scorned thinking” is a rallying cry, for 
the specific form of feminine political decoration which these poems not only theorise as the 
kind of aesthetic resistance that they desire, but which they also aim to model and enact. The 
idea of feminine decoration contextualises my original claims about the relationship between 
infra-linguistic experiences and non-recuperable meaning-forms, within the particular 
structures of domination and oppression currently existing. Subjective, non-realist modes of 
writing and thinking have particular resistive efficacy because they are at once antithetical to 
the dominant rational-realist modes of patriarchal capital, and can speak of experiences which 
are marginalised within that same structure. 
One particularly striking passage in ‘Third Summer’ becomes for me something of a 
manifesto for the work as a whole, in that it brings together a culmination of a great many 
elements of the work in a short space, to re-iterate the kind of political-aesthetic thinking that 
it calls for. The poem tells us enigmatically “the part of desire framed by the window | is my 
entire concept”, “in the fashion-nature dialectic | I’ve positioned myself as the custodian of 
the inauthentic” (Robertson, 2016, p. 99). It goes on: 
what are anybody’s elements? Or 
the base data of a lark? Or 
 
what if we’ve made the wrong use of the joy of our bodies? what if 




in the aesthetic-politics binary 
and the material of poetry is also the immaterial movement of history […] 
 
there is actually no binary – just the juiciness and joy of form 
otherwise known as hormones (2016, p. 100) 
The whole book has dealt in the bringing together or dissolving of binaries which exist on a 
continuum of conceptual relation: mind and body, thinking and feeling, the aesthetic and the 
meaningful, decorative and functional, the embodied and the abstract, the bodily and the 
ideological, the individual and the social. These binaries all form part of the same conceptual 
framework at the centre of which is the notion of the free, self-determining, rational subject 
and their ability to exercise their clear, expressive will over the matter of the world, seen as 
inert and evacuated of content. This is a framework that makes no sense to ideas of 
ideological subject formation, and its consequences for resistance, expression, action in 
general – to the questions of conditions, of flourishing within marginalised identities, of the 
hurt of capital, which Robertson addresses. 
At this locus in which all of these binaries collapse, we have the act of unintelligible, aesthetic 
communication – “bird cries” – seen as political, as offering some answer to the equivocal 
force of the body and its joys as both conditioned and potentially resistive. The question is 
how to use our joy in the right way; “the joy of form” encapsulates the way the turn towards 
the aesthetic, towards decoration as itself affective, is envisaged as a kind of solution, a way 
to think about how our longing for joy and beauty, our response to pain, might be harnessed 
in resistance to the ideologies which form and hurt us. 
In ‘Rose’, which makes this question of colour and adornment literal, in a document of the 
thoughts and perceptual changes that arise from wearing actual rose-tinted glasses, Robertson 
asks: “What if the rosiness did not actually have to do with desire in the standard sense of the 
marketers? Imagine a good experience of the body that isn’t necessarily or merely sexual or 
erotic, that isn’t limited by skin” (2016, p. 114). 
These poems attempt themselves to be something like the “bird cries”, or their formal 
translations. Through their use of a luscious beauty, a conceptual expansiveness, a 
shimmering array of conceptual interrelation that can’t be captured and summarised into mere 
concepts, these poems try to conjure a bodily joy which is a thinking, a set of uncertainly felt 
ideas, counter to the thinking of our current conditions and the structures by which they 
reproduce oppression and domination. In this thorough intertwining of conceptual and 
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aesthetic work, bringing together the unreachable subjective experiences from which the 
poems emerge, and the subjective experience of aesthetic desires and joys in reading, they 
open the way for some possibility of a shared perception of new ways of being together, and 







Chapter 6: Bhanu Kapil, Ban en Banlieue 
I wanted to write a novel but instead I wrote this. 
 (Bhanu Kapil, ‘[13 Errors for Ban]’, Ban en Banlieue, 2015, p. 19) 
~ 
“What is Ban?” I began to answer his question and in doing so came to my politics. 
How does the Far Right organise and come to be, in a post-war society (1965-1983). 
And how do you track a parallel rise in ethnic (British Asian) fundamentalism within a 
citizenry? Ban is a set of pre-conditions, the most basic of premonitions, and so 
perhaps I also want to say that this feels linked: to the domestic (gender) violence, 
alcoholism and sexual abuse that unfold at home. 
 (Bhanu Kapil, ‘End-Notes’, Ban en Banlieue, 2015, p. 96) 
 ~ 
The paratextual material of Bhanu Kapil’s Ban en Banlieue situates her as “a British-Indian 
emigrant to the United States” (Kapil, 2015, back cover). She grew up in the London suburbs, 
but now lives in Colorado; all of her six poetry collections, except for the most recent, have 
been published from the United States, the earliest in 2001.36 Kapil’s practice extends out of 
poetic writing, as her staff profile on the Naropa University website once stated: “Her work 
unfolds at the intersection of performance, prose and bodywork (questions of embodiment, 
memory and trauma).”37 Kapil folds these other practices – of performance, and therapeutic 
practice with the body – into hybrid prose-poetry book-projects. Her oeuvre is an ongoing 
exploration of racialised and gendered violence, through specific thinking about the ongoing 
history and trauma of colonialism, and Kapil’s own family history of immigration to the UK 
in the context of Partition, and her later move to the US. These areas are by no means the 
limits of Kapil’s work, but are recurring and central areas of attention that make up the locus 
around which the work overspills. 
In an essay introducing Kapil’s work, Eunsong Kim describes it as “the ‘performance of no’ 
through the labor of perpetual writing” (Kim, 2018, p. 251). When I invited Kapil to 
contribute a piece of work to a poetry festival I co-organised in late 2018,38 she quoted Kim’s 
words to me via email, accompanying a remote performance work: a set of instructions to its 
 
36 The Vertical Interrogation of Strangers (Kelsey Street Press, 2001), Incubation: a space for monsters (Leon 
Works, 2006), humanimal [a project for future children] (Kelsey Street Press, 2009), Schizophrene (Nightboat, 
2011), Ban en Banlieue (Nightboat, 2015) and How to Wash A Heart (Pavilion, 2020). 
37 https://www.naropa.edu/faculty/bhanu-kapil.php [Accessed September 2019, viewable at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190909205301/https://www.naropa.edu/faculty/bhanu-kapil.php] 
38 Poetry Emergency took place at The University of Salford, and Manchester Metropolitan University, on 23rd & 
24th November 2018. See: https://poetryemergency.wordpress.com/ 
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participant-audience to cut out one of a long series of “No”s which were printed on paper 
hanging from the walls, and to deploy them as they saw fit. I duly obliged, and this experience 
distilled for me a sense of Kapil’s work as concerned with refusal of the world as it is and its 
unjust demands, and also with the possibility of an intervention which recruits the reader and 
their body into a somatic realisation that, as we are formed in this world, we might also be 
formed together differently. 
~ 
The no of the poet is so often a yes in the carapace of no. The no of a poet is 
sometimes but rarely a no to a poem itself, but more usually a no to all the dismal 
aggregations and landscapes outside of the poem. 
 (Anne Boyer, ‘No’, A Handbook of Disappointed Fate, 2018, p. 13) 
 ~ 
The latest of these works, Ban en Banlieue, folds into itself and dramatizes Kapil’s biography, 
her intertwining creative practices, and a continuation of the broad concerns which animate 
her work as a whole. This is a book of prose poetry, and it is “Notes for a novel never written” 
(Kapil, 2015, pp. 20/44), and it is also a document of a series of performances, or of 
performative actions of writing. Ban is made up of five sections, each broken up into sub-
sections of fragmentary, digressional writing. It is dominated by the twenty-three passages – 
loosely connected, non-sequential in their occasional narrative – which make up the central 
section, ‘Auto-sacrifice (Notes)’. The work spins around a series of autobiographical events, 
primarily drawn from Kapil’s own childhood, but moves out from these to vast political 
contexts which form those experiences; to vivid descriptions of places, lives, mythologies; to 
performances, rituals and processual actions which contribute to or constitute the work; and to 
discussions and speculations on writing this work, writing in general, and on survival. 
Another version of a summary of the text might begin with its own self-statements, from a 
section entitled, ‘What is Ban?’: 
To summarize, she is the parts of something re-mixed as air: integral, rigid air, circa 
1972-1979. She’s a girl. A black girl in an era when, in solidarity, Caribbean and 
Asian Brits self-defined as black. A black (brown) girl encountered in the earliest hour 
of a race riot, or what will become one by nightfall. 
April 23rd, 1979: by morning, anti-Nazi campaigner, Blair Peach, will be dead. 




Ban is a girl walking home from school just as a protest starts to escalate. Pausing at 
the corner of the Uxbridge Road, she hears something: the far-off sound of breaking 
glass. Is it coming from her home or is it coming from the street’s distant clamor? 
Faced with these two sources of a sound she instinctively links to violence, the 
potential for violent acts, Ban lies down. She folds to the ground. This is syntax. 
[…] 
I want to lie down in the place I am from: on the street I am from. 
In the rain. Next to the ivy. As I did, on the border of Pakistan and India: the two 
Punjabs. Nobody sees someone do this. I want to feel it in my body—the root cause. 
(Kapil, 2015, pp. 30-31) 
This passage is one of the earliest points – thirty pages in – when the work comes into focus, 
situates itself with a particular specificity and clarity which is uncharacteristic of its 
associative leaps, its clashes of images, thoughts, anecdotes. It gives us a concrete version of 
some of the motifs that the text spins around, that recur in different shapes throughout, and 
situates them within a time and place which looms over the whole text: 
Ban: is a young girl who drifts in and out of fiction, a figure overlapping or semi-continuous 
with her half-namesake Bhanu, sharing aspects of her biography. The text flags this through 
shifts into a first-person author voice, as in the “I want…” at the end of this passage, or 
elsewhere: “In April 1979, I was ten years old” (Kapil, 2015, p. 37). Ban also spills out of the 
boundaries of this representation, constantly transforms; we see her enter this passage vague 
and unformed, as “parts of something”, “air”, before she solidifies as a girl.  
Ban lies down: the image of a girl lying down, on the night of this particular riot, recurs and 
spills out of itself also, into Kapil’s own life, and into identification with others. It does this 
first through its situation in the real historical riot in which, as the dedication to him tells us, 
anti-racist campaigner Blair Peach was killed by police while protesting against the National 
Front. This riot occurs in “an immigrant suburb of West London—the banlieue of the title” 
(Kapil, 2015, p. 14), the area where Kapil and Ban both grew up. (I see this as the inverse of 
Bonney’s ideal riot – the National Front, as with all racist street movements, are a crowd 
whose voice speaks out in defence of the ongoing violence of conditions as they are.) The 
identificatory expansion of this central image happens also through a series of reported 
performance-gestures – such as the act of lying down at the end of this passage, reaching into 
Kapil’s familial past, and to the memory and violence of Partition, connecting it by the thread 
of this act to the lives of those who left – and through anecdotes of Ban’s childhood. From the 
cover itself, picturing an adult woman lying naked on bare earth, amongst twigs and bushes, 
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the image of this act is the text’s dominant figure. In an earlier instance, this act of lying down 
reaches towards the second of two figures, alongside Peach, who are mostly absent central 
presences in the text: 
Body outline on the ground ringed by candles/flowers at the site where Jyoti Singh 
Pandey lay for 40 minutes in December 2012, raped then thrown from the bus and 
gutted with a steel pipe. […] The anti-rape protesters make a circle around my body 
when I lie down (Kapil, 2015, p. 16). 
Through these figures we can see how this central image reaches towards an array of issues 
and experiences, so important to Kapil’s work in general, of racialised and gendered violence. 
Kapil deals with these experiences on both intimate and structural scales, just as in the above 
passage, the fear of the violence of the race riot and the violence of the home are 
intermingled. 
Ban en Banlieue takes an approach which reaches out to the other works and concerns of this 
thesis then. As I will explore in detail in this chapter, it figures critiques and resistances to the 
conditions of the world it finds itself in – to the interrelated structures of patriarchy, racism 
and capital particularly – beginning from the subjective experience of the traumas and pains 
brought about by those structures. The attention to racial violence and racialised trauma 
intersects with and builds on much of what has gone before in this thesis, in the development 
of a gendered thinking from the question of survival within patriarchy in Robertson’s work. 
Thinking about the pains and possibilities of the raced and gendered body plays a central role 
in Ban en Banlieue, in a development of the figuration of the body as a point of aesthetic-
affective sensation. Ideas of colour and of touch – ways of signalling to, of and between 
bodies – bring the thesis’ thinking to bear on processes of identification, of resistive and non-
recuperable modes of communication which are also ways of being, and of being together. 
 
 The work of Ban 
This reading – or even just the basic situation and thematics of the text – comes into focus 
only gradually, through images and ideas which recur and spin back on one another. I want to 
begin as the text does, and with my initial impressions of it, my experience of its formal 
fracturing, its hybridity, its uncertainty. 
The first thing I encounter reading Ban en Banlieue – after a photograph of a wall of ivy, 
captioned “Hayes, Middlesex, 2012” (Kapil, 2015, p. 6) – is an augmented ‘Contents’ section, 
140 
 
with each named and numbered entry operating as its own subsection of prose passages. I 
flick through the book to get a grip on the relational status of these passages, and find that the 
sequence of its entries only roughly corresponds to the subsequent sections of the book. 
Instead they circle round what Kapil calls “the work of Ban” (2015, p. 11) – its failures and 
frustrations, that which wasn’t or couldn’t be written – inserted here as absence, struggle, 
paraphrase. The opening passage, ‘1. [13 Errors for Ban]:’ (pointing obliquely towards the 
later section of that name) promises “a scene from Ban”, but instead begins in the middle of 
something like dance or movement practice, before interrupting itself in firm authorial voice: 
“At that moment, I realize I have not written the part of Ban that is about sex—the bad sex of 
the riot. Two weeks later, exhausted, trying to write [re-write] Ban, as I do every day […]” 
(2015, p. 7). Two pages later, in ‘3. Stories’ (which has no corresponding later section), Kapil 
tells us: “I wrote a companion series or sequence of childhood stories to lie next to Ban, but 
when it was time to publish them, here (in section 3), I pressed the delete button and stored 
them in another file” (2015, p. 9). These accounts of the failure of writing are interspersed 
within descriptions of ritual acts through which the work is composed, accidents that intrude 
into it, and encounters with other writers or their works. These also shift and digress into only 
obliquely related reflections and anecdotes – a trip to a chimp sanctuary, for example (2015, 
p. 8) – or into surreal myth imagery. In this last instance – “I didn’t get to the part with Kapil 
Muni” (2015, p. 10) – a vivid evocation of a piece of Hindu mythology which is referenced 
and echoed later in the book appears here as a failure or absence.39 
The final sub-section of the contents, ‘8. Installations and Performances:’ catalogues twelve 
such pieces. In doing so, it goes further into detail and reflection than one might expect from a 
merely paratextual listing, introducing the first glimpses of many of the image-gestures and 
thematics of the text. These include the primary accounts in two performance-rituals of the 
death of Jyoti Singh Pandey – also known as Nirbhaya, “The Fearless One” (Kapil, 2015, 
front inside cover) – and Kapil’s acts of lying down as “memorial ritual” which connect 
Nirbhaya to the text and to Ban (Kapil, 2015, pp. 16-18). These installations, performances, 
rituals, and their uncertain relationship to the book itself – as its generative process, its points 
of reference, its central images or the artworks it catalogues – will become key to my sense of 
 
39 Kapil writes in the endnotes to Ban: “Kapil Muni is my ancestor. Many centuries ago he sat on a spit or island 
of sand” (2015, p. 100). The myth goes that Kapil Muni, an incarnation of Vishnu whose ashram was located on 
Sagar Island in the Bay of Bengal, brought about the birth of the river Ganges, which flows past Sagar Island. He 




how Ban troubles its own textual integrity, and in turn to the resistive imaginative work of the 
text. 
This opening section leaves me asking, what is “the work of Ban”? 
The implied function of this section as ‘contents’ – that is, paratextual commentary, peripheral 
but clearly corresponding to a text proper – is frustrated by these digressions and mismatches, 
which diffuse away from any stable structures of relation. As the ‘contents’ expand out of the 
conventional parameters of this function, to begin to unfold the thematics, imagery, and 
formal workings of Ban, it becomes essentially the first section in a work of experimental 
prose poetry, and not merely its prior listings. In this way, the text posits itself as its own 
paratextual material, as a catalogue in notes, of ‘failures’ in writing and performance. 
This continues throughout: the next section, ‘[13 Errors for Ban]’, describes itself as 
“Notes/instructions written into an AWP panel talk”; it is presented as a transcript of that 
performance-talk, which is itself described as “a list of the errors I made as a poet engaging a 
novel-shaped space” (Kapil, 2015, p. 20). The title of the long central section of the book, 
“Auto-sacrifice (Notes)”, presents the whole work as if it were only the notes on or towards 
the scene which comes at this section’s end. This scene blends the imagining of performance-
rituals of refusal with evocations of the myth of Kapil Muni, through the action of a woman 
about to be burned on the pyre of her dead husband – the ritual of sati – taking her sacrifice 
into her own hands and leaping into the ocean, and being carried to sea on the back of 
dolphins.40 Of course, the notion of “auto-sacrifice” offers itself up to a huge array of 
metaphorical interpretations too – as, for instance, a figure for Kapil’s treatment of her own 
body and life as material for text and performance – but here the suggestion remains that the 
text itself is merely notes on an action or process which somehow supersedes it. 
At each moment, through these manoeuvres, Ban en Banlieue doubles on itself, towards a 
posited but unreachable referent, an absent centre which this actual book I’m reading can only 
note, yet of which it is the residue or end point. The work is built on this faltering claim to 
 
40 Sati is a practice whereby, in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s words “The Hindu widow ascends the pyre of the 
dead husband and immolates herself upon it. This is widow sacrifice” (Spivak, 1994, p. 93). An act of supposed 
self-immolation, a show of dedication, an act of sacrifice, which is also of course, a violence of being sacrificed. 
Spivak discusses this at length (see footnote 43). 
 Kapil re-tells a version of this re-worked Sati event multiple times throughout the text (Kapil, 2015, pp. 
10, 74, 79-82). In the initial instance in particular, it blends together the myth of Kapil Muni: “a woman who—
Ban-like—contorted [leaped] out of the sacrificial [bridal] fire and is [was] carried out to sea—the Bay of 
Bengal—on the backs of tiny pink dolphins. […] Kapil Muni—seated—opens his third-eye as she drifts past 
Sagar Island—and sends a beam of gold [rose] [blue] light to her” (2015, p. 10). 
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self-externality. This split is firstly towards another un-written work in language, “a novel of 
Ban written [from 2010 to 2014] in the contemporary tradition of Indian writing in English, 
itself [abandoned]” (Kapil, 2015, p. 12). This is the work referred to as “Ban” in the first 
section, the novel that these notes fail to be, and yet memorialise and outlive. The text is also 
split towards its performance actions – those listed in the ‘contents’, the act transcribed in ‘[13 
Errors for Ban]’, and the acts of lying down which blend the fictionalised narrative of Ban the 
protagonist and the generative performance-acts of Bhanu her writer. These actions then are 
internal to the text, written here in front of me, and external in the posited actual event of their 
occurrence. 
This supplementary, referential quality, alongside the emphasis on “errors”, failures and 
absences in the writing, suggests an absence or insufficiency at the heart of the text. In a move 
which exemplifies my sense of how that absence is conceptualised, Kapil’s contribution to the 
AWP panel in ‘[13 Errors]’ opens with a performance action: “Nude Page for Ban: ‘Would 
you, or someone else you know, smear this page with soot from a car’s diesel pipe or dirt 
from the asphalt? And let this, this dirty page, be the page that I submit?’” (2015, p. 19). 
Kapil here wishes to replace the presentation of a conventional paper, the reading of a text, 
with a performance which visually represents the emptiness or insufficiency of writing, whilst 
at the same time aesthetically defacing and transgressing the space where text could be. The 
content of this absence is placed somewhere in the gaps created by the dual split, between the 
text that is, and the possibility of a text that might be, and between text and performance. 
The account of another of the performances listed in the ‘Contents’ section becomes key for 
me in further understanding this construction of an absent content, that which the text splits 
itself apart towards, but always inevitably fails to reach. This account begins: “At the last 
moment, it seems unbearable to read my actual writing aloud”. Instead of reading, Kapil gives 
an “improvised performance”, in which she asks three women of colour to stand to her left, 
and eleven white men to her right, and then invites the men to strike her partially naked body 
(2015, p. 17). Later, in ’13 Errors’, Kapil writes: “when the opportunity came to present my 
work at a literary event, I was mortified at the thought of reading Ban”; this is followed by 
another performance in which Kapil strips, climbs inside a red bag, or “meat sack”, and 
convulses her body in “a gesture-posture set for Ban” (2015, p. 24). 
In both cases, the performances emerge from a strong affective resistance to reading the work 
aloud: it is “unbearable”, Kapil is “mortified”. She expresses here a revulsion at the work, as 
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if, in the atmosphere of absence, failure, insufficiency, Kapil feels that her work can never act 
as she wishes it to, that something of the exchange between work and reader is deeply 
unsatisfying. The central insufficiency of Ban becomes implicitly a failure of writing in 
general, which is also the affect of its failure. This in turn suggests that what the work fails to 
transmit might itself be affective, the subtlety of feeling and experience at its centre. Into this 
space, into the impossibility of the existence of a text that would not feel this way, steps the 
non-verbal, bodily actions of performance. As well as giving an anecdotal – still textual – 
account of this move, the substitution of text is also made formally, through the inclusion of 
photographs throughout (just as artwork in Robertson’s 3 Summers non-verbally represents, 
contorts and combines elements which recur in the poems), with date and location, signalling 
that they depict and emerge from some of those same performance-actions. 
 
                  (Kapil, 2015, p. 26) 
I read this additionally through the explicit articulations throughout the text of a desire to 
reach towards kinds of affects and experiences which can’t be expressed and heard through 
coherent linguistic articulation: “I tried to trap the sounds made—sub-auditory—by Ban” 
(Kapil, 2015, p. 23); Kapil describes her obsession with the gestures in the novels of Kundera, 




because “They chart what remains undomesticated not as problems, but desires” (2015, p. 
69); “Approaching Ban as a pre-speech space: not linguistically, but in the sense of a body 
whose breath has been taken away” (2015, p. 89); “I was interested in vibration. I was 
interested in what happens when you don’t say anything at all” (2015, p. 99). 
That which is below the threshold of hearing, which happens outside of, before, or below 
speech, is conceived of here in terms of the eruptions of the acted-upon body. Its “breath”, 
from which it draws the capacity for speech, is taken away, as through an experience of 
shock, of a physical blow, or, metaphorically, through a structural silencing. These bodily 
eruptions are conveyed and received as a “vibration”, a signal received as sound and touch, 
rather than through the conveyance of pre-formed ideas in language. When this sense of what 
is felt in the body but below speech is added to the notion of “undomesticated desires”, it 
brings me back to the notion of infra-linguistic affect, to desires, pains, and the whole array of 
affective responses which speak of the bodily potential that can’t be contained by conceptual 
limits. Kapil expresses her desire to do poetic work that thinks directly about those infra-
linguistic bodily capacities which are hardest to express or contain in poetry, describing her 
performance contribution to the AWP panel as “at the limits of the poetic project—its 
capacity: for embodiment, for figuration, for what happens to bodies when we link them to the 
time of the event” (2015, p. 20).41 
The “notebook form” (Kapil, 2015, p. 92), the self-splitting function which defers and 
muddies the subject of the text, positing a central unwritten and unrealisable work of Ban, 
feels like the formal enacting of this desire, just as it also emerges from Kapil’s resistance to 
reciting that which is written. The work of Ban becomes the dialectical longing to write into 
the text that which could never possibly be coherently included in a work written here, as a 
book, as words on a page: the affective, aesthetic, bodily contents of performance which are 
least verbal, which overspill the containment of writing, and behind these, the affective-bodily 
contents of the experiences (of pain, violence, oppression) to which those performances refer. 
“What do they receive?” Kapil asks, of the protesters who watch one of her memorial rituals 
for Nirbhaya; “An image” she answers. And extending the question: “Which hormones does it 
produce?” (Kapil, 2015, p. 16). The delightful coincidence of language in which Kapil 
invokes a term – “hormones” – which has been so key to my reading of Robertson is perhaps 
 
41 You might notice in this use of “the event” another echo – perhaps incidental, but close nonetheless – of 
Massumi’s own language, as encountered in Chapter 3, for thinking about how affective possibilities and limits 
are inscribed or troubled in each interaction. 
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just that, a coincidence. Yet, bringing together “image” and “hormones” in the question of 
what spills out from a protest event which forms and precedes her book, Kapil similarly 
figures her writing as aiming to generate these kinds of aesthetic-bodily signals that move 
between individual and collective. 
We have a text, then, which is constitutionally built around a logic of unreachable content, a 
text which is aware of its own failure and insufficiency, a book which longs not to be a book, 
which longs to act as a kind of gesture, and which thinks of itself as embodied and gestural – 
which wishes to be a body, an image, an illegible mark. I take it as an implicit claim of Ban 
that these forms have a content which is more able to do the work of charting and disrupting 
the racist and patriarchal structural injustices at the book’s centre, to convey something of the 
infra-linguistic affective experiences, strains and instabilities produced by those structures, 
and push towards the imagination of new alternatives than the novel that this work isn’t. This 
maps on to the established link in this thesis between non-recuperable forms in writing and 
infra-linguistic experiences, as part of the mechanism through which poetry might gesture 
towards the fractures and hidden potentialities already existing within our experience of 
ideological subjectification. If the performances, like the photographs, are modes of non-
recuperable formal practice, their inclusion in the text, and its deferral of itself as its own 
notes, are strategies for the work to reach out of writing; they aim to include or reach towards 
the infra-linguistic, through linguistic means. 
The form of the work as ‘notes’, as it is posited to replace the unwritten more conventional 
novel, seems to buy into the analysis of ‘realist’, easily naturalizable, recuperable writing 
which I sketched out in Chapter 3. That is, the idea that a readily intelligible writing – even 
one which presents radical messaging or marginalised experiences – tends towards the 
reproduction of the conditions of those experiences, since they are also the preconditions of 
intelligibility. Yet, like Bonney at his most pessimistic, Ban also goes beyond those critiques 
by supposing that even the more experimental form of writing presented here is insufficient, 
or that its best possibility of working interestingly and disruptively is to include as a 
constitutive element an admittance of its own insufficiency. I read this emphasis on the failure 
of textual representation against the background of my thinking, after Althusser, on the failure 
of resistive action in general, and the tendency towards failure of any action or writing to do 
anything at all besides reproducing the conditions of its possibility. Kapil’s work, as with this 
whole thesis, begins from the admittance of failure. Only once that admission is made is it 
able to investigate the cracks and instabilities in this process of ideological reproduction, 
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pushing towards new relations and coherences through a failing, negative or non-recuperable 
representational relation to the actually existing but not-yet-coherent experiences which offer 
some resistance to that reproduction. 
 
Illegible subjects 
In order to understand the resistive work that these formal manoeuvres in Ban do, I need to 
examine in a little more detail its relationship to the work’s thematic treatment of experiences 
of violence and pain. In addition to the symbolic presence of the violence done to Nirbhaya 
and Blair Peach, Ban is full of examples of different kinds of overlapping violences from 
Ban’s own life. 
A member of the National Front youth league, in between urinating in his neighbours’ milk 
bottles, witnesses a man beating his wife, and responds by screaming “‘Go back home, you 
bleeding animal!’” (Kapil, 2015, p. 59), only able to see this gendered violence through the 
lens of his own violent perception, as an inherent racial animality. The longest narrative 
anecdote, in ‘Five fictions for Ban’, in which Ban and her friend Thippy spend a day escaping 
into the wet fields around their suburbs, ends with a return to the constants of underlying 
violence and abuse: 
We got into the car and in slow motion my father twisted from the chest up, from the 
driver’s seat, to hit my face so hard the side of my head hit the window. 
At this moment, I became Ban. When Thippy grew up, and his own father dragged 
him from the school disco at Villier’s High School, and beat him on his legs and back, 
he became a Sikh fundamentalist. What choice did he have? […] What I’ve left out is 
his brother, a boy I knew who also made me Ban. Not because he accompanied me; on 
the contrary, because he, too, made me weep. He wasn’t a boy. When we were eight, 
he was eighteen. (Kapil, 2015, p. 55) 
When the adult Kapil is “on the outskirts of Delhi” she writes: “I extend my life by trying to 
be a person in India. Here a person might BECOME not just through acts of descent or 
alliance […] but through the volume and scope of matter itself”. Yet, in the next paragraph, 
“driving through the forest at 4 a.m.” she passes a troop of BJP members – “the Hindu 
nationalist movement and party” – “on patrol”, carrying long sticks, on their way to a rally. 
“It’s time to go home” (Kapil, 2015, pp. 72-3).42 
 
42 The Bharatiya Janata Party – which has existed in its current form since 1980 – adheres to the ideology of 
Hindutva, a Hindu supremacism or nationalism, specifically in the context of the idea of the national identity of 
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Sikh, Hindu and British (white) nationalisms, partner and parental domestic violence, and 
sexual abuse overlap and intertwine here, and those who are on the receiving end of one kind 
of violence are shown to be capable of enacting another. There is an emphasis on painful 
“becoming” in these passages: “I became Ban”; the causal relationship between Thippy’s 
experience of violence and his fundamentalism; the undermining of a more restorative version 
of this concept in the last example with the interruption of grim political reality. This 
conceives of violence as inscribing itself on each subject, in a general atmosphere of pain in 
which the experiences of these different forms of violence perpetuate the ongoing enaction of 
the others. 
Moments such as those above, and particularly the long third section of ‘Five Fictions for 
Ban’ from which I’ve quoted, slip into a mode of fairly conventional, anecdotal story-telling 
which exists in tension with the other modes of the text, its fragmentation, self-notation and 
surrealism. Kapil writes in a final note that ‘Five Fictions for Ban’ was the first piece she 
wrote of this project, towards “the novel I wanted to write” (2015, p. 99). These anecdotal 
moments are the traces of the already-insufficient mode of telling. They provide concrete 
situations, a basis in the particular experiences of living in the world under certain conditions: 
growing up in the immigrant suburb, experiences of familial violence, the feeling of 
‘returning’ to an India itself riddled with racial violence. At the same time they are the points 
from which Kapil must extend outwards. Even in the telling, it is a constitutional element of 
Ban that we know that this mode has only a very limited capability for addressing the 
problems of which it tells, and that the text must attempt to reach into what it cannot represent 
of them, to make these stories more than just the reproduction of themselves. 
The notion of infra-linguistic experience comes into this most strongly when Kapil writes: 
I think often about low-levels of racism, the very parts of a social system or institution 
that are hard to address, precisely because they are non-verbal—a greater trigger for 
schizophrenia in immigrant populations: in women, that is, than larger events, the race 
riot, for example, with its capacity: to be analysed. (2015, p. 48) 
 
India as inherently linked to Hindu culture and values. The BJP won a landslide election in India in 2014, under 
the leadership of Narenda Modi, who has strong ties with other Hindu Nationalist groups, and as Chief Minister 
of Gujurat had been criticised for handling the 2002 Gujurat riots, in which hundreds of people, predominantly 
Muslims, were killed. Since 2014, the often violent persecution of Muslims in particular has escalated – and 
continued to do so significantly since the publication of Ban – such that in February 2020, for example, Delhi 




Ban en Banlieue is concerned with experiences wrought by racist and patriarchal structures, 
which also disrupt the possibility of fully hearing the voices of those who experience them. 
Yet Kapil in her turn disrupts the novel which might more conventionally tell these stories, 
with notes towards the infra-linguistic content of performance. The “non-verbal” is here a 
place of harm, as well as a source of the potential for positive articulation and imaginative 
work which diverges from our currently existing ideological conditions. It is a place also for 
the harm which is obscured, whose unnameable, naturalised presence is perpetuated by the 
boundaries of intelligible expressibility enforced by those conditions. These too must be 
brought into articulation, into the space where they can be shared, if we are to do the work of 
resistance, of imagining and enacting alternative conditions. 
Amy De’Ath writes of the above lines: 
This incompatibility with analysis seems a key characteristic of a racialised and 
gendered abject sphere. The non-verbal, as these lines imply, is a register that goes 
hand-in-hand not with the event, ‘the race riot, for example’, but with the perennial 
experiences of those forced to endure the bubbling quotidian mix of racism, 
Islamophobia, sexism and misogyny emanating from the emasculated poverty of the 
white dispossessed, deindustrialised social landscape. (De’Ath, 2016, para. 26) 
The reaching in Ban towards non-verbal contents, beyond positing an insufficiency, merges a 
raced and gendered critique of the cultural limits of intelligibility with a corresponding 
attempt to map out the positive presence of those elements of experience, both painful and 
hopeful, which are uncodified and uncontainable within currently intelligible language. In 
this, the ongoing conceptualising of the resistive potential of the infralinguistic in this thesis 
meets more familiar thinking about the ways certain marginal voices and experiences can be 
rendered outside of common comprehension, of being heard by the structures of 
understanding which privilege others – why women’s, immigrants’ and people of colour’s 
experiences might not be comprehensible to a white male hegemony that isn’t interested in 
understanding them.43 
 
43 This claim – that the constructed ‘we’ of Western bourgeois society renders only some voices and experiences 
within its frame of possible recognition, and silences others not just by refusing to listen but by constructing 
itself as unable to hear, rendering their voices unintelligible – seems commonplace to me, as loosely assimilated 
into the theoretical framework of e.g. the very online and mostly university-educated contemporary left. For a 
canonical account of this “epistemic violence” (Spivak, 1994, pp. 76, 78, 82, 90), we might look to e.g Gayatari 
Chakravorty Spivak’s ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’. Spivak discusses how imperialism, “the ideological 
construction of gender” (1994, p. 82) and the “international division of labour” (1994, p. 84) construct a Western 
knowledge, a Subject who can speak and be heard, and an Other, who is outside its knowledge, whose voice it is 
constitutionally unable to recognise, a “historically muted subject” (1994, p. 91), “people whose consciousness 
we cannot grasp” (1994, p. 84). This most particularly refers to the subaltern woman, but the critique also 




Poetry is the way we help give name to the nameless so it can be thought. 
(Audre Lorde, ‘Poetry is not a Luxury’, Your Silence Will Not Protect You, 
2017, p. 8) 
 ~ 
Fred Moten and Stefano Harney give an account of the relationship between what they term 
“legibility” (Moten & Harney, 2013, p. 80) or “communicability” (2013, p. 53), and the re-
production of white supremacy. 
They name contemporary capitalist and colonialist regulation as “governance”, which is 
“provoked by the communicability of unmanageable racial and sexual difference” (Moten & 
Harney, 2013, p. 53). In this account, reified and essentialising notions of the differences 
between racialised and gendered subjects – and their set places within the structures of racial 
capital, inevitably perpetuating gendered and racial violence and subjugation – are reproduced 
and enforced precisely by their communicability. This is intertwined with the “privatisation” 
of the social subject: “governance is a strategy for the privatization of social reproductive 
labor, a strategy provoked by this communicability” (2013, p. 53). Governance manages 
individuals’ wide and varying affective impulses, desires, wishes and needs – that which has 
the potential to be unmanageable – by rendering them up as “interests”, legible specifically to 
racial-capital, as voter or customer demographic. In doing so it buries all that is divergent and 
resistive, all that is incoherent to its structures of coherence, pushing each subject to 
understand themselves within already legible categories, desires, social functions. Any 
 
gender – “if you are poor, black and female you get it in three ways” (1994, p. 90). Spivak also uses the term 
“recognition by assimilation” (1994, p. 90), suggesting the way in which experiences and subjectivities can only 
be recognised by the degree to which they conform to the intelligibility of the dominant subject position. 
This essay ends with a lengthy discussion of the practice of ‘sati’ which also appears in Ban (see 
footnote 40). Spivak casts this as an example of the extreme voicelessness of the Hindu woman within 
imperialist knowledge. Between “the dialectically interlocking sentences that are constructible as ‘White men are 
saving brown women from brown men’ and ‘The women wanted to die’”, “one never encounters the testimony 
of the women's voice-consciousness” (1994, p. 94). Spivak offers an example of a purposive re-working of this 
framework, in the suicide of a young woman involved in the armed struggle for Indian independence. Perhaps 
Kapil’s reworking of the symbolism through the myth of Kapil Muni is another such re-working, which must, I 
think, be in direct conversation with Spivak. There is surely another essay to be written – by another writer than 
me, and one who is much more familiar with these cultural contexts – on the relation between the treatment of 
the practice in Spivak and Kapil. 
Another canonical space for working out the position on who can and can’t be heard might be in the 
writings of Audre Lorde, who writes, for example, about how within the narrowness of whiteness and patriarchy 
“women of colour become ‘other’, the outsider whose experience and tradition is too ‘alien’ to comprehend” 
(Lorde, 2017, p. 98).  
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marginal subject becomes legible (to the dominant centre) only on terms that perpetuate their 
marginalisation. 
 ~ 
Those who can represent themselves will also be those who re-present themselves as 
interests in one and the same move, collapsing the distinction. 
(Fred Moten & Stefano Harney, ‘Blackness and Governance’, The 
Undercommons, 2013, p. 56) 
 ~ 
Against legible representation, Moten and Harney propose an aesthetic of ‘blackness’. 
Blackness is described as an “anoriginary drive”, “whose fateful internal difference (as 
opposed to fatal flaw) is that it brings regulation into existence, into a history irregularly 
punctuated by transformations that drive imposes upon regulation” (Moten & Harney, 2013, 
p. 47). “Blackness”, as Moten and Harney figure it, is multiple: it is a category around which 
regulation is organised and enforced, but it is also a set of shared histories, identities, cultures, 
and experiences, including the shared experiences of oppression on which resistance might be 
founded.44 The aesthetic of blackness responds to the violence of being essentialised by a 
hostile hegemony by refusing comprehension on pre-given terms, pushing towards a kind of 
inclusive amorphousness and incomprehensibility. Blackness makes the “dispossessive 
assertion of an internal difference, complexity or syntax” (2013, p. 48); it is an assertion of 
heterogeneity which comes directly out of racialisation, an “anti-essentialist anti-racism” 
(2013, p. 49). This thinking proposes kinds of resistive representation which oppose the 
oppressive force of racial categorisation by rendering oneself illegible to those structures: 
“We owe it to each other […] to give the lie to our own determination. We owe each other the 
indeterminate” (2013, p. 20). 
In the pamphlet Threads, written collaboratively by Kapil, Sandeep Parmar and Nisha 
Ramayya, Parmar uses a passage from Ban en Banlieue as an epigraph or opening prompt for 
a discussion about the function of the white-coded lyric “I”, and structures of self-
representation in general, for writers of colour. This develops arguments made in Parmar’s 
‘Not A British Subject’ essay, which I have quoted previously. In a discussion which shares 
much with Moten and Harney’s arguments, Parmar argues that these available structures of 
 
44 This line of argument shares something of the structure of Denise Riley’s argument, discussed in the previous 
chapter, that the category of ‘women’ is both the basis and the object of feminist political resistance. 
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lyric representation alternately or in the same movement erase the experience of writers of 
colour and render them up in their most legible form. 
Within the white lyric “I”, Parmar finds herself “transformed into a curio of voice, an 
embodied other, an artefact vitrined alongside those with whom I shared a passing 
resemblance or common history”; yet, in “anti-lyric poetries” the poet is doomed “to not need 
to recognise oneself, to render oneself without a voice”. The latter is “only appealing or 
possible to those who have not been screened out, marginalised, silenced by the powers 
inherent in language itself” (Parmar, Kapil, & Ramayya, 2018, pp. 9-11). The negation of 
voice functionally naturalises the unmarked hegemonic voice, and in doing so silences the 
different perspectives and experiences of poets of colour (or those marginalised along any 
other lines). 
Parmar looks for alternatives to these poles as she experiences them between different white 
coded poetic traditions, between the readily recognisable realist forms which re-produce 
(white) stereotypical conceptions of marginalised experience, perpetuating the ideological 
structures of their marginalisation, and forms which acquiesce in the silencing that benefits 
those same structures. She turns to Rosi Braidotti’s concept of “nomadic subjectivity”, as a 
way to reach towards those marginal experiences in all their incomprehensible complexity: 
The point of nomadic subjectivity is to identify lines of flight, that is to say, a creative 
alternative space of becoming that would fall not between the mobile/immobile, the 
resident/the foreigner distinction, but within all these categories. The point is neither 
to dismiss nor to glorify the status of marginal, alien others, but to find a more 
accurate, complex location for a transformation of the very terms of their specification 
and of our political interaction. (Parmar, Kapil & Ramayya, 2018, p. 13, quoting 
Braidotti’s Nomadic Subjects) 
Parmar doesn’t directly discuss Ban in relation to this idea of “nomadic subjectivity”, but 
instead invites this passage and its ideas to be read alongside the Kapil quotation with which 
she begins: 
 ‘What is born in England but is never English?’ What grew a tail? What leaned over 
and rested its hands on its knees? An immigrant has a set of complex origins, is from 
elsewhere; the monster is made, on the other hand, from local mixtures of organic and 
inorganic materials […] I thought I was writing about an immigrant. I was writing 
about a monster. (Parmar, Kapil & Ramayya 2018, p. 9, quoting Kapil, 2015, p. 21) 
We can see Kapil sidestep “the resident/the foreigner distinction”, by turning from 
“immigrant” to “monster”. In the implicit connection between this passage, Braidotti and the 
discussion of the lyric “I”, Parmar points to the refusal of easily categorizable representation 
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in Ban en Banlieue, which can also be seen as a model of precisely the kind of racialised 
indeterminacy posited by Moten and Harney. Parmar goes on to describe the subjective logic 
of Kapil’s earlier work, Schizophrene, saying that Kapil “form[s] a subject that is […] 
marginal to national borders […] One that is unfinishing, that resists the violences of both 
coherence and negation” (2018, p. 27). 
A resistive refusal of legible subjectivity of this kind is built into Ban en Banlieue, and closely 
connected to its refusal and disruption of conventional narrative, and of text itself. Just as 
Ban’s story cannot be straight-forwardly told, but must gesture towards something else 
outside of the possibilities of textual telling, Ban herself is never simply a recognisable vision 
of a young British-Indian girl fixed at a particular point in history. Elsewhere as in the passage 
above, Ban is object, monster, or the material constituents of rituals or performances, affective 
relations and aesthetic contents: “she is a shape or bodily outline that’s familiar: yet 
inaccurate: to what the thing is” (Kapil, 2015, p. 20); “from one angle, Ban is slick, like the 
emerald or indigo tint of ring feathers. From another she is a kerosene patch set on fire” 
(2015, p. 36). Ban becomes the embodied contents of an aesthetic which might in some more 
than descriptive way make visible, and do serious thinking about, the violence of Kapil’s 
experience within an ambiguous British/immigrant identity. Kapil’s first-person writer-
narrator undergoes her own metamorphosis and monstering: watching a Ban who has now 
herself become (switched into the place of) an adult writer, in a café in India: 
But what is she writing? In my own way, from this wet perch, one foot chained to the 
cage, I am staring too. A parrot. A shabby, vivid bird, pecking at her words. In times 
of great freedom, when the writing comes, I fly back to my own writing with what she 
knows. This is another reason not to write novels. (Kapil, 2015, p. 45) 
Parmar writes, of the place of the “nomadic subject” against more reproductive structures of 
representation: 
certain poetic modes and traditions, their markets and readerships, essentialise through 
othering those poets who assimilate within and refuse to threaten fixed cultural 
hierarchies and borders. An alternate space of culture requires a rejection of culture 
that supersedes the complexity of the individual. (Parmar, Kapil & Ramayya, 2018, p. 
14) 
Kapil’s turn to the illegible, gestural, infra-linguistic, is a refusal to re-present herself (to use 
Moten and Harney’s term) – to codify the complex experiences of the text, as a stable 
otherness, assimilable by the reproductive force of its conditions. She responds to an already 
inscribed otherness, that which arises out of racial and gendered oppression, by purposively 
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turning it against dominant ideology, re-writing it as a defiant unknowability, refusing 
determination with indeterminacy. 
The shift from knowable other, to indefinable “monster” parallels the move from novel to 
performance-gesture; each posits the longed-for content of text and experience, that which it 
wishes to convey, as outside of pre-existing structures of linguistic representation. 
The formal muddying, the strategies of split and deferral, and positing of an unwritten content 
in Ban, are attempts to explore actual lived experiences of oppression and marginalisation 
without reifying categorical difference or reproducing oppressive frameworks, as might occur 
with their telling in conventionally recuperable terms. These strategies reach towards those 
aspects of experiences that are only articulable in ways which diverge from the general 
intelligibility of their available language, in service of a new articulation which is also an 
imaginative possibility of new and not-yet-legible subjectivity. In this way, the subject matter 
and formal procedures of Ban en Banlieue join together in the attempt to intervene in the 
dialectic between the violences of legibility and voicelessness. 
 ~ 
I think about a monster to think about an immigrant, but Ban is neither of these things. 
(Bhanu Kapil, ‘London (2)’, Ban en Banlieue, 2015, p. 78) 
 ~ 
In the rest of this chapter, I want to trace how this intervention takes the form of a reaching 
towards possibilities of identification, shared understandings, solidarities and subjective 
connections, as a positively illegible form of contact, or touch. The figuration of this contact 
is made possible by the on-going links I’ve identified in the text, between infra-linguistic 
affective-aesthetic contents, the raced and gendered body, and possibilities of understanding 
and connection which break through normative structures of representation and reproduction 
of marginalised and oppressed experiences. 
This argument will take me in sequence through a series of interconnected thematic areas of 
the text. Firstly, I consider the use of colour as an aesthetic signal, a medium for transmission 
at the level of the infra-linguistic. This conception meets the presence of colour as a social 
signal with regards to the surface of the raced body. This in turn brings me to the 
confrontation with the raced and gendered body in the text and its performances’ use of 
nudity. Finally, this interconnected argumentative thread culminates in the relationship 
between bodily touch, infralinguistic communication, and subjective identification. 
154 
 
Colour and the body 
One of the prominent ways the longing for contents which go beyond the representational and 
communicative possibilities of already-known language is met in the fabric of Ban en 
Banlieue’s written narratives and descriptions is through the use of colour. Colour exists in 
the text as a kind of non-recuperable aesthetic-affective content in itself, which works towards 
communication below the threshold of the infra-linguistic, an aesthetic content transmissible 
between figures but not recuperable in language.  
In the early reference to Kapil Muni, the mythical figure sends “a beam of gold [rose] [blue] 
light” to the “Ban-like” “sacrificial [bridal]” figure as she escapes her death and is carried out 
to sea; Kapil writes “I wanted Ban to receive the energy too, simultaneously, here” (2015, p. 
10). Talking in ‘[13 Errors]’ of childhood trips to the Tate to see “the golden ink and peacock 
green or blue embellishments” of Blake’s illuminated manuscripts, Kapil writes: 
The error here is that I chose to write my book in a place where these colors and 
memories are not readily available. There is no bank. Instead I scream them—I scream 
the colors each to each—and this is difficult. (2015, p. 23) 
Later: “Ban fulfils the first criterium of monstrosity simply by degrading: by emitting bars of 
light from her teeth and nails” (2015, p. 28). 
When Kapil describes a scene, “along the river” in India, in which “women are gathering raw 
silk and cotton in coils of dripping colour” (2015, p. 79), it pulls a thread of recollection 
through the “long red tail” which trails from a sheet in Kapil’s AWP performance in ‘[13 
Errors]’ (2015, p. 19), and the “milky, lilac effluent” which “spools” from a factory into the 
Grand Union canal near Ban’s home (2015, p. 30). The scene is followed by another, casting 
back in memory, which pulls too on this thread: 
I am born in England on a summer’s day, girls with ribbons in their hair trailing an 
even paler red light from their bodies as they gallop past on the street below. I count 
their cells. Each cell gives off a tiny bit of light. (Kapil, 2015, p. 79) 
Kapil writes, just before this, and just after the river scene above: “This is the day that wires 
me to color” (2015, p. 79).  
As I read the vivid and ever-present colours of Ban en Banlieue – as they light up scenes, 
travel to, from, between bodies – I think of the work which Robertson does with colour, in the 
Office for Soft Architecture, where the coloured surface offers a feeling interaction between 
object and body, a moment where indeterminate, unstable and uncontainable affective 
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experience leaks out into the world, that it might be figured anew. I think too, of Robertson’s 
general figuration of the aesthetic-affective content of feminine decoration; also of Sean 
Bonney’s idea of “harmony”, as a kind of musical vibration, an aesthetic-affective 
transmission of energy, a sub-threshold communication. 
Colour enters the text as a mythical restorative “energy”, as a beam of light sent intentionally 
to a woman symbolically escaping patriarchal violence; the “here” in which Ban might also 
“receive the energy” is then the here of the text, in what I take as an early expression of the 
desire to do restorative and resistive work with aesthetic-affective contents or signals. As the 
colours are later expressed as screams, they strongly suggest a relation to affective 
experiences such as pain which exist below the threshold of coherent linguistic articulation – 
that which takes its expression in the non- or pre-verbal form of a scream. 
Further, the colours here are not only received by the perceiving body, but also emanate from 
it – in a manner which is highly compatible with Robertson’s thinking, about colour as a kind 
of affective exchange, and about the bodily nature of the aesthetic-affective. As the coloured 
surface is the surface of the body – the cells and teeth emanating light – it is precisely the 
body which becomes the site of aesthetic-affective encounter, just as it is in the images or 
performance gestures that centre Kapil’s own exposed body. We can see this representation of 
the body as meeting point between the affective and the aesthetic, conceived, as in Robertson, 
as embodied contents, where its sensations creep into the conception of what might happen in 
the language of the text, as in: “when my nervous system hurts, so does the sentence” (Kapil, 
2015, p. 61), or “the bodywork language of imprint, fingertips, notochord, the watercolour 
map of the animal body” (2015, p. 87). Colour as an exchange of energy becomes a way to 
represent the longed-for non-recuperable content of Kapil’s performances, the possibilities of 
inter-personal transmission – or communication, thinking of that term’s development after 
Bonney – of something which is felt in the body but currently below the threshold of coherent 
linguistic articulation. 
This last quotation brings into the text the presence of Kapil’s own interest and practice in 
bodywork. It comes from a passage in the ‘End-notes’ in which Kapil writes that 
“conversations on embryology and cranio-sacral bodywork” lead to the idea which runs 
through the book that “Ban’s twitches and subtle movements were a form of discharge, an 
activity of the nervous system” (Kapil, 2015, p. 87). Kapil elsewhere describes the particular 
forms which she practices as “an integrative bodywork focussing on soft tissue dysfunction 
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and injury,” which has some relation to the practice of Rolfing, a technique invented by Ida 
Rolf that involves manipulating the fascia or connective tissue, “but I also include 
Ayurvedic/energy work too” (Donovan, 2010, p. 60, quoting personal correspondence with 
Kapil). As I read references to colour and energy through a theoretical and poetic framework, 
as figures or combinative concepts for kinds of signals, affects, aesthetics and communicative 
relations, this suggests that there is also a more direct and literal sense of these terms for 
Kapil, in terms of understandings of colour, energy and the body which come directly from 
her engagement with these alternative therapeutic practices. In these practices – themselves 
potentially antagonistic with ‘Western medicine’ and the determinations of the empiricist 
rationalism which underpins it – colour is really seen to work directly and literally with the 
body. 
In a discussion of one of Kapil’s previous works, Humanimal, Thom Donovan connects 
Kapil’s bodywork practice with the idea of the monstrous and non-conforming body. That 
book, like much of Kapil’s prior work, presages Ban’s use of the monster, focussing around 
the true story of Kamala and Amala, two girls found living with wolves in Bengal in 1920. 
Donovan suggests that “at the heart of this work is an admission of guilt”, in the connection 
between the doctors who attempted to brutally “normalize” the bodies of the two girls, and 
her own bodywork practice, signified partly by the use of an Ida Rolf quotation as epigraph to 
Humanimal (Donovan, 2011, para. 68). Underlying this guilt, Donovan argues, are the 
questions: “Who gets to put the ‘monstrous’ body ‘back together’? Who says what or who is 
monstrous? How do metaphors of the inhuman or liminally human affect how we encounter 
the human-animal other?” (Donovan, 2011, para. 68). Before Ban, colour and the body are 
already intertwined for Kapil in troubled questions of healing and normativity. 
As these concerns carry across into Ban, the relationship suggested between Ban’s 
“monstrosity” and the light which comes from her body further posits that the non-
recuperable aesthetic content of colour makes an essential link between experiences of 
identity-based violence and the resistive work of transmitting what is least recognisable in 
those experiences. As well as the engagement with Kapil’s Indian familial background 
through the implicit presence of Ayurvedic beliefs, the coloured surface of the body and the 
social content transmitted from that surface can never not be about race. The colour of the 
body is part of the race marker, through which an individual is marked as other, and around 
which much of their oppression is constructed. Kapil explicitly flags this, whilst bringing it 
into the field of language where colour is also a kind of aesthetic transmission, and energy 
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sent between bodies. Ban is described as “a woman (girl) so black she radiates a limited 
consciousness” (Kapil, 2015, p. 34). Later: “Is Ban a “black” person, using a mode of address 
she would not dare to in the United Kingdom? Is Ban black? Though now she is black. And 
flecked with silver” (2015, p. 56). 
The social-political gesture of solidarity of identifying as black at this point in time, becomes 
also a transmission of energy, between already raced bodies. Ban’s racial identity and 
experience, or the shared perception between people who are othered and oppressed by 
perceptions and structures of race, is also cast in the text as a kind of aesthetic content. That 
is, the colour which emanates from her skin is not only a social marker, but is also a kind of 
beautiful and ineffable monstrosity, the content of which spills out of the conceptual limits of 
the language available to it within a racist society, whether that’s the explicit insult or the 
categorical and ideologically reproductive structures of representation. 
The particular conception of the body – shown to be always gendered as well as raced – 
within this developing notion of aesthetic-affective exchange represented by the use of colour 
in the text can be seen in its use of nudity, and most often the nude body of Kapil herself, 
made visible as that of a woman of colour specifically. This is seen first in the early 
performances, in which, instead of reading her work, Kapil strips down, and has the audience 
witness her as a receiver of bodily violence. The first of these is prefaced with: “To strip 
down, partially, because nudity, to be effective, to be frightening, should be that” (Kapil, 
2015, p. 17). The effect of the nudity and the wish for it to be “frightening” leads into the 
performance of explicitly racial and gendered violence, the staging of blows to Kapil’s body, 
from white male audience members only. The performance in ‘[13 Errors]’ explicitly flags the 
wish for nudity to in some way address the reality of these endemic kinds of violence: one of 
the earlier ‘errors’ is simply “How nudity functions in the work” (2015, p. 21); after the 
performance of stripping down, and symbolic violence inside the “meat sack”, Kapil writes 
“The error of performance was not that I did these things—but rather—that the discharge of 
something long held—in the body—does not—affect—or modulate—the resurgence—of a 
latent—and vehement (British) Far Right” (2015, p. 24). In these performances, the exposure 
of Kapil’s nude body is a confrontation with the audience, both bringing forth and attempting, 
falteringly, to intervene in the real and latent violence of its racial and gender markers. This 
same confrontation is enacted with the audience of the book itself, through the arresting cover 
image of a naked woman lying on the ground. 
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This function of nudity, as an aspect of performance, comes up hard against the relationship 
between colour and race, and the unavoidable presence of the mark of otherness on the 
exposed body of the person of colour in a social setting within a racist society – a signal sent 
unbidden and unwanted: 
Days you never see, chucking back Bombay Sapphire gin on the patio. Define patio. 
You could be naked out back and no one would see. Nobody. Where the two vowels 
ooze geneticity. Or display it. Just as the body without clothes is analogous to a race 
mark. I asked my nine-year-old son why he wore his T-shirt to the outdoor pool. He 
said: “Mom, I think there might be some racists here.” I want to tell him: “Honey. 
Honey…” (Kapil, 2015, p. 44). 
“Bombay Sapphire” here contains an unremarked suggestion of the residue of British 
colonialism in India, flattened as it has been by capitalist brand-management to a de-
politicised symbol of minor indulgence. The passage then recalls all of the previous instances 
of nudity in performance, through the removal of performance and reception in the private 
comfort of the patio, before re-asserting the potential violence of being watched. The private 
space of being unseen contrasts with the entire public realm, in which – as the young child 
heartbreakingly comes to realise – the raced body is always seen, and seen as raced. “The 
body without clothes is analogous to a race mark” provides a very explicit key for reading all 
of Kapil’s uses of nudity throughout the text. The nude body here is not exactly made to 
contain everything in this scene, or that which spins around it – the history of colonialism, the 
scarcity of private bodily comfort, the heartbreak of the son coming into the realisation of 
racist interpellation. Rather, the book claims, the nude body already contains all of these 
different and conflicting elements. It is from this that the performance and image of the raced 
nude body derives some of its important infra-linguistic content. 
The nude female body in Kapil also always contains the traces of sexual violence. The image 
of Nirbhaya, and the implicit backdrop of endemic sexual violence, is present in every act of 
lying down in the book. Further, the description of her body “gutted with a steel pipe” in that 
first performance note (Kapil, 2015, p. 16) is more directly echoed, for instance when Ban is 
described as “a vaginal opening […] a blob of meat on the sidewalk” (2015, p. 20). The 
violence of the body as meat ambiguously meets the function of nudity in performance when 
Kapil writes “I wanted to write a book on a butcher’s table in New Delhi […] Swinging from 
that hook in the window, I wanted to write a book. Inverted, corrupted, exposed to view” 
(2015, p. 42). The writer’s body, its exposure in writing and in the performances adjacent to 
this writing are here made violent. Sexual nudity intersects with the violence of racism when 
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Kapil writes “I don’t want to have sex ever again in my life. | I don’t want it if it means 
partnering with a white man” (2015, p. 45). 
The nude body, of the performer, is then a key meeting point between an exploration of 
sexual violence, violence enacted upon raced bodies, and the capacity of the arresting image, 
the non-verbal, bodily performance, to create sensational shifts. Kapil writes: “The form is the 
body—in the most generic way I could possibly use that word. The nude body spills color. 
Blue nude, green nude […] I should stop writing now” (2015, p. 41). Nudity acts as a way to 
move through the limits of language, to attenuate the power of performance and colour as 
evocative for the audience member, onlooker or reader – particularly in the nudity of the body 
of a woman of colour – as confrontational, accusatory even, to white and male audiences. 
In the connection between the aesthetic transmission of colour, and the acts of non-verbal 
performance which strain against the failures of writing, is a dialectical conception of bodily 
content. The body is a site of oppression, of ideological control and prefiguration, and 
simultaneously the seat of those affective responses to prefiguration which, partly because 
infra-linguistic and uncodified, most speak of the felt resistance to and instability of that 
prefiguration. Kapil’s performance, her conception of colour, of nudity, of their signalling 
properties, is partly then about re-conceptualising the possibilities of these signals which arise 
from points of pain and imposition, and harnessing that in the real lived experiences of people 
of colour which push at the unstable edges of the ideologically available conceptions of those 
experiences. 
 
Touch as resistance 
Reaching and touching as the beginning actions, re-organized in time as desire. 
(Bhanu Kapil, Humanimal: a project for future children, 2009, p. 64) 
 ~ 
Through the body, this affective-aesthetic transmission becomes a kind of contact 
materialised as touch. Immediately after the incident with the member of the National Front 
youth league, an anecdote which condenses much of the everyday violence of the book’s 
primary setting, Kapil writes: 
To reach the point at which: “life rubs up against matter, its inner core.” And thus to 
analyse nudity, in a text, as friction, the sacrifice gone wrong: but also: to normalize 
contact with membranes of all kinds—plants, brush, nettles, ivy, asphalt, skin. What is 
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the function of a non-genital nudity in a work of narrative? How can the body perform 
something in a new way—something that belongs neither to the scene nor to history? 
(2015, p. 59)  
This idea of “contact” between different subjects, with each other and the world, conceived as 
“membranes”, brings together the web of concepts developing in my reading of Ban – the 
non-recuperable formal contents of the text, of its use of performance, colour and the body. 
The transmission of affective-aesthetic signals, bodily gestures, beams of light, becomes also 
the possibility of forms of identification, or recognition (thinking about the concept of non-
reified recognition that I developed in my reading of Bonney), which are bodily, as kinds of 
touching. The (raced) (gendered) nude body is a threshold, meeting violence and oppression 
with confrontation (with the white/male reader/viewer), but also with positive contact – in the 
sense of reaching out, identifying with, sharing that which cannot be marked out and mastered 
from a hostile outside. In this sense, the question “how can the body perform something in a 
new way” becomes a question of bodies in general, asking how the poem can sketch out 
resistive forms of contact which let each body perform newly, together, in monstrosity; a 
question of collective transformation. 
This always politicised notion of identification and touch is already at the heart of the central 
figure of the text. Amy De’ath writes of the lying down in Ban: 
It is a powerful gesture of solidarity with the horizontal figures of racialised dead 
women, with Blair Peach, with the child known as Ban, and with all those who bear 
the weight of (to quote another pointed metaphor) ‘the strength of the British Pound’. 
(De’Ath, 2016, para. 17) 
When Kapil first lies down, she puts herself in the place – literally – of Nirbhaya; when Ban 
lies down, she does so similarly at the site of Peach’s death. Through the multiple 
performances, memories and fictionalisations of acts of lying down, Ban and Kapil reach 
across time, text, and the distance of fiction placed between them, to put themselves in one 
another’s place, to lie next to each other. In doing this, there is an attempt to make a political 
and symbolic act from what is shared between them, from the experiences of violence, of 
gendered and racial oppression which link these acts and figures. 
This identification is conceived specifically in terms of touch, or the transmission of energy 
between bodies. Within the account of colour – of the women gathering silk, and the memory 
of light-emitting girls – about to leave India to return to the US, Kapil writes: “It is the last 
day I knew you in the time that we touched” (2015, p. 79). The “you” here, touched through 
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the acts of performance, writing and thinking in these spaces, is Ban, but also, perhaps, 
Nirbhaya. 
Yet this is precisely not a kind of identification which requires the identified-with figure to be 
known and understood, to be assimilated into a stable understanding of oneself. It is instead a 
non-reified recognition of some of the infra-linguistic contents of those experiences, through 
the signals of performance, of colour, through that which is felt and experienced in the body 
but which writing cannot hold. At the very end of the work, this idea of a bodily identification 
is strongly articulated as part of the drive of the work: 
This is why I write: to unfold the electrical mat of my nervous system. The nerves are 
all blue, red and yellow with flaring nodes. This is my cyborg text. It is planar. It is a 
substitute for other forms of speech, or intimacy. Glissant: ‘nonhistory.’ The 
boundaries of my work are ‘structurally weak’: Glissant. What weakened them? 
Violence. (Kapil, 2015, p. 108) 
In this passage from the ‘Butcher’s Block Appendix’, which the work claims was composed 
through a semi-random performance process, everything connects. The writing specifically 
aims to activate the tactile, sensate and colourful. It does so through a “cyborg” hybridity, of 
text and body, in an effort to open up what cannot be contained in more conventional writing, 
to mimic or create something like intimacy in this tactile writing, to be porous to those it 
touches, to let touching cross and alter the boundaries of body and work, as a response to 
experiences of violence. 
I find myself returning to an early passage of Ban, as a staged encounter which has become 
central for me in my understanding of how the work synthesises all of the elements I’ve 
connected in this chapter: the work’s folding of the connections between non-recuperable 
forms – fragmentary text, performance, colour – and infra-linguistic experiences – traumas, 
violences, desires – into the space of the raced and gendered body; the possibility, and also 
the necessity, for forms of transmission, of communication, which allow these experiences to 
be recognised in all their incomprehensibility, against the codifying and essentialising drive of 
racial, patriarchal capital. In ‘Ban en Banlieues (suburban)’: 
The country outside London, with its old parks and labyrinths of rhododendron and 
azalea. 
Futile and tropical pinks in a near-constant downpour of green, black and silver rain. 




A snake, aspen-colored, bright yellow with green stripes, slips through the bracken, its 
pink eyes open and black diamond-shaped irises blinking on then off. In frozen time, 
ancient beings emerge with the force of reptiles. In the forest, time and weather are so 
mixed up, a trope of bedtime stories, bottom-up processing, need. I need the snake to 
stop the news. This is the news: a girl’s body is dressed and set: still yet trembling, 
upon a rise in the forest. There are stars. Now it’s night. Time is coming on hard. The 
snake slips over her leg, her brown ankle. […] 
[…] 
An April snowfall, the ground still coppery, gold. A snake has escaped from time: a 
water box, a shelf. Volatile, starving, it senses a parallel self, the girl’s body emitting a 
solar heat, absorbed in the course of a lifetime but now discharging, pushing off. 
Without thought, below thought, it moves towards her through the rusted trees. (Kapil, 
2015, pp. 39-40) 
With the dense use of vibrant colour – both straight-forwardly descriptive but also more 
surreal with “like glitter” and “a light ice”, as in rain or snow, but also perhaps something like 
an ice made of light – literal description and narrative is adorned, decorated, becomes 
otherworldly, gesturing towards the signalling aesthetic content of colour uncontainable by 
language. 
This is the setting in which Ban lies down, in a re-telling of the more prosaic earlier comment:  
I grew up partly in Ruislip. The Park Woods that bounded it were rimmed, 
themselves, with landforms that kept in the boar. I used to go directly to those masses 
and lie down on them, subtly above a city but beneath the plate of leaves, in another 
world. (Kapil, 2015, p. 34) 
The scene is set as one partly of banal escapism then. Ban retreats to the quiet woods, perhaps 
from the pains and stresses of her everyday life and of her home, from the daily violence of 
the immigrant suburb, hiding, seeking respite in “another world”. Through the act of lying 
down, the scene reaches out as an emblem or symbol too, connecting this to all the other acts, 
to Peach, Nirbhaya, the riot. Where in the earlier, first person account this is Ban’s and/or 
Bhanu’s body, in this specific story, it becomes in the later account “a girl’s body”, “dressed 
and set”, a symbolic image which begins from the single story and expands outwards into 
more vast signifying and identificatory potentials. 
As Ban lies down, another monster figure, implicitly linked to those “ancient beings” “with 
the force of reptiles”, adorned with colour, comes into contact with “her brown ankle”. The 
use of colour here is not ephemeral or decorative but bodily, foregrounding the figuration of 
colour as an interface between different embodied, formal contents – the aestheticized and the 
race marker. This monster figure emerges, in the associative logic of the passage, from Ban’s 
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“need”, which is also the need of the passage’s “I” narrator, or of Kapil, in a telescoping 
between the small-scale, the everyday life of the girl Ban, and all else that “the news” might 
imply of the world and its catastrophes. The need is also “bottom up processing”, suggesting 
in the conjunction something of the deeply felt but inarticulable, a way of processing need and 
affect from the body, without rational oversight. 
Where the snake “senses a parallel self, the girl’s body emitting solar heat”, the transmissive 
effects of colour and gesture transpose to the snake’s ability to sense heat over distance, as a 
transmission of energy more concretely of and between physical bodies. In this exchange of 
energies the two figures are visible to one another, as parallel selves, in commonality, 
recognition, and the faint possibility of mutual comfort. Whilst the action of symbols – such 
as the lying down which hazily connects Ban, Bhanu, Nirbhaya, Blair Peach – is a kind of 
action of identification across distance, here the identification becomes a form of touch, where 
the formal or embodied nature of colour and symbol as a transmission of content meets the 
actual exchange of energies and affects between bodies, in sensing or touching. Operating 
“without thought, below thought”, the snake becomes a metaphor for all these forms of 
knowledge or content exchange which engage with the brutalities and strains of the text – 
around racist and gendered violence – at the level of the infra-linguistic. 
The snake can’t stop the news – as the text cannot propose concrete solutions to its pain – but 
it meets the expression of that need. It is this which the text offers: the possibility of making 
contact, in a more disruptive, but also more intimate way than the conditions of language 
allow; of touching one another with a kind of understanding which, because infra-linguistic, 
affective, formal, bodily, can respond to conditions of violence and pain without reproducing 
the structures of sense and representation that perpetuate it; a possibility of recognition, which 
nevertheless allows bodies to be more unknowable, less fixed. 
The intervention is ultimately at the level of subject to subject. This is true of the way the text 
conceives of the connections built or reached for between Kapil as writer-performer and Ban, 
Peach, Nirbhaya, or the witnesses to her many performances, but it is also true of the way the 
text conceives of its relationship to its reader. It is littered with various forms of address to the 
reader, ranging from commands to perform some action, as if in an identificatory mimicry of 
its own performance-actions – “Invert yourself above a ditch” (Kapil, 2015, p. 28) – to wishes 
for an intimacy of interaction: “If you were here, I would make you some mint tea and turn 
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out the sofa for a little bed. Here you are. There it is” (2015, p. 13). Kapil directly addresses 
the readers of her blog: 
I was writing for you. You know the truth. You know that putting Ban in this form is 
like wearing a three piece suit in the hot springs. I wish I had the courage to let the 
blog be my book instead. (2015, p. 95) 
She also writes one section as though it were an email to a friend: “I did not know how to 
scan in the page and send it to you […] The page, as you will see, is empty” (Kapil, 2015, p. 
50). This recalls the “Nude Page for Ban”, covered in soot, from ‘[13 Errors]’, as this email 
section goes on: “could I ask you, or someone else you know, who does not mind getting 
dirty, to take some charcoal or soot and, casually, smudge the page” (2015, p. 50). 
This cross-reference specifically highlights an element which is present in all these examples: 
the consistent desire in the text for an operation which is somehow non- or extra-textual, to 
reach towards the contents of performances, colour, and the experiences of the body, meets a 
desire for the text to relate to its reader with a greater immediacy and intimacy than the 
boundaries of textual separation allow, to reach through the time and space between writing 
and reading, and touch each reader. The reader is implored as part of the text to step outside 
of it, to imagine, or to really enact, the text’s own disruptions of textuality, to engage the text 
with their own performing body. 
Towards the end of the book, this wish to reach towards the reader directly is folded back 
towards the function of colour as a transmission between figures, as a form of infra-linguistic, 
non-recuperable contact: “I transmit this light: to you. Can you feel it? I am sending it right 
now!!!!” (Kapil, 2015, p. 100). 
This is the gift, and also the demand, which Ban en Banlieue gives to, and makes of, its 
readers. It negotiates the paradoxical problem of using the written word to push towards 
conditions other than those reproduced in and by comprehensible language, by making the 
figuration of that which is outside the text a constitutional element of the text itself. It brings 
together a structural commitment to disruption of and reaching beyond its own capacities – its 
de-centred self-insufficiency, its inclusion of paratext, of photograph, of performance-gesture 
– with stagings of infra-linguistic affective-aesthetic encounters, at the level of colour, of the 
body, of touch. These are interconnected ways of positing the presence and possibility of 
embodied meanings and experiences which run counter to and have the capacity to disrupt the 
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reproduction of conditions as they are, and the pains those conditions cause. They are also 
modes for moving towards actively creating encounters of that kind in and through this text. 
As was implored in Robertson, and will be developed further in the thinking about 
Mendelssohn’s work in the next chapter, the work makes a gesture which starts from 
individual survival, coping, experience, and moves outwards towards re-assessing a general 
sociality. It aims to posit, represent and create moments of inter-subjective communication or 
transmission beyond that which can be transmitted in language, firstly of the individual pains 
of being reproduced by and within violent structures, and then reaching out – in a combined 
critique of the reproductive function of legibility in language and the legible representation of 
our own selves and experiences – to a possibility of being, illegibly, together. Ban en 
Banlieue responds to structures of oppression by reaching out towards an illegible shared-ness 
(primarily as women and people of colour talking to one another) – contact as shimmering, 
shifting surfaces, bodies coming up against one another – as exemplary mechanisms for 
communal coping and reckoning with the action of pain upon the self, in the hope that the 
attempt allows that self to be differently, to survive and flourish more fully, and in some small 
way send waves out into the world. 
 ~ 
the gift, a color healing so radical it extends to a future self 







Chapter 7: The works of Anna Mendelssohn 
wanting to write undetected by lasers, exposed by lasers, the floodlit pitch. one more 
sweep over the Cities 
 hugging das kapital in burton-on-trent I have to congratulate the wrong answer, but 
there must be an explanation 
 […] 
 a sentient being who sensed antagonism from more serious-faced dissenters whose  
conversational exchange 
 was more cognisant of its own creation although i would not resist the general 
direction 
but really knew it was better for me to be flying off in another direction away from  
their miserable 
groundings in what i only knew too well, that life for the majority of people is more or 
less hell 
(Grace Lake/Anna Mendelssohn, ‘the fourteenth flight’, viola tricolor, 1993, 
unpaginated [pp. 20-22]) 
 ~ 
Anna Mendelssohn was born in Stockport in 1948, and died in 2009. The great bulk of her 
poetry was written and published relatively late in her life, from the mid-1980s, after she 
moved to Cambridge, where she remained for the rest of her life. Though she had a prolific 
output of poetry, short fiction, drama and visual art, a great deal of this work is unpublished, 
uncollected, or out of print.45 Her major – and most readily available – publications are three 
pamphlets published by Equipage in Cambridge, under the name Grace Lake – viola tricolor 
(1993), Bernache Nonnette (1995), and Tondo Aquatique (1997) – one full collection, 
Implacable Art (Folio/Equipage, 2000), the first of her works published under the name Anna 
Mendelssohn, and a later pamphlet, py (Oystercatcher Press, 2009). 
Mendelssohn’s poetic and other artistic work sits in the shadow, however, of an earlier 
notoriety. In 1971 she was arrested in connection with a series of bombings carried out by a 
loose group called The Angry Brigade. She stood trial in 1972 as one of the ‘Stoke 
Newington 8’, in what was until fairly recently the longest criminal trial in British history, 
was found guilty, and served five years in prison. Mendelssohn always protested that she had 
had no involvement in the bombings, though she was sympathetic with the politics of those 
who carried them out. Following her release, Mendelssohn retreated entirely from political 
activism, turning instead towards renewed study, care for her children, and towards art and 
poetry. Yet it remains very difficult not to see in the work traces of these events and the 
 
45 All of this material, along with extensive collections of notebooks and letters, is held in the Anna Mendelssohn 
Archive, at the University of Sussex. 
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retreat from them – though they are never explicitly mentioned – and I find myself reading 
her work partly through the knowledge of these facts. 
~ 
What is to be done? heard Vladimir and somewhere Krupskaya was calling him 
Vladimir. The baby’s nappy needs changing, for this—were meine kinder deposited in 
the neo-liberal police force […] The Celts don’t love Judaism & they stamp down 
hard on a little child’s love for his mother. But listen, this will drive you crazy. I don’t 
talk to the police except never 
  (Anna Mendelssohn, ‘[basalt. basalt.]’, Implacable Art, 2000, p. 71) 
 ~ 
Mendelssohn’s poems show a familiarity with activist politics and organising, and with the 
history of radical struggle, implying or making reference to revolutionary work, military 
conflicts (there are for example multiple references to the Spanish Civil War, which 
Mendelssohn’s father fought in46), industrial and labour struggle, situations of domestic 
labour often starkly demonstrating gendered inequalities therein, and explicit condemnations 
of racism, in particular anti-Semitism, suggesting Mendelssohn’s own Jewish heritage. By a 
similar token, the poems often mention, with great disdain, a wide array of authority figures, 
and those involved in the state apparatuses of power: the police and judiciary foremost, but 
also often artistic and academic elites. Other recurrent areas include familial conflict, 
implications of domestic abuse, the relationships between mother and child, children in 
general, and their removal from mothers, as well as not infrequent passages of lyrical pastoral 
imagery. Much of this chapter will be dedicated to looking in more detail at the ways some of 
these different concepts, events and experiences are deployed, and drawing out some of the 
interconnections between them across the poems. 
There is a strong implicit relationship between the wider matters of Mendelssohn’s poems and 
her own subjective experience, taking in both her family history, and her specific experience 
of political activism, and incarceration. For further biographical context I would add a second 
legal battle, which culminated in Mendelssohn – then a single mother of three, attempting to 
complete a Cambridge degree, through poverty and ill-health – having her children removed 
from her care, and never subsequently returned (Crangle, 2018, p. 472). I mention this not 
because I wish to treat such biographical details as having too strong an explanatory force 
 
46 For some account of these and other biographical contexts to Mendelssohn’s work, see Crangle, 2018. This 
particular piece of information, p. 467. 
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over the poems, or to read them as stable and unambiguous referents, but rather to point to the 
strong presence of a lyric subjectivity with close relation to Mendelssohn’s own. 
~ 
eyelash once eleven jonquil cibachromed en route 
washington vacuous quay point sizzling palermo 
messages visited square bank ochre charged by bolt 
magnet, curtsey, falling out, back room rat: 
white sliced delivery, spanish cake shop windows, 
tiled frames fused infantry, grille, behind a face 
a ransacked library, daubings, bricked out. 
(Grace Lake/Anna Mendelssohn, ‘concilia’, Bernache Nonette, 1995, 
unpaginated [p. 14]) 
 ~ 
The subject matters and subjectivity of these poems come to their readers obliquely, in a body 
of work which is highly fragmentary. In a short essay introducing Mendelssohn’s work, 
published in the Poetry Project Newsletter, Sean Bonney gives a general description: 
It is chaotic, at times manic and compulsive, by turns mocking and playful, hurt and 
exasperated, and always exceptionally confrontational and political. At times the 
poems seem to begin and end almost arbitrarily, as if the reader has walked into a 
room midway through a conversation. They change direction rapidly: thoughts trail off 
and morph into associative play, from which a bewildering irruption of direct, and 
often accusatory speech, may appear—and just as quickly disappear back below the 
porous surface of the poem. (Bonney, 2011b, p. 17) 
The opening of ‘Concilia’, quoted above, shows some of Mendelssohn’s most obviously 
fractured language. A-syntactic strings of words, including obscure or specialist language, 
build up a collage of sound, suggested images, actions, places, moments of sardonic speech, 
and the faint possibility of some occasion which holds them together. But, as Bonney 
suggests, the poems don’t persist in any particular mode for long, but will push off in new 
directions and forms without obvious prompt or warning. The following untitled poem, for 
instance, shows a different mode of fragmentation: 
 light on water, beneath shadow 
 unrecognizably rolling despisal 
 befriend writing relinquish 
 a close brush unseen my friends 
 spend my money on earth 
 to throw at the memory 
 of births in times recently past 
 they write nothing to an imaginary word 
 being unknown to me I leave myself 
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for my friends have destroyed creation 
by latching on to derision 
unopened books lie in communities 
waiting for jokes where it never mattered 
as long as the match met a dry day 
that I was smashed by a fist 
when these colour bouts over symbols 
for nature, accident, vilheula– 
cease to be portents of modest improvements 
the bridge in the world of vision 
involving my early amazement 
I shall not prove and neither shall I be proven 
that where we play unembossed by close métier 
remains awash in arcades of high spring light (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 27)  
At the level of tone this poem is quite consistent in voicing a speaker who feels put upon, 
hurt, abused and betrayed. Yet the grammar is twisting, interrupted or multiple. The opening 
couplet begins as an almost parodically lyrical description, in “light on water, beneath shadow 
| unrecognizably rolling”; light and shadow skips across the moving surface with ineffable 
beauty. This is exploded with “despisal”, laying a doubled grammar over the imagistic 
opening with the generalised and disembodied menace of “unrecognizably rolling despisal”. 
The injunction “befriend writing” is addressed openly, to the reader or to the speaker herself, 
as a possible alternative to what she will “relinquish”: “a close brush” (with what? With the 
law? Or the paintbrush which she abandons for writing?); or the “friends” through which, in 
the possessive “my”, the speaker comes obliquely into view. “unseen” sits suggestively 
between brush and friends, linking them through a double grammar, as post- and pre-modifier 
of each phrase respectively, muddying the possibility of a clean grammatical break whereby 
“my friends | spend my money” begins a few lines of relatively clear accusatory description. 
The possible sense of refuge in “befriend writing” is over-written by strong echo in the 
“friends” who spend her money and “write nothing”. As with “unseen”, phrases such as “in 
times recently past” and “being unknown to me” reach out to the phrases that precede and 
follow them, to create clashing and overlapping syntaxes which yoke each phrase and 
moment together, suggesting conceptual or narrative connections that remain always elusive. 
And so on throughout the whole poem. 
Each moment presents clashes, over-lapping possibilities, re-writings, as a series of un-
makeable micro-decisions in reading. I find myself as a reader pulled in different directions in 
a fraught and uncertain reading experience. Lisa Jeschke describes how, at the Anna 
Mendelssohn symposium at the University of Sussex in 2017, 
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several speakers and attendees admitted to having experienced, and continuing to 
experience, extreme uncertainty with regard to how Mendelssohn’s work, so openly  
subversive of the academic study of poetry, might at all be approached. This moment 
of an openly-stated intellectual and ethical helplessness did not constitute a critical 
impasse, but bright, relieving clarification: suddenly it made sense to start talking, 
from within hell, no knowing-already assumed. (Gardner & Jeschke, 2017, p. 10) 
On the one hand, the dis-integral form of the poems, their recalcitrance to naturalisation, 
demands a high degree of openness to irresolvable uncertainties, to the suspension of 
intellectual understanding. Some of the clearest statements in the poems are on precisely this 
poetics, taking a very clear and stern position against over-hasty naturalisation, reading for 
easily extractible meaning, or a poetry which makes itself amenable to such reading. 
Yet, for me, the poems make other demands too, which make a reading that would dwell in 
willing bewilderment on the conflictual surface of interrupted significations difficult to 
maintain with any confidence. This begins in their tone, the sense of persecution and dejection 
which persists in the above poem through “derision”, “unopened books”, “jokes”, the speaker 
“smashed by a fist”. Mendelssohn’s poems are often highly painful; they suggest acutely 
painful experiences, but only through a series of glimpses, of scenes, events, claims, positions 
and perspectives, fragments of language and a tonal residue of the speaker’s pain, paranoia, 
and her feeling of being persecuted and harangued.47 The feeling of “helplessness” in 
responding to these poems is “ethical” too then, partly because these pains seem to demand an 
empathic response which is hard to reconcile with the abstracted or open reading that they 
also demand. Mendelssohn’s poems give an impression of coherence, relations and 
conceptual dependencies, around shared knowledge of disasters and persecutions occurring 
just out of shot, which always shift away, not quite seen. 
“I shall not prove and neither shall I be proven” speaks directly to this constellations of 
difficulties. It will later be key for me in a reading which connects attitudes towards poetics 
and the judiciary across Mendelssohn’s poems. But initially it is a bold but somewhat 
 
47 I have in this reading treated the fractured and disorienting/ed nature of these poems, as well as their almost 
paranoid sense of persecution, as primarily poetic strategies. These characteristics could, however, be read quite 
differently, as relating to the mental distress which might result from the traumatic experiences of 
Mendelssohn’s life. Letters between Mendelssohn and Douglas Oliver, as quoted by Joe Luna (Luna, 2019, pp. 
2-10) demonstrate many of these same properties. It’s absolutely not the place of a critic to speculate about 
Mendelssohn’s mental state, and I would not wish to pathologize the poet through the lens of her poems or 
letters (especially given a thematic interest in precisely this point in Mendelssohn’s work, in the pathologizing 
critic, to be discussed later in this chapter). As such I will continue to focus on the poetic effects of these 
properties, but at the same time I wish to acknowledge that abuse, persecution, trauma, have real, personal 
effects that go beyond the abstracted realm of their poetic traces, and that my sense of the ethical duty of the 




disconnected statement of defiance, in possible response to the abusers and false friends of the 
poem, but also to any reader who would attempt to grasp at implied underlying referents or 
occasions. More than just encouraging a suspension of naturalisation, this line berates its 
reader. This combination of an uncertainty of interpretive approach with the poems’ painful 
emotional landscape leaves me often pained, exhausted and disoriented. 
 
(Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 40 [pencil underlining my own]) 
Mendelssohn’s poetic works also fold in her visual art practice; renditions of her pen and ink 
drawings are scattered throughout Implacable Art, and used as cover illustrations on her 
pamphlets. Intricate, beautiful and abstract, these bring forward similar questions of 
interpretive difficulty. From typewritten poems, to poems rendered entirely in an almost 
unreadable handwriting, to drawings scattered with writing and then to those drawings with 




no writing at all, often loosely suggestive of forms such as faces, bodies, landscapes, there is a 
clear line of aesthetic continuity. This continuity again makes conflictual demands on the 
reader, suggesting at once that the poems be experienced as drawings – through looking, 
privileging the formal or aesthetic over the strictly semantic – whilst at once suggesting that 
the formal and aesthetic in the drawings might be ‘read’ as the poems, for depictional 
suggestion, for traces of the lyric subject and her experience. 
The ways that these initial problems of reading become a productive poetics in the poems is a 
key point of investigation for this chapter. One initial synthesis comes from Jordan Savage, 
who calls Mendelssohn’s work “anti-confessional life writing,” and claims that “the 
associative force of the poet’s lived experience is what can decisively bring its disparate 
elements together” (Savage, 2018, pp. 11-12). Savage describes how the poems accumulate 
perspective and position through this subjective grounding and through the persistent tone of 
their speaking voice:  
The poem does not relay a political narrative or stage a political argument, so much as 
it accumulates, turn by turn, a political orientation. The language all twists through the 
poet herself, so that whilst it is difficult to identify specific political claims that are not 
colourable or deniable, and whilst some of the language may be altogether 
incommunicative, the salient points recur often enough to dictate an overall political 
tendency for the poem. Given this accretive approach to meaning-making, the poem’s 
unifying form may be no more than the coexistence of every element of the verse in 
the speaker’s voice. (Savage, 2018, pp. 4-5) 
Bonney calls this collision of poetic tone and subjective perspective “attitude”, saying “the 
attitude of the poetry is consistently one of absolute contempt for bourgeois society and its 
domination by police reality” (Bonney, 2011b, p. 18). This tonal work allows the poems to 
convey political and personal perspectives emphatically, whilst absolutely resisting modes of 
recuperable ‘clarity’ more often associated with expressive-confessional writing, and yet 
perhaps coming closer to the actual disjointed unclarity of living in the world. 
 ~ 
where writing is supposed to 
be qualified, in any costume, greek, wings, hoofs confiscated, there simply is no idea 
of 
the nature of the (shut up) relationship (oh christ) with a heap of rough husbands. 
My poems are a heap of rough copies of other people’s rough husbands. 
  (Anna Mendelssohn, ‘Naturalia’, Implacable Art, 2000, p. 133) 
 ~  
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Describing some of the poetics which underlie his own work, but with an eye to the wider 
project of better delineating the principles and techniques common to his contemporaries in 
the Linguistically Innovative Poetry scenes of the UK in the 1990s, John Wilkinson describes 
“a principle of organisation which I call metastatic”. This principle gives a sense of the modes 
of organisation through which I will be reading Mendelssohn’s work: 
What gives the poems such coherence as they exhibit is not a metaphorical 
development, but a set of linked and transforming entities, which can be syntactical 
gestures, vowel and consonant patterning, imagistic or discursive modes. ‘Metastasis’ 
is a term in rhetoric, but my use derives from a brief experience of nursing in a cancer 
hospice, the way metastatic tumours echo about the body and these nodes define the 
shape of the body subjectively, through pain. Of course, the location of the primary 
tumour is outside the poem’s real; the poem develops around the metastatic nodes, and 
these gestures come to evoke its physical lineaments. The reticence of the primary 
helps guard against a reductive essentialism in approaching the poem, that it is about 
such-and-such—in fact, there will be a number of extrinsic primaries. (Wilkinson, 
2007, p. 154) 
I firstly take this as an extremely useful way for describing the formal workings of 
Mendelssohn’s poems. They resist any sense of “the primary”, of central conceit or thematics, 
and instead, across multiple poems, they repeatedly touch on similar thematic and linguistic 
areas, around the implicit absent centre of particular experiential events or not-quite-said 
social attitudes. In this way the implicit shape of ideas – political attitudes, poetics, etc – can 
be traced through these scattershot and uncertain poems. 
This also reflects the ways that the structure of my reading of Mendelssohn differs somewhat 
from the readings in the previous chapters. Rather than as a discrete encounter with a single 
text, taken as a relatively self-contained entity with its own structure and argument, it is an 
encounter with an oeuvre.48 I will connect a number of these “metastatic nodes”, through a 
laborious process of pattern-tracing, connection-building and speculative naturalisation, 
attempting in doing so to subjectively feel out the shape of the body which these multiply 
connected and diffuse nodes suggest or evoke. I trace not exactly the ‘argument’ or implicit 
positions of the poems, but something more like the premises which allow them to begin, the 
world from which they emerge, and into which the reader is inducted, conditioned by the 
gradual familiarisation to a set of recurrent links, seen through the process of strain through 
all the poems’ indeterminacy, excess and misdirection. This is also a question of their poetics, 
 
48 I am not, of course, reading the whole of Mendelssohn’s oeuvre. I am taking instead a partially representative 
sample from her most prolific period of publication, between 1993 and 2000, which takes in 
the three most readily available pamphlets and one collection. These share a great deal in terms of form, style, 
tone, and concerns, as well as a relatively close period of publication. 
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the principles under which the work seems to operate, the effects that the work has on the 
reader, and what the work can teach us regarding the possibilities of a poetics of resistance. 
Though the work is from a slightly earlier period than the others under discussion in this 
thesis, it is an influential body of work that is only recently coming to see some scholarly 
attention, which I believe also reflects a renewal of interest among contemporary poets. 
Examples include Bonney’s introduction to Mendelssohn’s work from 2011, the symposium 
in 2017, and a number of articles appearing in the last several years, by, for example, Vicky 
Sparrow, Jordan Savage, Joe Luna and Sara Crangle. Fathomsun Press recently published an 
anthology of poetry and prose in response to Mendelssohn’s writing, and a special issue on 
her work, edited by Vicky Sparrow and Eleanor Careless, is forthcoming in the Journal of 
British and Irish Innovative Poetry. Mendelssohn’s is some of the poetry which comes closest 
to the unreachable notion of an actually non-recuperable language, and yet its intense 
subjective grounding and political commitment – albeit oblique, anti-programmatic, and full 
of scepticism – appeal, I believe, to certain prevalent sensibilities in contemporary radically 
intentioned poetics.49 Mendelssohn’s poems can therefore work as a kind of test of the poetics 
which I have been working out in the thesis so far. 
 ~ 
I can’t be Everywhere 
 ensuring that no harm is done. My poetry is not the harmful type. It stems 
 from the affections not their antithesis 
(Anna Mendelssohn, ‘My Chekhov’s Twilight World’, Implacable Art, 2000, 
p. 76) 
 
 ‘to any who want poems to give them answers’ 
One of the few reviews of Mendelssohn’s work around the time of its original publication is 
by Andrew Duncan, in the magazine Angel Exhaust. Duncan’s review of Bernache Nonnette 
shines important early attention on her work, provides valuable context and gives close 
attention to the forms of Mendelssohn’s writing, describing, for example, how she approaches 
her thematic material “only by periphrasis, substitution, fantasy, and camouflage”, and how 
critical discussion of her work risks “crumpling” it, as if “knocking nails in with my head” 
 
49 For a discussion of this context, see Chapter 3 
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(Duncan, 1998, para. 1-3) – observations which chime strongly with my sense of reading her 
work. 
There’s one particular critical move in his reading, however, which I see as somewhat 
inadequate in a way which is characteristic of some of the differences between common 
articulations of radical poetics prevalent at that point, and that which I am attempting to 
formulate in this thesis. Duncan writes: “At one level, BN and I think the whole of Lake’s 
poetic work, is a critique of the determinism of left-wing discourse […] Lake is a social poet, 
writing against something always being said” (Duncan, 1998, para. 5). Note the closeness 
here to the terms of Robert Sheppard’s distinction, after Levinas, between a poetry of 
“saying” and of the “said”, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, in which realist, clear 
language, or programmatic political statement, are seen as producing totalising and inflexible 
ideas of the world, or reproducing at a linguistic level the world as it is “already known”. A 
frequent response, as here, is to turn towards ambiguity, openness, collaborative reader 
completion, to destabilise current conceptions. I have discussed at some length my partial 
sympathy with this position, as well as my critiques of the limits of stopping short at a 
radically-conceived openness, and refusing the challenge to ‘say’, with much uncertainty and 
liability to failure, something of the better world we want from within all the mess of the one 
we have. I aim to demonstrate across this chapter why in this instance too, I think Duncan’s 
reading does Mendelssohn a disservice. He gives an easy answer to the disorienting 
experience of reading it, quickly naturalising the poems’ difficulties into a contradictory 
programme against the programmatic, and erasing some of the more pointed political 
positions and imaginative possibilities which accrue obliquely throughout the work. 
Somewhat paradoxically, some of Mendelssohn’s most clear and explicit lines expound the 
virtues of unknowing and obscurity in poetry, suggesting the ready possibility of a reading 
like Duncan’s. ‘A man who snatches a ring’ states bluntly “directions are not given in poetry” 
(Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 9); ‘to any who want poems to give them answers’ rephrases, “a 
poem is not going to give precise directions” (2000, p. 34). Yet to take such lines to represent 
a simple critique of “something always being said” treats these moments of comparative 
clarity as precisely the definitive thing they demand not to be, ignoring all that surrounds 
them. For example, to extend the first quotation: 
directions are not given in poetry one day caught 
 By crowded brains, apart from any who, concerning themselves 
 With satisfaction hold throbbing unconscious surfaces 
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To shore up their ever appealing inadequacies (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 9) 
The pithy phrase is immediately complicated by “one day caught”, suggesting a qualification 
about precisely the kind of poetry in which directions are not given. The initially declarative 
tone is deflated, and the sweeping claim recedes into a tortuous syntax that suggests 
something more particular about the kinds of bad readings and bad readers against which it 
addresses itself. The poem appears to satirise those “crowded brains” who would use their 
readings of poems as a vehicle for personal aggrandizement, at the expense of something 
more valuable and indefinable in those “throbbing unconscious surfaces”. Even this reading is 
disrupted by the interjection “apart from any who”, which suggests the “crowded brains” and 
those concerned with satisfaction are potentially different parties; a potential satire on, say, 
academic reading is present but not allowed to comfortably settle. 
This poem ends with a different sort of claim for poetry: “the exquisite birthday present: a 
poem of objects that live by magic” (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 9). ‘to any who want a poem to 
give them answers’ goes on: 
 you mustn’t touch the hiding places. 
 they address a different world 
 where trees are decorated with diamonds (2000, p. 34) 
These lines suggest a distinct aspect to the anti-programmatic sentiments of these poems. 
They suggest some other ineffable and aesthetic content of poetry, approached through 
oblique and slightly mystical images – bringing again the question of what the poems and the 
drawings have in common. This aesthetic content, this “different world” or alternative kind of 
poetry, is explicitly opposed to the kind of knowledge constituted by “answers” or 
“directions”. We’re back towards the territory mapped out in different ways in the previous 
three chapters, to the relationship between the aesthetic and the infra-linguistic.  
In the rest of this chapter I want to trace out in more detail the way Mendelssohn’s poetry 
deals with its own difficulty and the difficulty of understanding, ruthlessly critiquing the 
power relations involved in the terms on which we make the attempt to understand. In doing 
so, I claim, Mendelssohn’s work builds its own embedded radical and more propositional 
poetics, suggesting a kind of counter-knowledge which in turn entails something like an 





Against demanding explanations 
The reviling of reading for answers or directions, of bad naturalisation – the speaker always 
“waiting for the time when it would not offend | the demands for legibility, clarity” 
(Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 42) –  becomes across Mendelssohn’s work also a condemnation of 
the conventional reading of the academic and critical establishment, as already suggested 
above, and a rejection of the scrutiny of the repressive state, often in the same breath. Take 
‘Friday’: 
To distance myself 
 From hatred I have nothing to say to inquisitorial people 
 […] 
    really the law should not encroach 
 Upon poetry. It is a different voice that rakes embers for clues. 
 Poetry can be stripped. Racketeers compromise advantageously 
 Unracked by the objects of their disquieted attention 
 […] 
 And literature is lost, lost to the word work, lost to the temptation 
 Of gradgrind rectification and its concomitant collapse (2000, p. 31) 
“Inquisitorial people” initially chimes a similar note to those bad readers who might “want 
poems to give them answers”, but quickly follows the lead of another implication of 
“inquisitorial”, into a critic-as-cop metaphor, a reading “for clues”. This mode of reading is 
ruinous for poetry on an artistic level; it is dismissed as “gradgrind rectification” to which 
“literature is lost”. The “grad” in “gradgrind” implicitly frames the kinds of reading carried 
out by graduate students and the academics they become as overly rationalistic and 
disciplinary. But this reading is further ruinous because – as the proximity of “the law should 
not encroach | Upon poetry” to the account of inquisitorial reading suggests – it is a kind of 
enforcement enacted upon poetry. Those who would “rake” poems, the sound pattern 
suggests, might also be “racketeers”; the bad reading perpetuated by academic and critical 
institutions is seen as concomitant in its oppressive action upon poetry with the oppressive 
action of capital and the state. Similar lines of implicit connection crop up throughout 
Mendelssohn’s work. For example, in “my long flowing sentences | rapidly turned into 
sentencing full of legal acrimony” (Lake, 1993, unpaginated [p. 20]), the ready pun on 
“sentence” suggests a fear of detection and incarceration in and through her writing. 
Similarly, Mendelssohn defiantly states “I shall not prove and neither shall I be proven” 




The terms of this intertwined revulsion with inquisitorial reading and the actual inquisition of 
the police keep on expanding outwards. Take two examples:  
not wanting to be understood, crooned over, 
by a liege lord, from a district, speccy four eyes, 
his voice, cannot be the only voice (Lake, 1997, unpaginated [p. 10]) 
A man can demand explanations. 
 
A woman is accused of aggressive behaviour 
for querying motive[…] 
[…]one can be invited to live 
in a house & find oneself being used 
 
for servitude. And Interrogated (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 84). 
Being understood, demanding explanations – once again we’re in the field of language in 
which bad reading is associated with oppressive inquisitions, but here, the critic, the 
interrogator, is also creep and abuser. This inquisition, in reading and out of it, is cast as 
explicitly patriarchal, where being understood is also to be “crooned over”, as if under the 
diminuating advances of an unwanted wooer. The demand for explanations (of poetry) is 
exemplary of unequal gendered expectations of behaviour, where men are permitted or 
expected to be assertive, aggressive, demanding (over women) and women aren’t. As this 
slides into a sketch in which the unequal division of domestic labour has overtones of abuse, I 
am reminded that these demands can be modes of control: ‘where have you been?’, ‘who 
were you with?’. 
Again, this a pattern which recurs frequently, as in my first two examples of Mendelssohn’s 
self-stated poetics: the lines that immediately precede “directions are not given” are “A man 
who snatches a ring will always have snatched | the world of poetry” (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 
9); the “inquisitorial people” have a “detestation | of singularity in the female writer” (2000, p. 
31). In another example, “I don’t want my poetry to be mouthed. | I don’t want to be an 
executive.” (2000, p. 60) begins as if rejecting a speaking of the poetry at all, but might 
suggest other kinds of ‘mouthing’, such as slavering over – as in a caricature of patriarchal 
objectification – or else consumption, as food. In the slip from being mouthed to being an 
executive, there is the direct implication that a poetry which can be consumed, which gives 
itself up to a speaking and an examination that can own and master it, is a poetry which is 
complicit in the oppressive systems of capital. There is at the same time the more indirect 
implication – evoked despite the parallel grammars of these phrases –that a (male) executive 
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is precisely the kind of person who might do the mouthing. Into the web of condemnation and 
rejection at the centre of Mendelssohn’s poetics is folded the male gaze, as another kind of 
inquisitorial process, and the poems fear and guard against a figure who is at once critic, cop, 
executive and abuser. That which harms poet and poem, it thereby claims, is at the 
intersection of an institutionally sanctioned reading which reduces poems to their most readily 
recuperable answers, and the harm of a carceral, patriarchal capitalist state. 
The gendering of Mendelssohn’s persecuted and defiant poetics is extended through a 
recurrent association with the forceful separation of mother and child. This collocation occurs 
with most uncluttered brevity in ‘[the ribbon & white]’, which goes, almost in its entirety: 
I was told off for loving my own children. 
I didn’t think that they would have to be removed 
and that I would be spoken to as though I were 
pigswill. We are of different species. 
       I don’t incarcerate artists. (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 23) 
The biographical reading of this poem – which might connect Mendelssohn’s incarceration 
and the removal of her children through the repressive action of the capitalist state, both in its 
corporeal form, cops and social workers, and its structural form, as the poverty which strips 
away support systems – is clear, and deeply painful.50 But a pattern that connects these areas 
pervades the poems’ understanding of their own poetics also:  
there is no excuse 
 for approaching me on any matter 
 other than writing, on no other grounds. 
 no swiping my passport, having 
 swiped my childrens’. no knocking at 
 the door to demand flesh. (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 46) 
 really the police have nothing to do with poetry, nothing. and if 
the police would have something to do with Poetry then let them give up 
their jobs & forgo their privileges forever, and let their children 
never know what it is like to not have the normal methods of dispensation 
of judicial procedures fully accessible to them. (Lake, 1997, [p. 27]) 
life is hell on earth and 
 art has decided to subject us to its 
flaming will, even the power brokers 
 learning to swivel in office chairs 
 
50 Sara Crangle’s account of the events which led to the removal of Mendelssohn’s children from her care 
connects this both to the failure, ultimately, of Mendelssohn’s arguably revolutionary view that children should 
be cared for by their community, and also to the negative view which a family court takes of parents with a 
history of incarceration (Crangle, 2018, p. 472) 
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 forget that art is unplaced, is summoned. 
 our children are kidnapped by these 
 women in the service of conquering armies. (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 43) 
From what might be a rejection of an overly personal or biographical reading in this first 
example, or the by now concomitant rejection of the police’s imposition on poetry in the 
second, each slides into talking of the removal of children. In so doing, the social worker or 
family court judge is added to the rank of institutional figures who line up together against 
poem and poet, and against which the poems direct themselves. Once again, this is in close 
proximity to other interrelated apparatuses of enforcement and authority: border police 
“swiping my passport”, another potential cop figure who “demand[s] flesh” in a merging of 
carceral and sexual violence on the body, capitalist “power brokers | learning to swivel in 
office chairs”, “conquering armies”. 
One final element which is woven into this expansive range of related political and personal 
accusations levelled at those who would mis-understand or seek to overly rationalise 
Mendelssohn and her poetry, is the suggestion that lurking in the mindset and practice of their 
reading, looking, and interrogating is a racism, and often specifically an anti-semitism. As in 
the above, this too is closely linked always to the question of poetics, to the dismissal of 
certain reading practices. Racism is made directly concomitant with the sexism and carcerality 
of that reading, and seen as existing through a common logic and emerging from a common 
cause.  
This is seen with most consistent focus in ‘basalt’, which talks of “the Baudelairean’s 
determination to declassify the Jewess from the functioning economy in Academia and in the 
Arts” (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 71) (in addition to the lines already quoted above, “the Celts 
don’t love Judaism […]”). Then, in the final passages of the poem: 
I am alone here, the art school refused to acknowledge that painting could be flawed. 
This was another perverted tactic to exonerate filthy racism, to conform […] It is 
stupid to write for so many people whose positions of authority now desensitizes their 
use of language. It is true that the reactions of the radical authorities have confirmed 
their unwillingness to act promptly to stem the racist abuse. The Jew is the least 
protected. People simply start to speak in a mock-Jewish way. (2000, pp. 71-2) 
Academic and artistic establishments are here seen explicitly as racist and anti-semitic, 
specifically in relation to their insensitive and conformist uses of language, and stemming 
from their proximity to power. “Radical authorities” might also finger the closeness of 
experimental poetic traditions, with all their purported radicalism, to precisely the academic 
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settings which Mendelssohn so reviles. Another poem opens “Concentration camp styles” 
(Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 80). These recurrent areas are starkly brought together in ‘The 
arrested poem’, in which the obscured subject “has nothing to say in her own defence | to 
those who search for the final solution” (2000, p. 131). With “the final solution”, reading for 
answers is cast as fascistic, and the critic-cops who would destroy Mendelssohn’s poems and 
lock her up are now also Nazis, or at least acting in a manner which is consistent with the 
logic of fascism. In this way Mendelssohn’s own persecution is seen partly here through the 
lens of her Jewish background – referenced throughout the work, either through historical 
reference, as in “Nowhere short of Nuremberg nervy with stolen sources” (2000, p. 64), or in 
more familial terms, as in “I was the only female in my family, my immediate family, who 
could read the services from beginning to end in Hebrew” (2000, p. 76) – as if anti-semitism 
is one of its motivating factors.51 
‘on challenge’ suggests something of the conceptual connection that underlies these 
accusations by association. In amongst a general sneering against the implied hypocrisies of a 
poetic establishment, the political pretensions of “poets critical of consumerism” are offset 
against the claim that 
  our code of poetics works 
 as confusedly as a code of war 
 fought by people whose disparate reading lists 
 
 everywhere prevent freedom of speech, 
 of movement, of thought, of style. (Lake, 1993, [p. 28]) 
A stanza later: 
 & here are too many words which tend to order 
 the rights and wrongs of feeling sorry for someone or other 
 who turned out to be hidebound by racist and economic intelligence 
 theories (Lake, 1993, [p. 28]) 
Whilst a literal reading of this stanza’s syntactic structure puts the poetry whose ‘ordering’ of 
feelings it criticises at some distance from its racist, classist figure, I can’t help but read it as 
simultaneously suggesting that the poetry and its ordering function is also “hidebound” by 
such embedded ideas. Though it doesn’t reference the Holocaust directly, an implicit 
connection of “final solution” or “concentration camp styles” is more explicit here: that the 
 
51 Crangle describes the importance of the family’s Jewish heritage in Mendelssohn’s life: her parents had three 
trees planted in Israel for her first birthday, and Mendelssohn’s mother volunteered to help refugee Jewish 
children during World War II (Crangle, 2018, pp. 467-8) 
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violent habits of thought involved in treating a poem like a specimen, an artist like a criminal, 
or a woman like an object to be crooned over are related to “racist and economic intelligence 
theories”, to the historical place of bunk race science and eugenics in the academy 
(experiencing something of a revival at the moment).52 
 ~ 
  there is no intelligence 
 there’s an anti-fascism and an anti-semiticism and that is all. 
(Grace Lake/Anna Mendelssohn, ‘twelve to midnight’, viola tricolor, 1993, [p. 
9]) 
 ~ 
This web of recurrent interrelations is a kind of backdrop, a sense of the basic oppositional 
attitude of the poems, constructed in such a way as to suggest two parallel levels of 
connection which hold its objects together. They are firstly implicitly connected on the level 
of the intimately and contingently personal. Additionally, the way the poems relate their 
objects of fear and derision, not through any particular argument about their interrelation, but 
through long-built-up patterns of proximity and association – simply talking of these things in 
the same breaths, and in the same ways, over the body of the work – implicitly makes the 
claim that these different forms of enforcement are structurally related. That is, they are seen 
to have, at some level, the same kind of ideological and material underpinning, in terms of the 
relations they perpetuate and from which they arise. The critic-as-cop is always male, brutally 
extracting explanations from the poet and her work, reaching across her personal boundaries, 
demanding of her, impoverishing her, imprisoning her (though Mendelssohn’s poems 
elsewhere also recognise the ways women can be caught up in and perpetuate these 
patriarchal conditions and behaviours). 
 
52 It is difficult to give a comprehensive account of this, but for some examples, see: the London Conference on 
Intelligence, a conference on eugenics at University College London, organised by an honorary senior lecturer 
James Thomson for at least three years around the period 2015-2017 
(https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018/jan/10/ucl-to-investigate-secret-eugenics-conference-held-on-
campus); in 2019, well known author and evolutionary psychology Jordan Peterson, who believes, among other 
things, in the natural difference of intelligence levels between ethnic groups, was briefly offered a visiting 
fellowship at the University of Cambridge (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iF8F7tjmy_U, 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/mar/20/cambridge-university-rescinds-jordan-peterson-invitation); 
a paper, ‘Long Term Barriers to Economic Development’, by Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg, in the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, argues that the “intergenerational transmission of human traits” – 
loosely translated as an inherent cultural primitiveness – prevents certain technologies from spreading to less 




We can see also the ideas discussed earlier, of “attitude” from Bonney, and a subjective 
grounding as “anti-confessional life writing” in Savage, in action here. These events are built 
up around the locus of a particular speaking voice – from her moments of strain, anguish, 
trauma and persecution – which has a close relationship to the lived experiences of 
Mendelssohn herself. “Jewess” in the above quotation, in addition to the connotations of its 
historical usage, recalls Mendelssohn’s repeated use of “poetess” (e.g. Lake, 1996, [p. 13]; 
Lake, 1997, [p. 9]). The speaker of these poems, like Mendelssohn herself, is implicitly 
always a Jewish woman poet, who has been unjustly imprisoned, has endured much hardship, 
and has lost her children. The extreme specificity of this experiential basis, so insistently 
present, is not in contradiction with the implicit structural critique, but is the basis from which 
it emerges, and which makes it possible; the suggestion of a structural relation between the 
different kinds of oppression referred to in the poems becomes also the ongoing assertion that 
the experience of attack coming from these different avenues has certain shared qualities, that 
it feels like the same thing. 
Through my tracing of these connections then, it emerges that the critique of reading for 
answers is far more than simply a critique of “the said”, an espousal of indeterminacy as a 
kick-back against too certain or programmatic a politics, though it is partly that. Bad, 
“inquisitorial” reading, reading for understanding, the “gradgrind rectification” of institutional 
education, is tied up with a whole web of fear and condemnation, of the carceral state – in the 
form of cop, social worker, soldier, academic – of patriarchal power and abuse, of structural 
racism, and of the power and depredations of capital. The hegemonic and authoritarian 
thought structures found in this mode of reading also entail, the poems implicitly argue, all 
the abuse and carcerality that the poems condemn, through the continuation of their logics of 
reading which stretches even to the violent rationalism of the eugenicist. 
These poems form an unrelenting critique of the modes of thinking and being which underpin 
the social structure through which power and authority is enacted – and specifically, enacted 
upon the poet – under the current conditions of our being. The demand for the poet to be read 
well, or the construction of a poetry which absolutely refuses a reading of ready recuperation 
within pre-existing ideological frameworks, is also a demand for the poet, as a specific 
experiencing subject, to be allowed to live a life of peace and freedom. The preconditions of 
that life are alternative ways of thinking, more liberatory modes of thought, which would 
themselves entail nothing less than the complete dismantling of all of these interrelated 
ideological and material structures. I might then re-read the emblematic earlier claim, that the 
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poems “address a different world/where trees are decorated with diamonds” (Mendelssohn, 
2000, p. 34), as speaking of the intersection of their refusal of a poetics of easy and 
intelligible naturalisation, with their wide claims for what such a reading logic entails. The 
poems are set up as reaching for the opposite of that logic and its world. 
 
‘searching her feeling into intelligibility’ 
Against this backdrop – against all that exerts unjust force, and perpetuates conditions of 
violence and deprivation – I believe there is also a positive counter-poetics suggested across 
the body of Mendelssohn’s work, with specific properties which can be tentatively and 
speculative drawn out of it beyond – or alongside – all that the poems refuse. This extends the 
logic of the refusal of inquisitorial reading of poetry out into the realm of relations between 
individuals, as a kind of generous negativity, and as a set of relations which are radically 
opposite to all those condemned in the poems. 
In order to trace these poetics from Mendelssohn’s oblique poetry, I must first turn to one last 
refusal: if these poetics are not a poetry of answers, of that which can be extracted through 
inquisition and re-produced by and for the carceral capitalist state, they are also explicitly not 
the “horrible hideous concept || of knowledge” (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 94). The rejection of 
knowledge here offers a point of synthesis, for the structural relation which binds together the 
network of condemnation I have traced above, and for its close relationship to the 
experiential. 
I have already discussed at length how knowledge formed on the terms that are most readily 
recuperable under current conditions is also the form of already-known concepts which are 
made possible by, and primarily reproduce, those same conditions – the conditions of 
patriarchal and racist (etc) capital. I would further argue that the critique of institutional 
reading – the reading practices which emerge from and serve the intertwined institutions of 
the academy, the state, of capital and patriarchy, etc – is a critique of a gendered and raced 
rationalism. This sits alongside the arguments of my previous chapters, in which Robertson 
asks “show me something unknowable”, connecting the resistive force of aesthetic-affective 
thinking-feeling, of bodily and experiential knowledge, to a feminine gendering, against the 
relationship between masculine-gendered rationalism, patriarchy and capital; or Kapil turns to 
the illegible and the gestural, to resist the racialized & gendered violence of representing her 
experience as a pre-figured and knowable thing. 
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The rejection of knowledge, for all the poets in this thesis, becomes a rejection of the kind of 
emotionless, supposedly objective standards which obfuscate and reify dominant subject 
perspectives. It rejects the silencing or speaking over of women’s & other marginalised 
voices, the male violence it obfuscates and excuses, the creation and perpetuation of supposed 
racial differences (the eugenicist position being the extreme extension of the logic which 
would render all human subjective experience in rationalistic and quantifiable terms), 
exploitation of labour, and the brutality of the state. 
This recurring link between rationalistic, institutional enforcement on art or the (female) 
artist, policing, state violence, racism, and the removal of children, can be substantiated in all 
the material instances where some of these issues intersect: the Holocaust, most obviously, 
but also the increased likelihood of safeguarding issues and interventions where a parent has 
experience of mental health difficulties, trauma, abuse; the cases in which the forcible 
removal of indigenous children by occupying powers has been an act of colonial control and 
violence, in which education itself is a tool for cultural eradication – “kidnapped by 
conquering armies”. And so on. 
This rationalist knowledge – the bourgeois thinking which, as Keston Sutherland told us, 
would reduce the full and complicated experience of the world or of a text to abstract and 
digestible concepts – is akin to what Moten and Harney, in their essay ‘The University and 
the Undercommons’, describe as “enlightenment-type” thinking. They argue that this is the 
dominant thinking of the academy, as Mendelssohn would surely have agreed. They describe 
its harm:  
This enlightenment-type charade is utterly negligent in its critique, a negligence that 
disavows the possibility of a thought of an outside, a nonplace called the 
undercommons – the nonplace that must be thought outside to be sensed inside, from 
which the enlightenment-type charade has stolen everything for its game. (Moten & 
Harney, 2013, p. 39) 
In Moten and Harney’s account, the “enlightenment-type thinking” of racial capital encloses, 
privatises, professionalises and delimits any potentials of more varied, resistive, collective 
thinking-feeling. It turns any such variation into a shallow, denatured, easily recuperable 
version of itself, nothing more than a commodity which allows its thinker to become a more 
consummate (and better paid) academic professional. Such thought structures, and those who 
perpetuate them, work to rule out and render illegible and unthinkable any more disruptive 
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kinds of thought. In doing so they are recruited in the enforcement and perpetuation of violent 
ideological and material conditions. 
Another example of Mendelssohn’s treatment of knowledge begins to suggest an alternative 
figuration which might act more positively: “language collapsed on language | stark freedom 
knowledgeable stony silence” (2000, p. 21). “Knowledgeable” here is part of a noun phrase 
that doesn’t go anywhere, and it could just as well be a consequence or correlate of the 
freedom which precedes it, as it could be an opposite. Yet, with a collapsing language falling 
into both freedom and silence, I wonder if the poem doesn’t here suggest that freedom resides 
in a kind of silence, which is to say a kind of language collapsed in on itself, which doesn’t 
speak, and yet which can be seen as knowledgeable, if not conventionally so. Or else, the 
inverse, that knowledge, conventionally formulated, is silent, that the freedoms it affords are 
stark, that it is unable to offer the means for speaking. These readings don’t appear so 
different, in the end. Both can be read as suggesting something like the infralinguistic. They 
figure a dialectic of articulation and silence, whereby certain experiences which lie outside of 
the current framework for being articulated and comprehended can best be understood 
through modes which themselves gesture outside of our current frameworks of knowledge, 
comprehension and articulation.  
The refusal of knowledge then begins to open the way for alternative modes of 
communication. Speaking in Mendelssohn’s work is often more specifically, speaking of 
oneself, as in: “you don’t carry the same stigma, you can boast money | you don’t have the 
same experience” (2000, p. 96). This balance, of a scepticism for knowledge of a certain kind 
with a lauding of personal experience, can be seen again:  
Books don’t exactly. I don’t exactly. Aim. 
I don’t want to know what it is I am doing now exactly. Source of strength. 
A morphous lump. I should like to tell you this true story but I daren’t. (Lake, 1995, 
[p. 17]) 
Against the dismissal of knowledge, of answers, characteristically suggested in this first line, I 
wonder what it is to tell a “true story”, and why it’s difficult or scary. It is cast as something 
different to what might be aimed for with precision, to directions, or even self-knowledge; 
true, perhaps, in the act of telling, in relation to the subjective experience of the teller. 
Just as Bonney re-figures the concept of understanding, from a bourgeois form of reductive 
conceptual mastery to a way of thinking about solidarity across the non-reified or infra-
linguistic affective expressions of the pains of living under capital, Mendelssohn suggests a 
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kind of truth, or a knowledge, which is directly opposed to the objective, rationalist, 
authoritarian forms those concepts take within a dominant and dominating culture. She 
directly makes the demand, in opposition to the knowledge she rejects, to be believed: 
we prefer to be rather than not to be trusted to be believed 
that we listened to despair and could not leave it there, personally 
[…] 
the merciless and literate have advised me of what they are about to do. 
I hope they find me tasty. the sound beyond the periphery is incessant. 
I want to analyse it. we write of sensitivity and are reviled for it. (Lake, 1997, [p. 11]) 
The fairly explicit claim to the importance of being believed, of having one’s emotions 
recognised as valid and listened to, even if this may not be strictly speaking known or 
knowable, shifts into “the sound beyond the periphery”. This phrase might work as a 
metaphor for the attempt to put into writing those out of reach, indescribable emotions that are 
not quite knowledge, which is to say, a metaphor for the infra-linguistic, that which is present 
but can’t quite be heard. This notion of indescribable affective experience is evoked on the 
next page, in “the blue I dreamt is untranslatable” (Lake, 1995, [p. 12]). As earlier, that which 
is ineffable or cannot be described in present language is evoked through reference to 
aesthetic perception, as the aesthetic and affective has in this thesis been established as the 
same experiential register. 
This poem pits a notion of fitting words to experiences, of finding a space for those words to 
be believed and valued even as they are not “translatable” – not communicable on the terms 
of a false generality – directly against the bourgeois-realist forms of understanding, when the 
speaker asks: “How without the second world war | Can I possibly in the presence of 
relentless realism get it right” (Lake, 1995, [p. 12]). Taking as its backdrop the whole history 
of critiques of ‘realism’, as a primarily ideologically reproductive form of writing, realism 
here becomes also specifically an impediment to belief, to sensitivity, to an actual closer 
relationship to the specific and often not or not-yet comprehensible reality of subjective 
experience. Mendelssohn’s poems implicitly espouse what might be thought of as an anti-
realist affective sensitivity, which is able to be sensitive precisely for its distinctness from 
realist forms of recognition which deal in pre-reified categories of feeling. 
Being believed, bringing marginal, painful affective experience into intelligibility, is given a 
conciliatory, comforting, or restorative function three pages later: 
had I words I could confidently write 
& not be told that they were an excuse 
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I might find the time to warm into less fright (Lake, 1995, [p. 15]) 
‘half.’ lays out more explicitly the posited opposition between a framework of inquisitorial 
knowledge and the possibility of an intervention in that ideological framework of 
intelligibility which is based in infra-linguistic affective experience. 
First, the dismissal or diminishing of emotions by the drive to render all experience in the 
form of an abstract and mastering knowledge becomes a kind of academic, gendered 
pathologizing, with “hatred never helped me, emotions don’t, in the grip of literary 
psychoanalytical gynaecology” (Lake, 1993, [p. 12]). This is a process of demarcation which 
seems to take those emotions and their validity from her: “silly theory. Personal theory.” 
(1993, [p. 12]). This same link, between the pathologizing force of some practices of 
psychology – as a kind of rationalising of experiences of trauma, distress, and psychological 
variation – is suggested in ‘concilia’ with:  
descriptive psychology dents & is reinforced 
unglobed throat, fascistic debasement a la mode 
 grained in wheaten filings, securely modern ode. (Lake1995, [p. 14]) 
The accusation of fascistic poetic aesthetics implied by the rhyming couplet is prefaced with 
“descriptive psychology”, relating this fascistic poetics to an impositional, rationalising, 
compartmentalising way of viewing both the individual and the poem. ‘half.’ goes on to posit 
precisely what it is that is being dismissed or diminished by the literary critic-cum-
psychologists: “if what had been written had been a young woman’s searching her feeling | 
into intelligibility” (Lake, 1993, [p. 12]). Where there might be some apparent contradiction 
here, between the rejection in the poetry of an inquiry into the poet’s life and the value these 
lines appear to place on a writing based in intimate feeling, an important distinction can be 
made between the attitudes – and concomitant forms of writing and reading – taken towards 
the writer’s experience. On the one hand is a sense of the poet-subject as already-intelligible, 
her experience wrenched into oppressive pre-conceived frameworks, or else punished for 
detected deviations; on the other hand we see a kind of not-yet-intelligible writing which 
reaches more fully towards the specificity of her individual experience, and in doing so, 
attempts to alter the grounds of the intelligible. 
In keeping with my readings of Robertson and Kapil, Mendelssohn opposes a masculine-
gendered rationalism – and all its complicities in the ongoing perpetuation of racial capital – 
with a feminine-gendered knowledge which is based in belief, in lived experience, and in the 
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reality and resistive possibility of infra-linguistic affective experience. In Robertson’s 
‘Perspectors/Melancholia’, those most difficult and unstable affective experiences were the 
most acute source of subjective, and therefore political and ideological, instability. Across this 
thesis I’ve traced multiple articulations of how those difficult and painful experiences, caused 
by the conditions we resist but simultaneously not comprehensible within those conditions, 
are seen as points of resistance, as moments of instability in the ongoing process of 
ideological inscription. Mendelssohn pushes this to its hardest point, through the high degree 
of pain, of fear, of persecution and trauma which pervades these poems. 
In just the examples already given above, we’ve seen the poems’ speaker claiming (twice) 
that “life is hell”, bemoaning the loss of her children, fearful of the police, of fascists, of anti-
semites, of “rough husbands”. She has been inspected by “inquisitorial people”, “crooned 
over”, had explanations and flesh demanded of her, “accused of aggressive behaviour”, “used 
for servitude”, “interrogated”, “incarcerate[d]”, “mouthed”, tasted by “the merciless and 
literate”, her passport swiped, “reviled”. Her personal disputes, persecution, experience of 
loss and violence are all mixed in with state repression, and the violence of “conquering 
armies”. These kinds of references are scattered amongst Mendelssohn’s work, irrespective of 
the other ostensible subject matter of any given poem. Some of the most stark examples of 
this pain, trauma, and abuse have still not yet been mentioned here. For example, ‘twelve to 
midnight’, from which I have above drawn a single line relating to anti-semitism, mixes this 
thinking about familial experience of racism with a strong suggestion of more intimate abuse. 
Here are three of its six stanzas: 
 a quieter place which jolts a memory of being slapped, & lying under the bed 
 with a book. Tyranny is nothing to brag about. Victory seethes, bed springs make dull  
music. 
 
 as rivers flow by brown industrial landscapes a mattress fell over a fall. 
 they don’t know. there is no such thing as common intelligence. there is no 
intelligence. 
 there's an anti-fascism and an anti-semitism and that is all. anything 
 i did wrong was potentially anti semitic. anything. i could not speak. 
 treated as a walking joke. family lore. i grew consciously 
 
 stunted, seated on the bottom step whenever they called to visit us. 
 struggling home from school with stomach ache, reluctancy at its limit. No God. 
 Yes God. And never breathe ‘maybe’ because it presents a sexual possibility. 




The slap, the stomach ache – regular complaints of stomach aches are treated as warning signs 
by school safeguarding guidelines, as displacements of other types of distress – tyranny, bed 
springs, the second guessing of language, all strongly imply a fear of abuse, including sexual 
abuse. This is in amongst other forms of distress, as a familial outcast, but also as the victim 
of racist violence precisely because of the familial background from which she is outcast, as 
well as lines which tap into the wider exploration of discursive possibility, limit, violence – “i 
could not speak”, “I won’t talk”. It is on this basis of implied experience – as either victim or 
witness – of some serious abuse, that the poem also explores these other areas. Another poem, 
‘On Vanity’ begins, abrupt and horrifying: “When a poetess is raped she loses her interior 
life” (Lake, 1997, [p. 9]). Or ‘Abschied’ has the heart-breaking lines, implicitly spoken to a 
lost child: 
 By tonight I shall have lost you 
 because I cannot hold you 
 & be anything but abused (1997, [p. 28]) 
It is this speaking of the pain that arises out of the conditions of our existence, always rooted 
in the personal pain of the poet-speaker – but with an eye to the wider structures that create 
that pain – which is precisely the source of fracture and resistance to these conditions. 
Mendelssohn’s consistent focus on moments of trauma, abuse, personal marginalisation or 
oppression further opens out my theoretical question of how infra-linguistic affective 
experiences can work as sources of resistance, onto more practical considerations of believing 
the claims of marginalised and persecuted people about their own lived experience. As I have 
already quoted earlier in this chapter, “his voice, cannot be the only voice” (Lake, 1997, [p. 
10]). 
When followed through, this has much more direct and clear applications, from conviction 
rates for sexual assault to healthcare provision for disabled people, which are themselves 
necessarily radical structural challenges, to both the material and ideological hegemony of a 
relatively narrow set of people. As I also discussed in relation to Kapil, the more esoteric 
arguments about a radical challenge to the conceptual frameworks of intelligibility, and the 
prosaic but essential claim that marginalised perspectives must be heard and listened to, are 
not so far apart, really. If we are to truly hear one another in meaningful and liberatory ways, 
and to conceive of meaningful ways to do something about what we hear, then we must 
fracture and re-constitute the basic structures of our hearing. These poems argue for, and take 
as the basis of their poetics, an anti-realist or anti-rationalist expressivity then – an address to 
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the real experience of living in the world, of its pains under the current material and 
ideologically dominant structures, which is far more fractured and complex than that which 
could be captured within the intelligible language of those conditions. 
 ~ 
 It is a pity that you took my body seriously, for what fears were yours 
 I have raced around myself like a maypole in the act of self strangulation 
 what a twisted girl you were you might have sighed before you popped 
 me into the oven having broken me over your knee like a long french loaf. 
(Grace Lake/Anna Mendelssohn, ‘Ordered into Quarantine’, viola tricolor, 
1993, [p. 8]) 
 
 The strains of reading 
I have already discussed at the start of this chapter the way that the thematising of deeply 
unpleasant experiences combines in reading with the fragmentary and disorienting nature of 
these poems, and their sometime hostility to the reader. Long before any synthesis can take 
place, the experience of any given moment of reading Mendelssohn’s work is a combination 
of this undefined but emphatic affective register of the poems themselves, and the affective 
strain of reading them, a feeling that my framework for understanding isn’t sufficient for the 
space I’m in. My common feeling is one of identifying with and sharing the pain of 
Mendelssohn’s speaker whilst also being in an often antagonistic position with her, at once 
de-seated and disoriented, and also accused. In this de-centred space, with its anti-realist 
expressivity, I find not the naming of pain as such, but instead I take the poems as 
foregrounding something more like the response to pain, the cry, the eruption, the fear, which 
arises from moments of trauma, abuse, personal marginalisation and persecution. 
A line in Bernache Nonnette which states “I hated Mr Gaslight” (Lake, 1995, [p. 8]) suggests 
something of the relationship between the experience of reading these poems and their own 
affective-experiential content. This line refers to the Patrick Hamilton play Gaslight, or its 
more famous 1944 film adaptation starring Ingrid Bergman. It is from the behaviour of its 
male protagonist that the term “gaslighting” is derived. This term describes a form of 
psychological abuse whereby an abusive party attempts to destabilise their victim’s sense of 
reality, and their trust in their own memory and perception, through consistently contradicting 
or misdirecting them, claiming that what happened did not happen, or vice versa. This 
behaviour is one of the starkest intersections of patriarchal abuse and masculine rationalism 
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(though obviously not carried out exclusively by men). This line suggests both an actual 
experience of abuse for the speaker, and also hints at the ways we as readers are de-seated, 
uncertain that our understanding and perceptions are reliable in the space of reading. 
In this combination of the poems’ own affective base with the strained experience of reading  
– a sounding in concert which is itself a kind of empathetic mirroring – I’m pressed by their 
demand to be believed, to be felt with, just as strongly as their more explicit demands not to 
be interrogated or understood on interrogatory terms. It’s this combination which I take to be 
the cornerstone of their positive poetics. In a sense the two are the same demand: to meet the 
poems not with a mastering intellectual reading, that which they so consistently condemn, but 
to meet them instead with our affective sensibility, with an openness to feeling that which we 
cannot fully understand or explain – “no knowing-already assumed” (Gardner & Jeschke, 
2017, p. 10), as Lisa Jeschke put it. This combination of highly pressing and difficult affective 
content with formal fragmentation and resistance to reading itself makes the demand that I’ve 
found in the poems, for a kind of thinking which rejects certain forms of knowledge and is 
instead prepared to hear the felt experience of those who don’t have ownership over the 
dominant forms of coherence, of being heard. 
Bonney describes Mendelssohn’s poems in a way which – whilst most directly speaking of 
Bonney’s own poetics, with clear resonances of my reading in Chapter 4 – finds space also for 
their antagonism: 
a communication that only speaks to [the enemies] in order to deny their ability to 
read, and to refuse them a place within the poem […] the content of her refusal to 
communicate with her enemies is one that demands the possibility of communication, 
and of the reality of a community that can exist despite the accusations of its 
incomprehensibility and illegitimacy. (Bonney, 2011b, p. 19) 
I read the concert of affective and intellectual strain through my reading of the operation of 
understanding in Bonney’s work, where understanding was taken not as a term for the 
reduction of something to a pre-understood concept, but was a kind of recognition of non-
reified elements of experience, an understanding as solidarity. 
These poems are absolutely not the liberal call for recognition and understanding that asks 
only to be seen, and perhaps taken sympathy upon, by those in positions of power and 
dominance which they are unwilling to significantly trouble. I see Mendelssohn’s poems as 
resources for recognition, after the necessity of a common recognition and solidarity across 
extreme difficulty, which work to create a radical readership. They offer meeting points with 
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the currently-unintelligible, but only to those who would come to them as equals. To meet 
their demand, to recognise what we cannot articulate, to feel alongside them, to receive them 
as moments of solidarity for those who might recognise something in them – “searching 
[their] feeling into intelligibility” – we must feel their pain too, and we must recognise at the 
same time our involvement in the structures which perpetuate that pain. Only as we share with 
the poems the experience of battling through dislocation – as we are pained alongside and in 
sympathy with them – can we meet them with some attempt at sufficiency, finding an 
adequate, if not articulate, way to meet the cry of pain. Only then can we find a strength and 
solidarity in and through the real pain of living in the world as it is, which is also an affective 
understanding of the necessity of the destruction of all the intertwined mechanisms of 
authority, oppression and abuse which these poems condemn.  
This reading of the function of strain and difficulty in Mendelssohn’s work leaves out a more 
over-arching point – that the wide-ranging nature of their critique of the conditions of our 
living and the ideological habits of thought that underpin them absolutely necessitate that the 
poems be hard to comprehend from within those modes of thought. Just as I have claimed that 
any clearly recuperable language will primarily reproduce the conditions of its intelligibility, 
Mendelssohn’s radical critique of our conditions of relating and recognising one another as 
subjects must therefore necessitate a radically different structure of understanding, and a 
language which is likely to be very difficult for its readers under current conditions. 
Further, I might claim that the strains of these poems can be read as something akin to Riley’s 
affect of linguistic unease, but here taken to its most acute limit. Where in Riley, a sensation 
of unease arises from the experience of descriptive language – from the mis-match between 
its categorical claims and the distinctiveness of individual experience – in Mendelssohn’s 
work this unease becomes a real, acute pain. Being named, being read, being subject to 
inquisition as a poet or as a subject, being seen as something recognisable within the 
dominant, authoritarian, pathologizing terms available, is not only painful. It also has the 
potential for serious material consequences – to be incarcerated, to have one’s children 
removed, to be an object of abuse and disbelief. Mendelssohn’s poetry has, at its core, a deep 
and painfully felt resistance to all that language can name in the world as it currently is. 
In this work, then, an aesthetic of fracture, disruption, de-familiarisation, steps off from a 
poetic tradition which understands these aesthetics as formal mechanisms for a rejection of a 
‘realism’ in writing – here a shorthand for an intelligibility, recuperability, bad naturalisation, 
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etc, which passively reproduces its prior ideological conditions. This fractured, anti-realist 
aesthetic becomes also a rejection of a different kind of ‘realism’ – rationalist, inquisitional, 
verifiable knowledge whose terms are dictated by those in positions of dominance & 
domination, as a mode of control.  
 
Nurture and amorphousness 
It can be seen in all the above that the poetics of these poems is not just deeply rooted in a 
political and social thinking, but contains its own implicit politics, or perhaps – since the 
poems outright reject any recuperable programme – something like a tentative subjective 
ethics, in terms of beliefs and principles about the ways we ought to relate to one another as 
subjects. They wish also to do the work, in the processes of writing and reading, of bringing 
into being subjectivities capable of relating in those ways. One way in to more fully exploring 
this aspect of the poems – and the relationship that they conceptualise between their poetics 
and the hoped-for social relations which underlie them – is through their thematics of 
motherhood. In ‘digne’, Mendelssohn writes: 
  three babies. 
 i can’t teach moral behaviour. 
 i only see people behaving as though 
 other women’s children were up for 
  grabs. 
 carelessly. playing around with 
  trumped- 
 up charges. confusing teachers with 
 revellers in diamond snatching. (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 53) 
The combination of elements brought together here – the encroaching authority, ready to steal 
away children and falsely imprison, the possible implication of a corruption levelled at 
“teachers” which might be another jab at the academy – are by now familiar. But something 
happens a little differently with “i can’t teach moral behaviour”. This line, which fits in 
amongst the many lines reiterating versions of the position that poems won’t “give 
directions”, is stacked among references to children in such a way as to suggest that it is also 
making a claim about parenting specifically. The refusal of directions in poetry becomes also 
implicitly a related refusal to give her children directions, within the intelligible terms of the 
world in which they live, on how they might behave – a refusal of bourgeois morality when 
whole structures need to be overturned. Yet there is an ambiguous doubleness to the potential 
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tone of this line. Alongside the defiance of the above reading, I might detect a potential 
despondence, about the inability to comprehensively nurture values in her children, or live 
morally within the world as it is. Mendelssohn elsewhere writes “a mother writes this” (2000, 
p. 24). If I take this to suggest that the poet always writes also as a mother, and that nothing 
appears in these poems which couldn’t be sympathetically read through this lens, then “i can’t 
teach moral behaviour” becomes in this doubling of defiance and despondence less 
confrontational to its reader. In this reading, the line meets the refusal of teaching, or the 
acknowledgement of its difficulty, with a wish to nonetheless somehow perform this 
impossible act of poetic nurture. 
Any account of the possibility of this work must begin from its impossibility. I hear an echo 
in “a mother writes this” of the thinking in the “reproduction” pun which I identified in 
Robertson; that is to say, the anxiety to escape persecution and bad reading as a mother-poet, 
and the anxiety of being free and able to properly nurture one’s children, is also an anxiety of 
ideological reproduction. An earlier poem imagines a more direct relationship between the 
activities of nurturing children and of creating a readership, with: “I created a world of art for 
my children | to live in. But I am required to | Leave my world of art & Repent” 
(Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 13). All induction into collective understanding is both artificed and 
artificial – a project of collaborating with the world to create new subjects, and in turn to re-
create the world, through forms of representation and interpellation, to shape beliefs, actions, 
ideas and conceptual frameworks. In the final turn, however, the individual nurturer must 
acknowledge their lack of individual control over such understanding, as over the collective 
world, of material and ideological relations. The problems of complicity for the poet and 
parent are themselves similar, in the sense that, object as we may, we are inevitably doomed 
to mostly reproduce the conditions in which we live, but must retain some hopeful glimpses 
of an alternative future. 
‘digne’ opens out the question of the helplessness of the parent in the face of material, 
political, and ideological structures more explicitly as it goes on, asking: “Why were my own 
children plump | and Indian children not plump” (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 54). The poem is 
intimately aware of its pained and partially privileged position in a world which offers 
unequal access to the material necessities for a flourishing life for children, outside of the 
scope of their individual parents, and of the wish of other parents to nurture their children as 
much and more than its speaker is herself able to from within that position. 
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In this light, I might attempt a re-reading of “confusing teachers with | revellers in diamond 
snatching”. Where it might readily be taken as an indictment of academic or other educational 
authority figures for their implied complicity in capitalist and colonialist plunder – and this 
reading absolutely remains present – it might simultaneously suggest an opposite. The 
confused and confusing teacher might be the same reluctant “i" a few lines earlier, and the 
diamonds here recall the “world where trees are decorated with diamonds”, earlier presented 
as an explicit alternative to a poem which gives “precise directions”, positing instead a kind of 
ineffable aesthetic content. “diamond snatching” might not suggest plunder then, but a kind of 
aesthetically driven re-distribution. If poetry, especially in its most recuperable forms, is 
reproductive of the conditions of its emergence – if a poetry which can be “mouthed” 
becomes that of “an executive”, reproducing the structures of capital – then this image of the 
poet-mother “diamond snatching” becomes a way to imagine the necessary modes of radical 
re-nurture which could do something very different from what could be described as teaching, 
and in doing so could begin to create a different kind of subject-reader and militate towards a 
different kind of subjective relation. 
The method here – a kind of radical aesthetic and subjectively nurturing negativity – is also 
the aim. The value which Mendelssohn’s poetics place on not knowing – on a refusal of 
reproductive and violent reading practices and recuperable answers, in favour of an aesthetic 
of affective and experiential solidarity through struggle – can be mapped on to how she thinks 
about nurturing her children. Her longing to bring them (and implicitly, her readers also) 
towards a different kind of subjectivity through her acts of creativity, through her poetic 
nurturing, still refuses any kind of moralising or categorical stance. Instead, both turn towards 
uncertainty, as their own positive content – I might think again of my evocation much earlier 
in this thesis of Keats’ negative capability. I’ve already suggested that there is a direct 
relationship between the rejection of rationalist reading and a rejection of ways of 
understanding which are carceral, pathologizing, inquisitorial of the nature of the subject 
herself – what I have called ‘realism’ as a mode of control. I would therefore further suggest 
that these poems demand, and attempt to nurture, a kind of non-recuperable subject, one who 
refuses to look for these forms of knowledge, to demand answers of themselves or of others. 
Early in this thesis I suggested that I might talk about this relationship between 
Mendelssohn’s poetics and its subjective ethics in terms of an ambiguity of social relation. To 
conclude, I want to expand on what I mean by this, beginning from one moment where 
Mendelssohn almost articulates outright some of the qualities of her positive political poetics: 
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western art, is vastly 
 construed to be in opposition to personal papers 
 is scourged by obvious righteous power 
flipping over subject potential, reinforcing 
sadism, resenting comradeship, refusing 
co-ordinated collaboration, knowing that 
security unjustly has come to enshrine art, 
whereas diplomacy should continue to 
distinguish between security and art. (2000, p. 37) 
“Personal papers”, “subject potential”, “comradeship”, “co-ordinated collaboration” – these 
are some of the features of an art which is not also security, the features of an art which 
attempts to oppose the whole web of authority and oppression that Mendelssohn sets her work 
against, and to nurture the possibility of a radically different world. This is a kind of poetry 
which is more intimate, which doesn’t talk to the police, which is both sensitive in its use of 
language, and virulently rejects racism and authoritarianism, and which might have the 
capacity to develop a kind of linguistic sensitivity to the complicity in structures of power that 
it is so persistent in calling out. 
Mendelssohn’s poems push towards these values then, by modifying the rejection of the 
reproductive or deterministic force of ‘realist’ recuperable writing, which is familiar and 
inherent in the formal techniques of difficulty, de-familiarisation, openness and ambiguity in 
poetry. Not content to meet the unfreedom of the world with these resources only, her work 
challenges this too as a too easily given answer, and instead asks us to really live with all its 
difficulties, to believe and hear through it at the same time as we meet its challenge of a 
suspension of understanding, of a more radical form of negativity. 
In the link between a rejection of authoritarianism and a rejection of naturalisation, there is a 
rejection of what I might call the over-hasty naturalisation of the individual. That is, the 
inquisition, the pathologizing, the mode which reinforces reified categories of identity in 
oppressive ways, and which uses an understanding of what someone is – or what they are 
interpellated as within the dominant ideological conditions – to exercise power over them. 
Mendelssohn’s is an aesthetic that refuses the mechanisms whereby individuals can be 
dominated, whereby identities, intentions, and interiorities can be named from the outside, 
placed under scrutiny, have their ownership of themselves taken away – from gendered 
pathology, racism, and sexism, to the reduction of people to their economic function or their 
bodies, or the extraction of evidence towards incarceration. 
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Despite its anger, pain, protestation and refusal – specifically through its aesthetic, tonal, 
attitudinal integration of anger, pain, disorientation, refusal of recognisable forms of sense-
making, into its sweeping condemnation of the world as it currently makes sense of us – 
Mendelssohn’s work proposes the opposite of this painful, dominating rationality. It proposes 
a positive space where we might nurture forms of solidarity, recognition and belief which 
doesn’t require this use of objectifying, reductionist rationality; a set of relations which are 
much more hazy, more beautiful, where we might relate to one another as subjects formed by 
and in tension with our social circumstances always, in states of suspended confusion; where 
we might exist amorphously – “a morphous lump” one and all – and still cry out to one 
another, relate to elements of shared experience without the necessity for a strictly 





Chapter 8: Conclusion 
I began this thesis with a wish – for things to be different, and better, and to begin to lay out 
some of the ways in which contemporary innovative poetries can, and do, contribute towards 
that making-better. This becomes, in simple terms, the question: how can poetry resist? Re-
iterated more precisely, with an anxious understanding of ideological reproduction as a basic 
premise: how can poetry which finds its conditions materially and ideologically oppressive 
attempt to imagine – and contribute to the realisation of – alternative (better) realities through 
the language of those conditions? I feel compelled to return again to Robertson’s beautifully 
concise version of the general problem: “practice arises from conditions | yet these are the 
conditions we must change” (Robertson, 2016, p. 47). 
In this form, the specific question of how poetry can contribute towards resistance – how it 
can intervene in the process of ideological reproduction, to re-produce differently – is 
underpinned by the question of how resistance can occur at all, given the universality of 
ideology, and the specific effectiveness of liberal capitalism to recuperate divergence. Each of 
the poets in question demonstrates a deep awareness of the problems of ideological 
reproduction, in poetry, in language, and in resistive action, knowing that most forms of 
representation and action at our disposal will primarily reproduce the conditions of their 
possibility. The answer to the question of poetry in particular requires at least a tentative 
answer to the more general question, to even begin. 
Another foundational point of enquiry is the contention that many predecessors within radical 
poetic traditions have, understandably, faced the all-encompassing problem of ideological 
reproduction, and the structural pre-figuration of linguistic meaning, with a drive towards de-
stabilising, fracturing, defamiliarisation, but have been less able to account for the possibility 
of articulating or driving towards specific change and imaginative alternatives. I have 
tentatively formulated an account of how the poetries I examine attempt to think through and 
enact this more propositional or newly imaginative resistive work. 
Since the preceding chapters are semi-discrete, reading the poetry in question as an encounter 
in its own right, their answers to these questions have not been given in the form of a linear 
argument, but have spun around a variety of related concepts, building cumulatively but 
diffusely on one another. I hope here to delineate some of the lines of connection that are 




The answer to the initial question – if ideology operates as universally as I understand it, how 
can resistance be possible at all? – begins, as the whole enquiry does, with the individual 
subject. A central aspect of ideological reproduction in Althusser’s account is the process of 
subjectification – each person coming into the world as a certain kind of subject, with their 
conceptual framework for understanding the world and themselves, the possibilities of 
thought and action, pre-figured in ways which also reproduce the material relations into and 
through which they emerge. This initially seems totalising, impossible to escape, and indeed, 
it is my contention that it almost is. Yet, as this is the primary site of inscription, it is therefore 
also the primary point of resistance. 
This resistance is possible if ideological construction is recognised not as a predetermination 
as such – an outside force imposed upon some separate and essential subject – but as the 
premise for any action at all. It is the premise for the very existence of each subject, who is 
constructed as always collective-individual – “outside from the start” (Riley, 2000a, p. 44) – 
their solipsistic selves always also figured by their sociality. This process of ideological 
subjectification is unstable too, liable to failure and difference, because the subject is unstable, 
the relationship between the feeling self and the social world more complicated and fractious 
than any pre-figuring framework, and because ideological inscription is not a single act, but 
an ongoing process. In each moment of inscribing repetition there is space for shifts and 
change, for repeating differently. The primary points of instability, the points of fracture 
which open up the possibility of newness and difference, in this account, are those affective 
experiences which are ‘infra-linguistic’ – felt in the body but below the threshold of coherent 
articulation, and therefore in a less stable relationship to the ideologically enforced and 
enforcing bounds of coherence. 
It follows that resistance in poetry begins also from the subject – conceived as both 
individual, solipsistic in their experience, and collective in the formation of the articulable 
horizons of that experience. Any resistance in poetry might operate primarily through its 
interaction with the reading subject; poetry might begin this resistive work through an 
exploration of experiencing subjectivity. 
The poems in this thesis begin their exploration of the problem of resistance accordingly, 
from a highly subjective perspective. They outline the felt necessity of resistance, its 
possibility and its impossibility, from a grounding in particular subjective experience – of the 
pains which cry out against the conditions that cause them, or the desires which call for some 
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alternative. In doing so, rather than reify certain subject-positions or pre-figured experiences, 
these poems treat the subject as precisely that dialectical collective individual, at once 
constructed in oppressive and pre-figuring ways by its ideological conditions, and also 
containing the possibilities of disruption, resistance and newness, in its fractious and unstable 
responses to those same conditions. It is those infra-linguistic responses, moments of 
uncertainty and tentative re-formation in affective extremity, which these poems are most 
interested in. 
The specific capacity of poetry to activate the resistive potential of these infra-linguistic 
experiences begins with the concept of poetic work whose meaning is ‘non-recuperable’. That 
work in poetry which has an uncertain relationship to coherence, whose meaning cannot be 
recuperated on the terms of the already-known world, might have a particular capacity to 
evoke and gesture towards those elements of experience which are not-yet-coherent, and in 
doing so work to alter the bounds of the expressible and push towards alternative ideological 
and material possibility. 
These poems bear out this conception by taking a dialectical position in relation to 
communication which is closely related to the position on the subject. Each of these poetic 
works contains an implicit or explicit critique of ‘realist’ forms of coherence, which suggests 
that the most coherent and intelligible uses of language are most apt to reproduce 
unchallenged the conditions of their intelligibility. Yet their basis in subjective experience 
which both emerges from and wishes to alter its collective conditions necessitates some 
possibility of sharing those experiences, in retaining a commitment to some form of mutual 
understanding in their writing. 
A way through these two related oppositions can be given multiple speculative names: I use 
“non-recuperable affective subjectivity” in chapter 3, “non-reified affective recognition”, 
referring to Bonney’s work, and quote Jordan Savage on “anti-confessional life writing” 
(Savage, 2018, p. 11) in Mendelssohn’s work. These variously get at how these poems do not 
present the subject and their experiences in their pre-coherent form, but instead gesture 
towards that which is least representable, least coherent or intelligible, experiences whose 
meaning is in fluid formation, through poetic strategies that disrupt and re-form coherent 
meaning. The poems militate, in accordance with this, towards a kind of anti-rationalist 
negative thinking – the shadow of Keats’ “negative capability” is present throughout the 
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thesis – which attempts to posit the presence and content of these experiences, as that which is 
experienced but not-yet-understood. 
These poets use a range of different techniques in their work, and provoke a range of different 
experiences of reading, to achieve this effect of positing and gesturing towards those 
experiences which by definition cannot be clearly described. These are highly complex and 
various poems, but I can briefly characterise some of their most relevant distinctive moves. 
Bonney’s work, even at its most directly discursive, involves a high degree of self-doubt, 
contradiction, a shifting of didactic position which is always inflected through the doubting 
subject-perspective, rigorously refusing to ever settle into a definite sense of what is or could 
be done whilst never ceasing to recognise the need to do. Robertson’s work is full of what I 
have referred to as a luxurious indeterminacy – sentence-forms which have a rich and 
expansive register of sensuous thought, alongside dense and beautiful sound patterning, in 
such a way as to give a sense of over-fullness, of sound and of possible meaning. These allow 
for a work which is provisional and exploratory, which reaches after possible senses, new 
sense, without quite settling on the known. Kapil’s Ban en Banlieue mixes a thematics of 
failure and incompleteness with a highly de-centred and digressive structure to create a sense 
of the text as its own paratext, to continually posit the presence of an unreachable content, and 
to create a text that reaches always beyond and through the insufficiency of textual 
communication. In Mendelssohn’s work the extreme fracture and disorienting nature of the 
poems is used not just to disrupt and refuse meaning, but also, within a highly subjective 
poetry, to create a sense of identification through shared feelings of disorientation and 
distress, where mere expression of these affects in their coherent form is insufficient. 
Robertson, Kapil and Mendelssohn’s work also de-centre linguistic coherence by their 
inclusion of non-linguistic forms of content, such as design choices, photographs, and 
drawings. 
These are some of the key ways these works critique and undermine the stability of the 
coherent expressions of the world as it is already known, whilst still reaching towards a de-
centred, uncertain, unstable possibility. They strive to communicate infra-linguistic, negative 
content through the experience of working through and alongside their difficulties. These 
works uncertainly feel out the edges of their own subjective formation, in each moment newly 
formed, with an urgent eye on the attempt at transformation. 
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A final key element to this thesis’s thinking on how poetry might contribute towards 
ideological resistance is ‘musical thinking’. This becomes a re-thinking of the relationship 
between infra-linguistic affective experience and non-recuperable poetic work, between 
thinking-feeling and aesthetic perception, which dissolves the distinctions implicit even in 
articulating these terms. Through a variety of vocabularies – harmony in Bonney, hormones in 
Robertson, colour in Kapil, or more implicitly in Mendelssohn’s trees decorated with 
diamonds – these poets find ways to figure the relationship, and commonality, between 
aesthetic and affective perceptions and contents. 
In Bonney’s work, music is treated as what I have called a “non-recuperable system of 
thought”, which can act as a “sonic receptacle” (Bonney, 2015, p. 35) of the revolutionary 
potential in actual moments of social dis-harmony. Pre-linguistic affective responses to music 
– itself expressive in an aesthetic manner, without verbal meaning – are seen as sharing 
something with the inarticulate cry which registers feelings of dissonance with our ideological 
limits. These responses contain an aesthetic mark of the potentiality for change and re-
inscription which exists in the shared affect of a resistively activated collective at key 
historical moments. 
I develop this line further in my reading of Robertson’s work, where the aesthetic and 
affective are treated as the same kind of content, and united through ideas of embodiment, in 
the perceiving and feeling body, in the necessity for all thinking-feeling to emerge with and 
through its particular forms, and in the interface between different kinds of surfaces. The 
embodied “resistance-sensation” (Robertson, 2016, p. 14) of affective thinking-feeling, the 
felt experience of rupture and recombination, is connected to the embodiment of poetic 
thinking in aesthetics. The body is the subjective threshold between these different kinds of 
thinking-feeling activities, in casting its eyes or fingers across the surface of the page, in its 
own capacity for feelings described or evoked, in the perception of its own surface, or the 
perception of other surfaces with and through the surface of the body. The potential for a 
resistive thinking in poetry can then be figured as a kind of decoration. 
The figuration of colour in Kapil’s work further substantiates this unifying of the aesthetic 
and affective, through the sensational and perceiving body. Colour is an aesthetic-affective 
content which we see transmitted and shared between bodies as a signal much like Bonney’s 
harmony. Further, in specific acts of identification and infra-linguistic recognition – “below 
thought” (Kapil, 2015, p. 40) – between people for whom colour is also a signal of the 
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racialised body, and a marker for potential violence and discrimination, that aesthetic-
affective signal becomes materialised as touch. 
Mendelssohn doesn’t thematise this meeting of the aesthetic and the affective in such explicit 
terms, but it has a strong implicit presence, in her lauding of an “unplaced” art (Mendelssohn, 
2000, p. 43) and poetry against intellectual mastery, in favour of a negativity which pushes 
towards the as-yet-unknown in aesthetic and affective register, “a different world | where trees 
are decorated with diamonds (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 34). It is present too in the integration of 
drawings and handwriting into her collections, and the experiential intertwining of formal 
fracture with the intensity of the emotional register and traumatic experiences present 
throughout her poems. 
These poems are committed to the importance of affective responses to beauty, to decoration, 
to those formal sensations that simply cannot be explicated. They all attempt not just to 
thematise the possibilities of affective-aesthetic transmission – the communication of the 
infra-linguistic content of experience in poetry, in ways which might activate, bring into 
expressibility, or create, fractures within the process of ideological reproduction. They also 
use their own forms in such a way that these poems constitute those acts of unstable and non-
recuperable communication. Bringing together the aesthetic and the affective as the basis for 
thinking-feeling which might reproduce differently, the poem is a kind of embodied political 
decoration, a sensational object which might hold and create affects at the edge of our current 
conditions. 
* 
This outlines the primary ways that this thesis has addressed its initial points of inquiry. There 
are, additionally, a number of important insights and lines of argument which have emerged 
in the process of answering these questions, but which are not direct responses to them and go 
beyond the parameters those questions set out. These initial questions are primarily to do with 
the possibility of resistance in general, at least nominally somewhat independent of the 
particular political or social horizon one’s resistance wishes to agitate towards. However, in 
the process of answering this question, this poetics of resistance comes also to contain what I 
would tentatively call a subjective ethics – a set of implicit claims about the kind of world that 
they strive for, which emerges directly from the subjective basis of this poetics to focus on the 
conditions and relations which might allow for collective subjective flourishing. 
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These claims are not merely reflective of the specific poets’ political inclinations and 
incidental to the poetics itself, but emerge as necessarily concomitant with the ways in which 
their poetics opens up possibilities of resistance in the more general sense. A poetics built 
around ideas of positive incoherence or illegibility – those areas of experience which are felt 
but can’t be contained within the pre-given language of their ideological situation – also 
proposes the possibilities of bonds of recognition, solidarity and care not based on categorical 
identity and explicable sameness or difference, but reaching between widely varying and 
amorphous subjects across the bounds of that which we cannot naturalise or recuperate. 
This is a more or less latent or implicit element which runs throughout the argument for the 
possibility of resistance, and the re-production of difference, in the face of a universally 
subjectifying process of ideology. When Judith Butler describes the “necessary failures” and 
“incoherent configurations” of gender (Butler, 1999, p. 185), or when Denise Riley describes 
the possible refusal of interpellation’s announcement “you are this category” (Riley, 2000, p. 
85), they open up the possibility that the reproductive force of ideology can be disrupted and 
resisted precisely by appeal to an acknowledgement that categorical understandings of 
identity are painfully reductive of the actual vast range of subjective experience. This is what 
allows the enquiry to begin at all.  
The much earlier, but still foundational, Riley work, Am I That Name? opens: “A new 
Sojourner Truth might well […] issue another plea: ‘Ain’t I a fluctuating Identity?’” (Riley, 
1988, p. 1), and relatedly, “the history of feminism has also been a struggle against over-
zealous identifications” (1988, p. 5).  The claim of this work – that the struggle for liberation, 
in this case feminist struggle, involves resisting the very terms on which solidarity and 
struggle are founded – makes possible the analogous claim of The Words of Selves which has 
been instrumental to my own account, that interpellation produces precisely the unease and 
failure by which it might be resisted. By a similar token, the claim that this affectively felt 
unease – the pain experienced as a result of the impositional force of the identities we are each 
interpellated into – is a source of poetic resistance, leads to another claim, that this poetics 
might work towards less painful and categorical ways of thinking about shared identities and 
experiences. Through this set of close conceptual relations, the spirit of Riley’s early appeal to 
“a fluctuating identity” is formative at the heart of this poetics from the start. 
This is a direct consequence of the position and nature of subjectivity in these poems. Each of 
the poetic works encountered here builds its case for resistive poetic writing not just from the 
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subject-positions of their writers, but from the specific pains experienced through the 
marginalisation of those subject positions within oppressive material relations. Bonney’s 
work – least obviously invested in this kind of thinking – is focussed on a class analysis 
which explicitly marks the opposition in perspective, understanding and knowledge of the 
world between the bourgeoisie and those who have some direct experience of hunger, 
unemployment, and other damages of capital. All three of the subsequent chapters think about 
the intersection of these damages with those of patriarchy, through the poets’ experience of 
being interpellated into womanhood, and in Kapil and Mendelssohn’s work this also 
intersects with experiences of racist discrimination and violence. The other side of this is the 
possibility that precisely because of their marginality, these experiences and subject positions 
contain a resistive potential which challenges the conditions that produce them in the first 
place; they challenge their own reproduction, demanding at the level of felt need a set of 
conditions where these identities and positions no longer exist in their painfully categorical 
form. 
I trace the push towards a resistance and a solidarity which is based on fluctuating, incoherent 
and amorphous identity in its more explicit form firstly from Bonney’s work, where his 
argument for the possibility of disrupting bourgeois reproduction and breaking out of the 
inevitable web of “the law” (Bonney, 2015, p. 16) depends partly on his re-configuration of 
communication and understanding, where understanding is a kind of solidarity. If, under the 
conditions of capitalism and class society, a resistive form of communication must depend not 
on any sense of objectivity or clarity, but on solidarity across those experiences created at the 
edges of capital, then this is specifically a commitment to unstable, uncertain and highly 
subjective shared recognition, of experiences which are painful & challenging to the dominant 
social relations – divergent, incoherent or not-yet-coherent affective experiences which are 
marginalised within hegemonic discourse. The idea of ‘non-reified recognition’ here is a key 
contribution to this thread of the thesis as a whole; it attempts to recognise the simultaneous 
need for recognition of a common set of experiences and for a refusal of the categorical ways 
that commonality can be named and reproduced, which Riley identifies as a common feature 
of liberation struggles. The commitment to marginalised experience, and to a kind of 
recognition which is not quite or not yet coherent, carries through all the following chapters. 
In Robertson’s work, these arguments are more specifically based in a gender politics. This 
operates as a way to think through the direct experience of how certain identities are created 
and interpellated differently under current conditions, and as such open up different 
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possibilities, in their specificity, for resistance and newly configured subjectivity. Firstly, the 
analysis in Robertson’s work of the dialectical relationship between ideological construction 
and divergent possibility – much like that which appears in Riley – is impossible without the 
specific experiential understanding of gendered socialisation, as a woman under patriarchy – 
“impairment’s ability” (Robertson, 2016, p. 11). Similarly, the argument for the resistive 
possibilities of affective-aesthetic content – transmitting, evoking, or itself being infra-
linguistic experience – is underpinned by the fact that women have historically been figured 
as closer to their body, to its physical and emotional drives, and further from the abstract and 
rational. 
The intersections between embodiment, form, aesthetics and affect in the thesis thus begin by 
de-centring the forms of thinking reproduced by and for the primacy of the white and male 
subject. A critique of reproductive modes of knowledge – of the function of coherence, 
rationalism, ‘realism’ etc, to maintain the ideological conditions of the already-known world – 
is necessarily also a critique of the relationship between this rationalism and the specific 
reproduction of the violences of patriarchy and capital. The resistive capacity of that which is 
coded feminine within these structures is not essentialising then, but stems precisely from 
their marginality, their inversion of patriarchy’s dominant modes; Robertson relies on the 
feminine precisely in order to undo that which creates it in this form, as subjugated. Modes of 
feminine-coded aesthetic-affective language use which begin as answers to the need for 
survival, flourishing, or ‘health’ for women under capitalist patriarchy can become a gift, a 
resource for a thinking which might more generally build towards flourishing, solidarity and 
disruption, since we are all more or less painfully rationalised by these structures. 
In Kapil’s work, the configuration of the resistive capacities of infra-linguistic affective 
experience comes to more clearly intersect with more conventional arguments about identity-
based liberation politics. The concept of infra-linguistic experience is brought to bear on the 
notion that the experience of those in positions of material and ideological dominance is more 
visible, more intelligible, more able to be heard in the social sphere they construct, than the 
experience of those who are marginalised and abjected. Those experiences below the level of 
coherent recognition and analysis, in Kapil’s work, include the pernicious and non-verbal 
harms of racism, as well as positive possibilities of recognition and connection. The figuration 
of colour as an interface between aesthetic content and infra-linguistic affective experience 
here includes also the very explicit function of colour as a race marker. The work of resistance 
in this poetry, the work of altering the ideological landscape and bringing new experiences 
208 
 
and possibilities into articulation in order to militate towards new material relations, comes to 
also involve working to make the experiences of marginalised people more visible, opening 
up the possibilities of recognisable expression for those whose experiences are erased or 
silenced. 
Yet Kapil’s work absolutely doesn’t wish to only make those experiences more visible in a 
way that renders them readily up to the structures of comprehension which marginalise and 
oppress them. The idea of monstrosity emerges as a synthesis of these developing ideas, in a 
relationship between the posited resistive modes of communication, and a purposively 
amorphous idea of subjective relations. The attempt to communicate that which is least 
comprehensible to racist and patriarchal capital becomes the also defiant attempt to render 
oneself unknowable. The modes of communication initially figured in Bonney become in my 
account of Kapil’s work the notions of touch and identification, as thinking about 
transmissions of energy, solidarity, or infra-linguistic content between bodies who don’t wish 
to render themselves recuperable, who wish to be monstrous, or “indeterminate” (Moten & 
Harney, 2013, p. 20). Kapil’s thinking about resistance in the context of racial and gendered 
violence leans into the fact of incomprehensibility to dominant conceptual frameworks as part 
of the experience of being marginalised. The mechanisms by which this poetry wishes to 
disrupt current conditions to re-produce them differently posit a mode of connecting, 
communicating and interrelating which includes the possibility of mutual illegibility, now as a 
positive value, as a willing acceptance of all that cannot be reductively and categorically 
understood about one another. 
Mendelssohn’s work makes the argument for amorphousness and mutual illegibility most 
strongly, in a way that is most directly related to her poetics. Her initial rejection of reading 
practices which are most recuperable, re-productive, susceptible to bad naturalisation 
develops through a series of related critiques of police, the repressive state and the academy, 
into a thinking whereby the modes of representation and thought which are most reproductive 
are directly linked to the domination of the patriarchal and racist capitalist state. What links 
‘reading for answers’ with these structures of domination is a rationalism which wishes, 
through a drive that objectifies, criminalises, and pathologises, to look on a person as it might 
look on a poem, and know what that thing is. Mendelssohn’s poems push the resistive poetics 
of infralinguistic affect and non-recuperable poetry furthest towards the subjective 
understanding of negativity, of a refusal to be known or understood. This is nevertheless still 
committed to an idea of communication, with being believed even where we cannot or will 
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not be known, with finding recognition of one another’s shared and difficult experiences 
across this accepted unknowing. 
Mendelssohn’s work brings out an element – a kind of ethical imperative – which underpins 
the resistive poetics of the whole thesis. A critique of intelligibility in writing, and a strong 
value placed on subjective experience, directly leads to a position which values the possibility 
for subjective relations that themselves have unintelligibility, amorphousness and variability 
at their centre. The figuration of cries of pain, of the inarticulate or not-yet-coherent cries of 
those painful experiences of capital, patriarchy, racism, are cries for a world that is not painful 
in these ways, for the possibility of collective conditions of flourishing for all subjects. 
This recalls Keston Sutherland’s claim that “Capital itself is the fundamental ‘antisubjective’ 
force in the world” (Sutherland, 2013, para. 10). As this poetics is opposed to the structures of 
bourgeois thinking which are embedded in rationalist, reductionist and reproductive forms of 
‘understanding’, it is also opposed to everything that is concomitant to that thinking – the 
individualist, hierarchical and essentialising structures that create and centre the bourgeois 
subject, which is to say, capital, racism, patriarchy, and all relative structures of regulation 
and oppression. 
This ethical imperative is then towards a politics of solidarity, equity, compassion and mutual 
recognition which doesn’t require subjects – us all – to violently wrench our material and 
emotional lives into categorical and essentialising structures of thinking and being, and to 
build our commonality on exclusionary and delimiting categories. Instead we might hope to 
build bonds of collectivity and community, to relate to one another, share and build 
commonality, to be with one another in common, whilst still being able to flourish in all our 
huge and uncategorizable variance, to see one another within a sociality that can revel in the 
beauty of that which isn’t known. This might be figured as a meeting point between 
Mendelssohn’s “subject potential” (Mendelssohn, 2000, p. 37) and Bonney’s “insurrectionism 
and illegalism” (Bonney, 2015, p. 142) – not just a revolt against the laws as they currently 
are, but a rejection of any structures that would limit our potential through an attempt to 
codify the bounds of possible being. 
* 
The above characterises what I think of as the key contributions of the thesis. Through new 
detailed readings of works by four relatively contemporary poets, still deserving of much 
more critical attention than they have yet received, it builds an account of some of what I see 
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as vital resistive work being done in contemporary experimental poetry. In doing so the thesis 
is itself a theoretical and speculative poetics, of possible future work to be done in radical 
poetic writing, looking to find ways to move towards new imaginative possibility. 
I have framed this account as deliberately tentative, provisional, aware of its own tendency 
towards insufficiency and failure. In acknowledging the partiality of my own position, and the 
on-going and collaborative nature of the necessary resistance and resistive thinking, I hope to 
leave this work open to be critiqued, worked through and built upon by other poet-thinkers 
who might engage with it. Yet I can also myself identify a few key points where this 
speculative attempt has come up against its own limits. 
One fairly constitutional limit to the thesis is in a tendency to posit – in a variety of different 
but closely related areas – the presence and importance of content which it by definition 
cannot fully describe or substantiate. This is most evident in the positing of non-recuperable 
aesthetic content of a different kind to that which can be explicated through coherent semantic 
means, and of related elements of experience which are infra-linguistic. I can explain these in 
abstract conceptual terms – and I have – but by definition I cannot describe them with a large 
degree of explicit detail, since it is a central feature of these concepts that they are that which 
is not explicable within clear and coherent language. Any version of these contents or 
experiences – the aesthetic-affective thinking-feeling content which is not contained by 
language – which does appear in the thesis is, necessarily, only a distant cousin of the thing in 
itself. In a sense, this is a problem with negativity itself, and the same problem that begins the 
thesis, of how to posit, move towards, describe, or even think, something which is outside of 
the conditions of possibility of our knowledge. I can claim that the poems I examine wish to 
reach outside of knowledge, as they repeatedly say themselves; I can say that they long, with 
a kind of negative capability, for conditions of living which are radically different than that 
which we can imagine from within our current conditions. But it is extremely difficult, or 
rather, a conceptual inconsistency, to actually describe what those are. 
The problem of describing that which is indescribable (even if only contingently, because 
outside the current conditions of intelligibility) shades over into my encounters with the 
poetry. I have attempted to describe the particular artifices of the works in question, and the 
effects which their workings have upon me, in detail and by reference to specific and 
observable examples in the text. Yet I have often claimed only that these works “gesture 
towards” infra-linguistic experience, or claimed that they hope to exploit, evoke, or activate 
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the fractious areas of experience which cannot quite be articulated, without ever being able to 
substantiate or concretely demonstrate that they do indeed have these effects. I have in places 
moved from positing the theoretical possibility of negative or non-recuperable kinds of 
content in experience and in poetry, to pointing out the ways in which the poems under 
examination also posit this same possibility in their own fairly conventionally recuperable 
semantic content, in an ever receding claim to that which I cannot directly show. This in turn 
suggests that the works themselves might gesture towards these possibilities on a conceptual 
level more than they can actually enact them. 
Again, though, these are claims which fundamentally cannot be substantiated through the 
kinds of forensic production and interpretation of textual evidence that commonly form 
practices of close reading. There is no way to objectively demonstrate that these or any poems 
create an unknowable affective experience, below the threshold of linguistic articulation, and 
nor ought there be. In one way this is a convenient but problematic limitation – that some of 
the central assertions of the thesis are unverifiable. I can only appeal to the theoretical account 
of its possibility, and make the further assertion that, in the experience of reading these 
poems, I believe that something important, but not quite definable, has happened to me – and 
this is an assertion I now emphatically make, that this sense underlies all that has gone before. 
My reader might share my feeling, believe me, or remain sceptical. Either way, the degree to 
which my assertion of feeling is convincing may not seem like a solid basis for rigorous 
academic enquiry. 
However, I might anticipate my own worry about this as a limitation by pointing out that, as I 
have discussed earlier, this is arguably true of all literary or artistic criticism. Any appeals to 
critical dispassion, and to the agreeableness of the critic’s account of an artwork’s effects on a 
generally competent observer, mask the basis of that criticism in the ultimately unverifiable 
responses of the critic and their readership. This has ideological consequences, and privileges 
certain perspectives and experiences over others. I therefore plead that the limitations of this 
thesis are partly the limitations of any account of poetic works, made more explicit and 
brought to the point where usually hidden workings become points of provocation. 
This brings me to a further point of difficulty in the thesis: that of undertaking this sort of 
enquiry – one that is wilfully subjective, dealing in unverifiable imaginative possibility, and 
openly highly critical of the university, of rationalist thinking, and of forms of writing which 
aim towards rigour, clarity or objectivity – within the framework of a doctoral thesis. 
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I have attempted throughout to find ways of shaping my enquiry which disrupt the demands 
of its own form, which insert myself as an uncertain subject, which open it up to instability 
and tentativity, but ultimately it isn’t and hasn’t been possible to bring the work I’m doing 
here into truly close accordance with its own premises, or with the highly critical stance of the 
poets towards the forms of knowledge privileged within the academic establishment. This is 
perhaps a failing of mine, and of this project as I have enacted it, but even more so, it is an 
internal inconsistency of the task which I have attempted. To enact a written enquiry which 
takes as seriously as possible the challenges this thesis makes to notions of comprehensibility, 
conceptual understanding, rationalism, and academic knowledge, would be to abandon the 
attempt to write a doctoral thesis at all. Instead, I would perhaps have simply written more 
poems; or else, engaged in some kind of more concrete action in the world, to agitate towards 
the conditions which I and these poems long for, or to more directly spread the visionary and 
transformative work which I believe these poems are capable of initiating to a wider array of 
readers. 
Another limitation of this enquiry, as of almost any attempt at a resistive poetics, is its 
abstraction from action in the world. Whilst it suggests in relatively esoteric theoretical terms 
the possibilities of resistance and change through poetry, or the possibility through which 
poetry contributes to resistance and change at least, the relationship to actual political action is 
always oblique. Again, I might turn to my claim in Chapter 3, that the work of resistance must 
reciprocally involve ideological and material change, partly because the action necessary to 
break out of our current conditions is that action which isn’t yet clearly definable, which we 
cannot quite imagine. This thesis deals with the ways poetry can contribute precisely to that 
reimagining. If my reader is justly tired of hearing that, in the face of such urgent need for 
radical action and change, I only plead that this work is absolutely not seen as a replacement 
for any other forms of resistive political action, which happen outside of the scope of the 
writing of poetics, but as complementary to them. 
This brings me to the areas where I believe this enquiry could be extended through further 
work. In terms of academic study, I would firstly hope that this work could be received and 
engaged with by other poets and academics working in the field of radical contemporary 
poetry, to be taken up, argued with and modified by a confrontation with the thinking and 
practice of others. Further work could also include thinking about how the framework and 
speculative possibilities laid out in this thesis could be applied to the work of other poets – 
specifically, to investigate how they map on to a variety of work which has been written and 
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published in the four years since I began this enquiry. This might also include looking to 
poets who are undertaking a variety of other resistive activities in the communities in which 
they live and thinking about the relationship between this and their writing work. This is a 
somewhat different kind of enquiry to the work that I have undertaken here. 
There is, however, another equally urgent implicit point of continuation which this thesis 
suggests, as a work of poetics: to write, and to practice. I have, from the start, undertaken this 
enquiry as a poet, speculatively investigating the possibilities of poetic practice, both that of 
myself and of others. My own poetic writing is not included within the scope of this thesis – 
there was a brief moment in its planning when it might have been, but that notion was 
abandoned – but it has been happening alongside.53 I would hope that this poetics is of some 
use to my contemporaries and comrades – I might plead with you, my reader, to go forth and 
write! – and I can say also that a continuation of this thinking is happening and will happen in 
the ongoing project of my own poetic writing. This work involves thinking – in the diffuse 
and oblique modes of creative endeavour – about how I can incorporate the insights and 
commitments of these poetics into my own writing, how I can invoke my own exploratory 
and fractured affective experience, how I can mine the pains and longings which I feel as a 
person living under the often alienating and impoverishing conditions of contemporary 
capitalism, and invoke them in a spirit of generous collectivity, open to those who experience 
these pains more sharply than I do, to conjure the possibility of something better. 
As this poetics also has its own ethical elements, the practice which might continue this 
project is also practice outside of the bounds of either academic study or writing per se. This 
could include any number of political agitations, whose relation would be indirect to the work 
contained here, but it might more directly shade into various kinds of poetic organising and 
pedagogy. To take seriously the belief that poetry might do resistive work on the level of the 
reading subject, and that that subject is collectively figured, one might naturally wish to find 
ways to engage collectively in the kind of reading and thinking-feeling activity of these 
poems. I myself have been doing this in a number of ways which exist outside of the explicit 
scope of this thesis, but which are absolutely interconnected with the work that I hope it does. 
These include: teaching undergraduate creative writing classes; running workshops on 
 
53 My own works include: a full collection, a l’instar de (Knives Forks and Spoons, 2016); a brace as of 
pheasants hung (Generic Greeting, 2017), a small pamphlet put together with illustrator and graphic designer 
Grant Peacock; Cash/sex: A verse essay for voices, alto, contralto (Generic Greeting, 2019), written in 




experimental poetry with primary school children; co-organising Poetry Emergency, a festival 
of radical poetry that operates on the fringes of the academy, which has hosted a range of 
readings, performances and discussions exploring the intersections between radical work in 
poetic and related forms with radical political work, whilst in its small way funnelling some 
institutional funding to poets whose relationship to the academy, if they have one, is mostly 
precarious and underpaid; co-organising a series of readings, Peter Barlow’s Cigarette, which 
is free to enter and aims to host experimental work in a way which is casual and accessible; 
co-running a poetry reading group which meets every two weeks in the back room of pubs 
and cafes to discuss the poetic work that most excites its attendees.54 
I don’t report these activities with self-satisfaction – I would by no means claim that they are 
a sufficient response to the conditions in which we live. They are merely the things I am 
doing that are also most directly a continuation of the present study, in the sense that each of 
them is motivated by the same drive: for the world to be transformed for the better, and to 
enable thinking about the ways – at the grassroots level of subjects relating to one another in 
collectivity and community – that the work we do and the pleasure we take in poetry might 
contribute to that making better, by activating us all in transformative thinking-feeling, and 
opening up new imaginative possibilities. They are here illustrations of the hopeful, tentative 
and ever-failing attempt to engage in activities which extend the work of this study into the 
world. I would hope that this study also helps others, in some small way, to think about how 
they might do that and to extend the work that they are already doing, as it has been of great 




54 Poetry Emergency took place in Manchester and Salford in November 2018 and again in November 2019. It 
was co-organised by myself, Nia Davies, Imogen Durant, Tessa Harris and Lucy Burns. The 2018 programme 
included work by Bhanu Kapil, and a keynote performance from Sean Bonney; the 2019 festival was dedicated 
to Bonney’s memory and work. Information and documents from both festivals can be found at 
https://poetryemergency.wordpress.com/. We hope it will occur again. 
 Peter Barlow’s Cigarette has been running semi-regular poetry readings in Manchester since 2014. It is, 
at the time of writing, organised by myself, Tim Allen and Rachel Sills. Some traces and information on those 
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